When a club is drowning in debt, battling Profit and Sustainability Rules, and extorting its fans, they typically at least have something to show for it on the pitch – but not Manchester United.
The Glazer family’s cavalier approach to recruitment and retention has left them 13th place in the Premier League table with the division’s third most expensive squad.
Almost a year ago to the day, Old Trafford’s absentee landlords washed their hands of strategic control, leaving Sir Jim Ratcliffe and his Ineos deputies to clean up their mess and banking £1.2bn in the process.
A breakdown of the ownership (equity and voting rights) of Manchester United between Sir Jim Ratcliffe, the Glazer family and institutional investors.
The Glazers’ time in Manchester has been one of football’s ultimate riches-to-rags stories.
When they began buying shares in 2003, United had been the sport’s top revenue generator for eight consecutive years and had zero debt.
Now? United’s revenue has barely grown for half a decade. They have settled between 4th and 5th in the turnover stakes and smarter clubs are catching up fast.
Chart showing Manchester United's revenue since 2003-04 and the breakdown between commercial, matchday and media income
They are overly-leveraged and burning £30-40m in interest alone every season, which was one factor – alongside their worst ever Premier League season – that saw losses spiral to £114m in 2023-24.
Meanwhile, United have deposited over £400m in dividends in their owners’ bank accounts on the other side of the Atlantic since the leveraged buyout.
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He warned that things would get worse before they get better, but few could have anticipated the depths the Red Devils would have plumbed as the anniversary of Ratcliffe’s part-takeover approaches.
A billboard near Old Trafford shows a picture of Sir Jim Ratcliffe above the words 'Welcome To Manchester' prior to the Premier League match betwee...
Photo by Stu Forster/Getty Images
Around £40m has been spent hiring and firing at the front and back of house, with news of the latest possible 100-strong round of redundancies breaking earlier this week.
Ratcliffe’s regime took the scenic route, but they eventually sacked Erik Ten Hag several months after they should have pulled the trigger but instead chose to extend his deal.
The cost of that decision, including the fee United had to pay to release Ruben Amorim from his Sporting contract, was well north of £20m.
Chart showing Manchester United's pre-tax profit and loss account from 2013-14, superimposed over an image of Sir Jim Ratcliffe
Chart showing Man United’s profit-and-loss account CREDIT: Plumb Images/Leicester City FC/Getty Images
Those expenses come out of the profit-and-loss account, which in turn impacts United’s flexibility – or lack therefore – under UEFA and the Premier League’s Profit and Sustainability Rules (PSR).
Ratcliffe has already somewhat speciously blamed the club’s PSR status for his decision to hike ticket prices and begin phasing out concessions pricing at Old Trafford.
Although, that argument doesn’t really hold water, according to football finance expert and industry insider Kieran Maguire.
Infographic explaining Profit and Sustainability Rules (PSR), the system which used to be called Financial Fair Play (FFP).
Profit and Sustainability Rules infographic Credit: Adam Williams / United in Focus / GRV Media
“United have already said that they have sold 97 per cent of tickets,” he said in exclusive conversation with UIF.
“Three per cent is 2,500 tickets per match. Let’s say they have gone up by an average of £25 each and let’s say 20 per cent of those tickets are going to kids and seniors. I think that’s conservative.
“That means United are getting an extra £12,500 per match. If we then look at how much it cost United to pay off Richard Arnold, pay off Erik ten Hag, and pay the compensation for Ruben Amorim, that’s £26.4m.
“You’re going to have to sell an extra 1.05 million tickets to make the money back from those decisions.”
And this week, news direct from Premier League HQ won’t make pleasant reading for fans wary of being asked to shoulder the PSR burden.
Marcus Rashford, shock PSR vote, and Ruben Amorim’s budget for summer rebuild
United have lost almost £300m in the last three published financial years, which on face value is well in excess of the Premier League and UEFA’s limits.
However, as confirmed by the Premier League in January, the Red Devils have complied with PSR as of the end of last season thanks to various allowable expenses and add-backs.
In this photo illustration, the professional premier league football club Manchester United (MU) logo is seen displayed on a smartphone with an eco...
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They have been operating on the assumption that 2025-26 would see a new PSR system introduced by the Premier League which would be based on spending as a percentage of revenue, not profit or loss.
However, in a shock decision at a shareholder meeting in London yesterday, their fellow Premier League clubs voted to delay the introduction of the ‘squad cost rule’ (SCR) for another year.
For United, that means that they are stuck with the interest burden on their £714m worth of debt, which would have not been part of the calculation under SCR.
That further emphasises that sales will be needed this summer in order to fund the rebuild Ruben Amorim needs to fit his favoured 3-4-3 system.
Marcus Rashford will be in the first cab off the rank.
Marcus Rashford of Aston Villa in action during the Emirates FA Cup Fourth Round match between Aston Villa and Tottenham Hotspur at Villa Park on F...
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Rashford’s loan to Aston Villa doesn’t touch the sides of United’s 2024-25 PSR calculation anyway, with the club saving only around £4m in wages. But this season was never likely to be an issue either way.
However, the consensus is that things will get more difficult from 2025-26 with PSR set to remain in place, especially if United do not have European football of any description.
Villa have a £40m option to buy for Rashford. If that clause is triggered, it would theoretically unlock £200m worth of signings amortised over five years, while also clearing £17m from the wage bill.
Infographic explaining amortisation in football
Amortisation infographic CREDIT: Adam Williams / United in Focus / GRV Media
Of course, that PSR headroom would effectively be borrowed against future revenues, which United need to be cautious of given their cash situation.
But the ‘pure profit’ sale of a homegrown player like Rashford gives them the flexibility needed to make signings and offset interest on United’s debt before the SCR system is introduced and relieves the burden.
Speaking to UIF, Kieran Maguire reiterated how Ratcliffe’s cost cuts pale in comparison next to what cashing in on players like Rashford at the right time can generate.
“There are only so many teenagers you can make redundant to cover these costs,” the Price of Football author said.
“Looking at the data, it looks as though Man United are far, far behind their peers the other members of the Big Six when it comes to player trading.
“All the focus is on the in-door rather than the out-door. They have made about a fifth of the value of Chelsea’s sales over the last decade and probably a third of Man City and Liverpool.
“Given that they have an extra liability in the costs of their borrowing, all of the advantages of being Man United in terms of a huge stadium, the largest merchandise sales in the country, their global fanbase and so on, all of those are lost because of the inability to recruit effectively and find suitors for the talent.
“If you look at City, they got a good price for Alvarez and Sane, for example. It’s an area United are going to have to address.”
Chart showing Manchester United's gross debt since the Glazer family bought the club in 2005 via a leveraged buyout
Man United gross debt chart CREDIT: Adam Williams / United in Focus / GRV Media
Is Sir Jim Ratcliffe’s Old Trafford rebuild a threat to bedrock fans?
Many people have assumed that the Old Trafford 2.0 project will represent salvation for United.
However, as well as the huge extra debt burden it will set on the club, a brand new stadium could also see committed local fans squeezed out, says Maguire.
“They’re going to address the 20th-century stadium and they need to sweat the asset.
Charts showing Manchester United's matchday income and the potential capacity of an expanded Old Trafford compared to other Premier League stadiums.
Man United matchday income chart Credit: Adam Williams / United in Focus / GRV Media
“But the good will that existed towards Ratcliffe is evaporating. He is an enabler for the Glazers. They wanted to do this but they haven’t been able to because of the pushback from fans.
“They will continue to trade on that atmosphere, that history and that heritage at a new £2bn stadium, but this is petty and part of a broader issue.
Stadium Cost (adjusted for inflation) Location Opened
SoFi Stadium $5.5 billion California, USA 2020
MetLife Stadium $1.99 billion New Jersey, USA 2010
Allegiant Stadium $1.90 billion Nevada, USA 2020
Wembley Stadium $1.85 billion London, UK 2007
Yankee Stadium $1.79 billion New York, USA 2009
AT&T Stadium $1.79 billion Texas, USA 2009
Mercedes-Benz Stadium $1.56 billion Atlanta, USA 2017
Singapore National Stadium $1.41 billion Kallang, Singapore 2014
Tottenham Hotspur Stadium $1.33 billion London, England 2019
Optus Stadium $1.17 billion Perth, Australia 2017
SOURCE: Structural Repairs
“INEOS have made as many savings as they can. Now, they are going to turn their attention to people who, from their perspective, have outlived their usefulness.
“Season ticket holders are next. There will be steps taken to reduce the number of season ticket holders at Old Trafford.”