Russia’s 2015 intervention to prop up Syria’s autocrat briefly restored some of its big-power luster, but the Kremlin’s quest is collapsing.
Aleppo international airport, Dec. 2, 2024: Armed groups opposing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime after taking control of Syria’s second-most populous city after Damascus. Aside from some bombing raids, the Russian forces in the country were incapable of helping the regime. © Getty Images
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In a nutshell
Moscow’s transactional policy in the region seemed to work
Now overstretched, it cannot help its client states
The U.S.’s tight alliance with Israel proves a better bet
Until its disastrous full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia viewed its relations with the Middle East as an undeniable diplomatic success. In stark contrast to the United States, whose diplomacy is often shaped by its alliances, Russia maintained a policy of equidistance. This approach allowed Moscow to present itself as an honest broker, fostering constructive relations with all parties involved. In a region that has long appeared on the brink of a Hobbesian war of all against all, this was no small achievement.
Russian diplomats engaged with both Israelis and Palestinians, mediated between Turks and Kurds and established ties with both Shia and Sunni Muslims, while also communicating with Iran and Saudi Arabia. This does not imply that Russian diplomacy was more effective than that of the U.S. in addressing seemingly intractable problems. However, this phase of intense Russian diplomatic efforts is now undergoing fundamental transformation.
Military intervention and deft diplomacy
Russian influence in the Middle East peaked in 2015 when its armed forces were deployed to support the besieged regime of Syrian strongman Bashar al-Assad, now deposed. While Turkey sought to prevent Kurdish forces from gaining ground in Syria to the south of its border, the U.S. controlled areas bordering Iraq in the east, getting itself into a real hornet’s nest of rival militias vying for American weapons.
The Russian intervention allowed Moscow to take control of northwestern Syria, where the opposition had established its main strongholds. By significantly expanding its naval base at Tartus and securing permission for an air base at Khmeimim near the coastal city of Latakia, Russia positioned itself to project substantial military power.
Utilizing tactics of mass destruction and indiscriminate terror against civilians – similar to those employed in its previous conflict in Chechnya – Russia effectively crushed the Syrian opposition in the Idlib province. The devastation wrought upon Syrian cities like Aleppo and Idlib mirrored the destruction seen in Grozny during the Chechen War and in Mariupol during the conflict in Ukraine.
Despite its unconditional support for the Assad regime and the resulting human suffering, Russia managed to maintain working relations with all major parties involved in the Syrian conflict. A crucial aspect of the Syrian war was the agreement between Russia and the U.S. on a policy of deconfliction. With numerous American and Russian military assets operating in close proximity, the risk of dangerous encounters that could escalate into broader conflict was significant.
Fallback from the blunder in Ukraine
Until the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Moscow appeared to be in a favorable position. However, as the planned blitz transformed into a protracted war of attrition with severe casualty rates and no clear resolution, three key developments began to reshape the dynamics in the Middle East.
Three years into the war, Russia is no longer able to project significant military force beyond Ukraine.
One was the collapse of Russia’s standing as a leading military power. Another was the formation of strong ties with Iran. The third involved a crisis in relations with Israel.
The first of these developments has proven to be the most consequential. Once feared and respected as the second-most powerful army in the world, Russia quickly became the subject of ridicule. Within months of combat, the Kremlin’s propaganda claims regarding the invincibility of various advanced weapon systems were exposed as lacking, leading to a profound sense of humiliation.
Three years into the war, Russia is no longer able to project significant military force beyond Ukraine. The arrival of troops from North Korea signals increasing desperation regarding manpower. Additionally, the chief executive officer of Rostec, Russia’s leading arms manufacturer, has warned that rising borrowing costs could lead to widespread bankruptcies that would devastate the country’s military-industrial base.
The Black Sea calamity
The primary damage to Russia’s standing in the Middle East stems from Ukrainian missile and sea drone attacks, which forced Russia out of the Black Sea. Reports indicate that Russia has lost approximately one-third of its Black Sea Fleet, equating to over 20 vessels sunk or disabled since the invasion began in February 2022. Consequently, the Black Sea Fleet was compelled to abandon its main base at Sevastopol in Crimea and relocate to Sochi in the northeastern corner of the Sea of Azov.
With the Black Sea Fleet so diminished, the Russian naval base in Syria can no longer serve as a hub for projecting force into the Middle East.
The initial geopolitical consequence of the war in Ukraine has been the development of a mutually supportive military relationship between Russia and Iran. This collaboration began with Iranian deliveries of Shaheed drones and has recently expanded to include ballistic missiles, specifically short-range Fath-360 missiles, transported via the Caspian Sea. Following a shooting war between Israel and Iran, triggered by the July 2024 assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, Russia further responded by supplying Iran with both missiles and advanced air defense systems.
Khmeimim air base in Latakia, Dec. 11, 2017: Russian President Vladimir Putin poses for a photo with Russian pilots serving in Syria during the civil war. © Getty Images
From security supplier to supplicant
No longer able to project military force, Russia has been reduced to the role of a supplicant, willing to share advanced military technology with other countries in ways that would have been unthinkable just a few years ago. The full extent of what it has provided to its new allies remains unclear. There are allegations that Moscow has shared targeting intelligence with Houthi rebels, enabling them to strike Western ships in the Red Sea more accurately, and concerns have emerged regarding the potential sharing of nuclear weapons technology with Iran.
The third significant consequence of Russia’s war on Ukraine for its standing in the Middle East has been the spotlight on relations between Russia and Israel.
As of early 2024, North Korea is believed to possess approximately 50 nuclear warheads, with estimates suggesting it could produce enough fissile material for 70 to 90 warheads in total. Russian support is likely to focus on enhancing delivery vehicles that improve the range and accuracy of North Korean missiles, as well as potentially providing submarine technology. This situation casts dark shadows over regional security. In the case of Iran, which has long been viewed as nearing nuclear capability, Russian assistance could push it over the threshold. Should this occur, Moscow’s relations with both Israel and Saudi Arabia could be severely affected.
Ruined relationship with Israel
Historically, the two countries enjoyed a strong relationship characterized by frequent visits from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Moscow, where he reportedly developed a personal friendship with Russian President Vladimir Putin. This bond was likely bolstered by the large number of Russian Jews who emigrated to Israel, leading to Russian purchases of drones and other advanced Israeli technologies. Notably, Israel abstained from providing military support to Ukraine, despite Kyiv’s desperate pleas for access to its highly regarded Iron Dome air defense system.
Following the horrors of the Hamas attack on October 7, matters have changed. As Israel launched its attack to crush Hamas, Moscow felt compelled to assume a strong pro-Palestinian stance. Beyond the apparent desire to curry favor with Islamic countries, the Kremlin feared that a Muslim backlash might ignite an already tense situation in places like Chechnya and Dagestan, where its security forces would find it difficult to cope.
Read Amatzia Baram’s reports on Iran
While the initial Israeli reaction was forgiving, expecting that the Russian stance would be limited to rhetoric, over time, several leading members of Israel’s ruling coalition began to vent their anger. Israel’s ambassador to the UN excoriated Russia for using the Hamas attack “to distract the world’s attention from the invasion of Ukraine” and called Russia “the last country” that could lecture Israel about morality.
When Israel began making limited incursions into Lebanon to suppress Hezbollah, it uncovered large caches of Russian weapons, which the Israeli Defense Forces publicly exposed. Although these revelations did not prompt Israel to support Ukraine, its willingness to engage targets in Russian military bases and its actions against Hezbollah and Iran is also bad news for Moscow.
A new equilibrium emerges in the Middle East
On October 17, 2024, Israeli warships launched a powerful strike against the Russian air base in Khmeimim, targeting an Iranian 747 cargo aircraft believed to be delivering arms to Hezbollah. While Russian pilots managed to scramble their aircraft shortly before impact, the strike resulted in massive explosions in the cargo storage area.
When Israel responded to Iran’s earlier missile barrage, its U.S.-made stealth fighters targeted Iranian air defense and missile production capabilities, inflicting severe damage on long-range detection radars and surface-to-air missile batteries. This attack not only highlighted the effectiveness of Israeli military technology but also implied a significant humiliation for Russia, which had supplied these systems. The failure of Russia’s advanced S-400 air defense battery to protect its own air base in Syria compounded this embarrassment.
The final blow came in December, when the Syrian opposition’s quick offensive toppled the regime. Although Russia intervened with air strikes, its ground forces retreated, leaving behind substantial caches of military equipment.
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Scenarios
Onward developments in the Middle East will largely depend on the evolution of the situation in Syria. Given suspicions that Turkey may have played a role in planning the opposition’s military action and considering that Iran’s ability to intervene has been significantly weakened, Russia’s position appears increasingly precarious.
Likely: U.S. attempts to manage escalation in the short term
In this near-term scenario, Washington continues to try to manage the conflict’s escalation rather than pursuing its resolution. In Eastern Europe, this approach has arguably led to throwing Ukraine under the proverbial bus and created room for various rogue states to advance their agendas.
In the Middle East, escalation management has primarily involved preventing Israel from delivering crippling blows to Iran while simultaneously seeking a truce between Israel and Hezbollah to enable Lebanon to regain control over its territory.
If this policy is continued, which is likely until the upcoming transition of power in Washington, it could offer Russia at least a modicum of agency. Although Moscow has lost its ability to act on its own, it can still enable others. And by increasing its provision of advanced rocketry and air defense assets to Iran, it can help Tehran prepare for a coming showdown with Israel.
What makes this scenario short-lived is that the standing of both America and Russia in the region has been seriously degraded. While the value of Russian military support has been eroded by its debacle in Ukraine, perceived American appeasement of Iran has caused its previously strong regional alliances to erode. It was symptomatic that when the China-led BRICS met for a summit in Johannesburg in August 2023, both arch-enemies Iran and Saudi Arabia were invited to join.
Likely: Russia backs off from Syria
Russia realizes that being involved in Ukraine, Georgia and Syria at the same time is no longer sustainable and that the least painful solution will be to abandon Syria. Early indications suggest that while Russian diplomats and military personnel were evacuated from Damascus, Russian naval assets were being withdrawn from the naval base at Tartus. Moscow could also be forced to abandon its air base at Khmeimim.
The longer-term implications of Russia losing its foothold in Syria extend beyond the Middle East. With the loss of its Mediterranean hub, Russia will struggle to maintain support for its private security units and proxy forces operating in Africa. This situation is exacerbated by the increasing likelihood that Israel is poised to act decisively once President-elect Donald Trump assumes office in January 2025, which implies that all gloves will come off.
In this context, Israel may continue its military campaign against Hamas in Gaza while maintaining a low-level operation against Hezbollah in Lebanon. As it prepares for a potential collapse of any American-brokered truce, Israel is likely gearing up for a final confrontation with Iran. Such an escalation could significantly diminish Russia’s influence and power in the region, marking a definitive end to its role as a power to be reckoned with in the Middle East.
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