On January 1, 2025, Poland will begin its six-month presidency of the Council of the European Union. To understand where we stand today, let us first look back to 2011, when Poland held its first-ever EU presidency. The intense emotions, social and political engagement, and the events that started Poland’s turn at that time are still very clear in people’s memories. It was widely felt that a successful presidency would cement Poland’s place among the EU’s leading members. Thirteen years later, the atmosphere before another presidency is far less enthusiastic, marked by low interest and little public debate. This is not so surprising – Poland has matured and is no longer a _new_ EU member state. Maturing between 2015 and 2023, under the government of Law and Justice (PiS), was characteristic of teenage defiance. Once lauded as a role model, Poland was then viewed by many as an awkward partner, echoing the UK’s EU relationship of yore. Luckily for EU enthusiasts, Poland’s 2023 power shift means the 2025 presidency will be in the hands of a government led by Donald Tusk from the Civic Platform (PO), who is well-known within European circles.
Examining the agendas of both the 2011 and 2025 presidencies shows that external security continues to be a top political priority. In 2011, the focus was on improving the EU’s military and civilian capacities and developing the Common Security and Defence Policy. The goal was to develop the Eastern Partnership and Association Agreements and free trade zones with countries on the eastern flank, particularly with Ukraine. In 2025, the war on the EU’s Eastern borders heightens the need for strong external security. Today, the term ‘security’ is ubiquitous, appearing in diverse contexts: military, internal, energy, economic, health, information, food, and climate domains. In 2011, the focus was on strengthening the EU’s internal market, assisting SMEs, and furthering the Single Market Act. In 2025, enhancing competitiveness will become inextricably linked with economic security. While in 2011, economic issues and free movement dominated migration discussions, the focus shifted by 2025 to security concerns, highlighting migration’s potential use in hybrid warfare. In terms of food security, the Polish viewpoint is that environmental goals should not override the legitimate concerns of European farmers. Similarly, the recently signed free trade agreement with Mercosur, while promoting trade liberalisation that was already on the agenda in 2011, poses lower prices and food security risks to European and Polish producers, particularly the potential for unchecked food production quality in Mercosur countries.
Poland, as do other Central and Eastern European member states, now feel vindicated as having been correct on key issues, such as Russia expansionism, while the rest of Europe failed. Similar concerns exist regarding the long-held political interpretations of the Nord Stream pipeline, contrasting with Germany’s assertion of its purely economic nature and accusation of Polish Russophobia. This sentiment only changed after the 2022 Russian invasion. The changing geopolitical context, however, lends credence to the Polish perspective, underscoring the prevalent securitisation of current affairs.
The EU presidency also holds significant domestic importance for the new Polish government. Donald Tusk likely believes that his extensive experience as a long-serving Prime Minister and especially as the former President of the European Council gives him an edge in navigating EU politics. However, with Poland’s presidential election scheduled for May 2025, Tusk’s performance during the EU presidency comes with a huge political significance. As Tusk did not want to run, his party has nominated Warsaw’s mayor, Rafał Trzaskowski. His opponents, including PiS, will portray him as less influential in the EU than he suggests. For these reasons, the achievements of the presidency will have a real effect on domestic politics and the presidential election campaign.
In a recent speech on 3 December, Donald Tusk emphasised the need for the EU to ‘think in Polish’. He emphasised that the EU needs to take the offensive, and not simply focus on survival and reaction. A shift in European priorities and a wake-up call is needed to make this happen. Expect this alarm to ring even louder from the Polish side! And don’t forget that the presidency of another Donald will begin almost at the same time on the other side of the Atlantic. How much greater success could Tusk and Trump have achieved had the Ukraine war ended quickly at the start of their presidencies? But how likely is it that both leaders and, more importantly, Ukraine itself, will be satisfied with the result and the prospects of a lasting peace order in Europe?
ENJOYING THIS CONTENT?
[Stay up to date by joining our database !](http://eepurl.com/chIYw1)