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What a Victorious Ukraine Can Offer Europe

Argument

An expert's point of view on a current event.

With transatlantic cooperation under scrutiny, a battle-tested land power will be ready to step into the breach.

By Michael Hikari Cecire, an adjunct associate professor at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program and was previously a senior policy adviser and political-military affairs officer at the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

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Genya Savilov/AFP via Getty Images

Security

Europe

Ukraine

December 12, 2024, 6:00 AM View Comments ()

### Russia’s War in Ukraine

Understanding the conflict two years on.

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With another Trump administration incoming, the future of transatlantic cooperation is receiving fresh scrutiny—as is the U.S. security umbrella that has largely, if imperfectly, kept the peace in free Europe since 1945. As uncertainty over the endurance of U.S. security commitments to Europe intensifies, European leaders are grappling with the prospect of an increasingly challenging threat environment without the surety of American backing.

While this is leading to some shifts in European strategic thinking, even a major policy overhaul tomorrow would not be able to compensate for U.S. military advantages in mass and sophistication; that would take at least a generation of dedicated European defense investment. The bad news is that Europe needs a credible conventional deterrent in the near future. The good news? It has one right under its collective nose: Ukraine. To safeguard Europe, and save Ukraine, European states should move quickly to endorse and implement the Ukrainian Victory Plan and work now to put Kyiv in a strong negotiating position tomorrow. Ukraine can then offer Europe a highly militarily credible conventional deterrent, and key insights for European deterrence, defense, and resilience.

Should Ukraine emerge from the war more or less intact, it will be exhausted, bloodied, and bruised, carrying the scars and traumas of an epochal war of liberation. But it will also be a, if not the, premier land power in Europe, with a large, battle-hardened, and heavily equipped force that has experience taking on and often besting Russian forces. It will be among the few armies on the continent with real, practical experience in large-scale combined arms and maneuver warfare. Ukrainians have experience integrating varied and secondhand weapons systems from across the world and forming them into coherent and lethal operational elements. They also boast a rapidly innovating, specialized suite of advanced, battlefield-iterated domestic weapons—particularly drones and a growing array of long-range, precision-strike platforms—and real-life concepts of operations for their employment.

Ongoing Russian advances in Ukraine should be taken seriously, but they should also not be overemphasized, either. They do not represent strategic breakthroughs and are instead periodic operational gains at best. Yet Russia has paid dearly for these minimal gains, with casualties well above 600,000, and even above 700,000 by Ukrainian estimates. Still, should the United States suspend arms shipments again, as they did earlier this year, Russian momentum could turn into localized breakthroughs and provide Moscow with a commanding negotiating position in potential ceasefire talks. In that case, Ukraine may be forced to carry on the fight without U.S. supplies, perhaps increasingly desperately, or effectively capitulate to Kremlin suzerainty.

In either case, Europe is extremely vulnerable if the United States effectively abrogates its commitments. If Russia were to test NATO’s mutual defense clause, as many analysts fear it will, no time would be better than amid American disengagement, Ukrainian weakness, and alliance uncertainty. On its own, Europe may lack the sufficient conventional deterrence posture to give Moscow too much pause. In many ways, Western strategic forbearance has rewarded Moscow for its boldness through successive colonial adventures in Georgia and Ukraine, as well as further afield, despite its military’s incompetence.

Moscow certainly believes that without Washington’s influence, decision-making and the already cumbersome process of consensus would likely grind to a halt in the North Atlantic Council. Although Europe has some credible military capabilities in aggregate, including specialized areas of excellence, Moscow does not see Europe as being able to cooperate effectively to mount a decisive conventional defense without U.S. leadership or cajoling.

Meanwhile, national governments with varying threat perceptions that are not used to acting decisively in concert may opt to sit out joint action—or offer only token contributions—even if a decision were made.

In the absence of a strategic bulwark, Europe’s relative weakness would likely spiral into further fragmentation, as accommodationist elements gain ground in national politics and coalitions of states move in different directions while some states choose to resist as best they can. The end result is very unlikely to be continental Russian domination, but rather a return to the multipolar status quo before 1945—when Europe was far from a postmodern, pacific garden but rather the world’s laboratory for contagious, industrialized mass conflict.

What makes the United States an effective security partner is that its forces were combat credible, capable, and could be relied on to defend Europe. While there is no replacing U.S. troops and the symbolism of American backing—at least not immediately—Ukraine has the advantage of being battle-tested, evidently capable of inflicting pain on advancing Russian forces, and already in a state of total mobilization.

Earlier this fall, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy visited Western capitals, touting his government’s five-point (eight-point if you include three classified annexes) Victory Plan. The plan’s five pillars included: (1) an invitation to NATO; (2) defense assistance; (3) a conventional deterrence package; (4) strategic economic cooperation; and (5) a Ukrainian bulwark for Europe. By many assessments, the plan was sensible and even realistic when taken as individual elements, but as a whole it was mostly coolly received by Western capitals—particularly those looking for a solution that would swiftly end the war without increased outputs from them. More broadly, the plan quickly disappeared into the news cycle as the U.S. presidential election dominated proceedings.

Yet in the wake of that election, Europe may wish to reconsider the merits of the plan. In some ways, it is already being enacted. Since the U.S. election, Washington has agreed to massively boost and accelerate its defense assistance to Ukraine in advance of the new administration taking office. At the same time, the Biden administration eased its caveats on using longer-range precision strikes against military targets within Russia—a sharp reversal on a longstanding policy to the contrary—which was quickly followed by green lights from the UK and France on using their long-range supplied munitions. Notably, France has also revived rhetoric about potential European troop deployments to support Ukraine, though the idea remain in a conceptual stage.

If residual U.S. military aid and additional European tranches can restore Ukrainian military momentum, or at least significantly sap Russia’s, then Kyiv could enter ceasefire negotiations from an improved position and deter Russia over the longer term. For Europe, this will require significant resources, particularly if U.S. arms flows peter out, as well as a determination to adopt a more decisive approach to enable Ukrainian battlefield success and longer-term conventional deterrence. While this is a tall political order in Europe’s fractured and multivariate strategic environment, there is a strategic reason it is very much worth doing—it is easier than the prospect of urgent wholesale, multiyear military rearmament in preparation for responding to an Article 5 event.

While Ukrainian troops may lack the symbolism that U.S. forces currently offer, they may more than make up for it with their real-life experience hunting and destroying advancing Russian forces and demonstrating that they can inflict damage on Russia by land, sea, and air.

For this to work, however, European leaders need to move quickly. Committing to Ukraine’s survival, and providing it with the means to ensure it does so, should be the consensus position. That means creating a viable plan for surging arms quickly and sustainably to Ukraine and working closely with Kyiv to hammer out a common security concept that brings Ukraine into the fold in full and in earnest. In this way, if European fears come to pass, with the United States no longer seen as a viable guarantor to transatlantic security, Ukraine and its forces offer a ready-made and highly compelling alternative.

Security

Europe

Ukraine

Michael Hikari Cecire is an adjunct associate professor at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program and was previously a senior policy adviser and political-military affairs officer at the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. X: @mhikaric