The problems which German industry has faced due to the closure of production facilities and mass layoffs are a direct result of the rise in energy prices after the cessation of Russian gas supplies. The migration crisis has been aggravated by a million Ukrainian refugees, who have not solved the problems of the German labour market, but have taken their toll on the expenditure side of the state budget's social programme. Sanction restrictions have disrupted production chains that are sensitive for Germany. In short, even in the soaring price of doner kebabs, one can easily find a “Ukrainian trace”.
As the elections to the European Parliament and three eastern federal states in 2024 showed, the German voter understands and accepts this connection. The opposition parties’ (Alternative for Germany and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance) focus on criticising the foreign policy of the “traffic light” coalition has delivered them good results in all election campaigns this year. In Brandenburg and Thuringia, where the SWA managed to enter the state governments, Wagenknecht's party included a foreign policy preamble in the texts of the coalition agreements calling for a diplomatic solution to the Ukrainian conflict. The federal states do not have the right to maintain their own diplomatic initiatives, but they can contribute to the development of the public and political discourse in the country. In addition, the SWA proposed to more actively involve the network of foreign missions of the federal states and the Bundesrat Committee on Foreign Policy in resolving the Ukrainian crisis.
The early elections to the Bundestag in 2025 will largely repeat the logic of the electoral processes of 2024. At the same time, it is unlikely that there will be a political force in Germany ready to advocate for the preservation of Berlin's current foreign policy approaches. The parties of the former “traffic light” coalition are already blaming each other for the mistakes of their past three years of rule, distancing themselves from the decisions of 2022-2024. Even the Alliance 90/Greens party, faced with a decline in popularity, intends to reformat its political profile, primarily in terms of its excessive ideologisation of value systems.
Today, the most likely scenario is the formation of a so-called "grand" coalition consisting of the CDU/CSU and the SPD following the early elections. It is expected that the government in such a configuration will be more effective than the previous unsuccessful three-party experiment. The leader of the Christian Democrats, Friedrich Merz, is expected to become Federal Chancellor. The Social Democrats should get a solid set of ministerial portfolios, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, and the Ministry of Finance.
Can we expect changes in Berlin's foreign policy approaches from the new “grand” coalition led by the Christian Democrats?
The possible transformation of the German position on Ukraine after 2025 will be determined by factors beyond the electoral processes within Germany.
First, the new German leadership will continue to focus its foreign policy on the principles of transatlantic solidarity. The second election of Donald Trump as US President has once again raised the question of the sustainability of German-American relations. There is no guarantee that billionaire Merz will easily find a common language with billionaire Trump, although the CDU leader’s experience at BlackRock will clearly be beneficial here. One way or another, Berlin and Washington will need time to understand each other again.
During the election campaign, the leader of America’s Republicans advocated for a diplomatic resolution to the Ukrainian crisis. The specific parameters of a peaceful settlement proposed by Trump’s team remain unclear. However, the basic departure from uncontested confrontational rhetoric is already creating a new situation around Ukraine, including in terms of the format of its support from Washington’s European allies.
Second, the current socio-economic situation in Germany will play an important role in the foreign policy positioning of the new German leadership. It is impossible to solve the problems of German industry without resolving the issue of affordable energy resources. As the events of recent years have shown, Russian gas supplies cannot be replaced by alternative suppliers or by a forced transition to renewable energy sources.
Even a partial resumption of Russian energy supplies to Germany could significantly stabilise the German economy. During telephone conversations between Vladimir Putin and Olaf Scholz on November 15, 2024, the Russian side indicated its fundamental readiness to resume bilateral dialogue on energy supplies. The ball is in Berlin's court in this matter.
Finally, third, Germany's position on Ukraine will be determined by the logic of the development of military operations and the configuration of the front line. The activity of the Russian armed forces is intensifying the crisis phenomena both in the ranks of the Ukrainian armed forces and throughout Ukraine. The offensive actions of the Russian army are reducing the territory under Kiev's control and forcing the Ukrainian leadership to seek opportunities to compensate for losses in personnel and military equipment of the Ukrainian armed forces. This requires new support measures from Western allies, including Germany.
While declaring its commitment to the principle of unconditional support for Kiev, the German leadership is nevertheless forced to take into account the objective fatigue (including informational) from the conflict among its citizens. Stories about Ukrainian corruption, which were loudly heard in the German media at the end of 2021, are gradually gaining momentum. Germany remains the largest donor of financial and military aid to Ukraine among the EU countries, but it does not seem that Berlin has been able to convert this status into worthy political dividends.