By Yukari Easton
Donald Trump is now president-elect, and his ‘America First’ nationalist vision has returned. Japan, which counts the United States as its sole security ally, must prepare for a second Trump term.
Judging from his first term, during which the United States withdrew from the Paris Climate Accord, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty and the Iranian nuclear agreement, Trump will likely further advance this isolationism. With his penchant for dictatorial power and his aversion to international institutions, the United States’ commitment to its allies now looks uncertain. Similarly tenuous are the United States’ bilateral agreements, such as the longstanding US–Japan Security Treaty.
Europeans are already looking elsewhere. French President Emanuel Macron asked rhetorically, ‘Donald Trump was elected by Americans to defend the interests of Americans. Are we ready to defend the interests of Europeans?’. Seeing the United States deviate from its long-established security orthodoxy, some allies no longer wish to leave their security in the hands of US swing-state voters. But the alternative that Macron suggests for Europe is not an option for Japan, which is not a part of a strong and self-reliant multilateral defense alliance.
Trump’s criticisms of Japan were not, in the past, followed by action. But his complaints were unnerving enough to motivate the late prime minister Shinzo Abe to become the first foreign leader to visit the then president-elect in 2016. Trump had been attacking the US–Japan Security Treaty as unfair and suggested Japan and South Korea should have their own nuclear capabilities. Managing Trump became critical. One of Abe’s tactics was to court an uninformed and impressionable Trump by staging ‘closeness’ through assiduously manufactured golf-buddy antics.
But at the time Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba criticised Abe, declaring, ‘There’s no need to play golf with President Trump or go to Trump Tower. It’s important to present Japan as a formidable threat and to have a bargaining chip at the ready’. It remains to be seen whether Ishiba will deal with the Trump administration more effectively as prime minister. So far, he has not been able to procure more than a five-minute congratulatory telephone call.
The Ishiba administration has been in a precarious position since taking power in October 2024. Shortly thereafter, Ishiba dissolved the lower house in an epic miscalculation, which led to the Liberal Democratic Party coalition falling short of a majority for the first time in 15 years.
Some of Ishiba’s problems can be traced back to playing politics without clear goals coupled with some bewildering choices, such as controversial appointments, revisiting the fringe and destabilising concept of an Asian NATO and delaying the critical active cyber defence bill, an act of political vandalism without any obvious payoff. All of this exhibits a detachment from issues of importance.
Meanwhile, Trump’s cabinet nominations are progressing. Senator Marco Rubio for Secretary of State is curious but, so far, one of the more normal appointments. Serving as a ranking member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the East Asian and Pacific Affairs subcommittee for many years, Rubio has an understanding of what foreign relations entail. He has been a strong supporter of US alliances, describing the US–Japan and US–South Koreaalliances as ‘pillars’ of US policy.
His support of NATO has been steadfast, and his work led to a provision in the Fiscal Year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act limiting a US president’s power to leave NATO without Senate approval or an act of Congress. This pre-emptive safeguard was viewed as necessary after Trump encouraged Russia to ‘do whatever the hell they want’ to supposedly ‘delinquent’ NATO members. That said, even if confirmed, Rubio’s pro-alliance stance might vanish without Trump’s acquiescence, as did his prior support for Ukraine.
With his stranglehold over the Republican Party, the constraints seen in Trump’s first term will be absent. Trump’s strong isolationist tendencies, coupled with a cavalier attitude that does not distinguish allies from foes or dictatorships from democracies, make the United States an unreliable partner. Notably, the president-elect is openly opposed to the security concerns raised by his former vice president Mike Pence, secretaries of defense Jim Mattis and Mark Esper, and national security advisors HR McMaster and John Bolton. Trump’s soon-to-be-dropped federal indictments include the misappropriation of top-secret documents, including those relating to the United States’ nuclear programs.
Japan must now take more responsibility for its national security. Wishful thinking will not remove the dark cloud hanging over the US–Japan alliance. But Ishiba may not be capable of becoming a leader who executes a new foreign policy and national security approach. A worst case scenario for Japan would be that, with conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine and increasing tensions over Taiwan, Trump’s transactional disposition pushes him towards Faustian bargains with the United States’ adversaries.
The extent to which Trump will change Asian foreign policy is unknown. What is known is that Ishiba has a daunting task ahead of him in preparing for an atypical, volatile and unpredictable US presidency while simultaneously managing a fragile and unpopular coalition government.
Ishiba’s foreign policy weaknesses will only become more apparent as Japan prepares to work with the new president-elect. There are distressing times ahead.
About the author: Yukari Easton is a researcher and a 2014–2015 ACE–Nikaido Fellow at the East Asian Studies Center at the University of Southern California.
Source: This article was published by East Asia Forum