The Grizzlies and Magic surprised many NBA fans midway through the Finals by swapping **Desmond Bane** for **Cole Anthony**, **Kentavious Caldwell-Pope** and five first round picks, including swap rights in 2026 from Phoenix, and Orlando’s own protected (Top 2) 2029 pick swap. That, along with the No. 16 pick later this month, 2028 and 2030 unprotected firsts, amounted to a trade package comparable to last summer’s **Mikal Bridges** blockbuster.
The question emerged: did this set a new trade standard in the NBA as the Celtics prepare to assess the value of their players over the next month and beyond? A shift in trade market values could alter how Boston navigates its offseason. Though one trade is never certain to set a market, since it lives in its own world of connections, priorities, alternative options and what teams have available to offer.
The Magic stood in a unique position before acquiring Bane. They pushed the Celtics twice at home, winning one of the two games before **Paolo Banchero’s** foul trouble cost them Game 5. That increased pressure to improve the roster to support Banchero after they grew increasingly reliant on him and **Franz Wagner** while their team three-point shooting fell to last in the NBA. Offensively, they never appeared close to threatening Boston, despite the Celtics accumulating injuries as the series progressed.
So Orlando struck.
Recent reports expressed their willingness to part with Anthony and **Jonathan Isaac** in trades. They appeared more intrigued by scoring guards like **Darius Garland** and **Anfernee Simons** than stars **Kevin Durant** and **Giannis** **Antetokounmpo**, who could’ve become attainable, likely because those deals could’ve cost them Wagner or even Banchero.
In this trade, the Magic retained **Jalen Suggs**, **Anthony Black**, **Tristan da Silva** and Isaac. They moved off Caldwell-Pope, owed two-years, $43.2 million and formed one of the more formidable rosters in the east. All that context bears mentioning in any assessment of the trade or how it could impact the rest of the NBA.
The Magic simultaneously believed in their ability to take a leap and emphasized retaining their most important players. They also moved off a negative contract. All those factors drove up the draft capital cost, and while sending out five picks in total sounds daunting, it might not cost Orlando as much as it currently appears.
_They lost:_
* The No. 16 pick in this month’s draft, not considered a deep one. They still own No. 25 from Denver.
* A 2026 pick swap with Phoenix that offers them whichever selection lands worse between the Suns and Wizards. The Magic originally traded the Suns three second-rounders for those swap rights, which Washington originally received in the **Bradley Beal** trade.
* Orlando’s own 2028 and 2030 unprotected firsts.
* A top-two protected pick swap in 2029.
I’m not here to defend the deal from the Magic’s perspective, but their circumstances at least warranted an aggressive swing. Bane, while not a talent ensuring championship contention, at least goes a long way toward addressing their needs. He averaged 21.1 PPG over the past three seasons while shooting 39.4% from three on 7.0 attempts. Nobody on the Magic attempted 7.0 3PA last season. His ability to create his own shots, hit them off-ball and play a complementary role without sacrificing too much defensively from the players they traded fits in. The risk come in how many seasons down the line where things could go wrong are now exposed.
If all goes according to plan, offloading those picks shouldn’t hurt significantly while the young Magic compete . There’s also no guarantee that happens. Bane averaged 56 games played over the past three years with knee, ankle and foot ailments. The Magic’s offensive actions faltered as much as their shot-making, and their unit struggled even with Banchero and Wagner available following injuries. Suggs struggled to stay on the floor throughout the season before going down in March. **Moe Wagner** tore his ACL in December.
Then, there’s the financial reality. Wagner begins his max rookie scale extension this year and Banchero should agree to his this summer, beginning in 2026-27. Suggs signed a relatively team-friendly extension and Bane’s floats around 23% of the cap through 2028-29. It’s a good deal. Yet draft picks appeared to become more valuable to cost-control rosters in this new CBA. The Magic’s handling of them could prove the exception.
Sunday’s trade hard-capped Orlando at the second apron this season, [they’re $17.4 million below it](https://x.com/KeithSmithNBA/status/1934327992605692294) between 10 players. They’re inevitably a luxury tax team this season. While supplementing this core after they showed competitiveness at the highest level made sense, doing so with picks instead of their core players will likely hurt the sustainability of this group. If they break through and win in the near term, that won’t matter, as they could return value for them later.
Either way, consider me skeptical that the Magic’s move will spark a string of the throwback trades where teams ship out most if not all of their future first-rounders. Especially after the Bridges one might’ve faltered. The Mavericks only received one future first from the Lakers for **Luka Dončić**, because LA didn’t have many. Minnesota only received a Pistons pick that conveyed as No. 17 in this draft from New York for **Karl-Anthony Towns**. It only takes one, but the incentive to retain firsts heightened following the new CBA.
So for the Celtics, who should at least assess what they could receive for **Jaylen Brown** or **Derrick White** this summer, a seven-pick haul with multiple rotation players doesn’t seem promised by the Magic’s aggressiveness. Some other team would need a similarly narrow roster need, the desire to retain several core players, various draft assets and the belief that they could break through and win it all in the near term.
San Antonio, Houston and several other teams fit that profile. It’s unclear how much any of them see Brown and White as clear solutions to their problems. Though it’s increasingly possible that White could become that for someone.
White’s contract remains around 18% of the cap through his player option in 2028 and his impact floats around and occasionally exceeds Bane’s when factoring in defense. He resembles a pure point guard more than he did earlier in his career and a roster with its stars intact could view him as the finishing connective piece on a potential championship roster.
For Brown, a super max player who will command top-end value, an overpay relative to how the Celtics value him would appear unlikely. How many franchises can even reach that threshold while still maintaining a competitive roster? You could count on one hand, and some of them might pursue Durant or others.
San Antonio owns the No. 2 picks, future Hawks selections and even a Celtics pick swap. They could overpay for an addition, but also have the pieces to sustainably win. Houston’s contract situation, future draft picks and lack of clear centerpiece offensive player could accelerate their aggressiveness. The Clippers, Blazers, Pelicans, Pistons, Jazz, Raptors and Warriors share cases to act aggressively too, though less compelling ones.
It only takes one. And in Orlando, the Grizzlies found a team aggressive enough to make them trade Bane.
A similarly grueling decision awaits in Boston, [with the Celtics reportedly already receiving White and Brown calls that they declined](https://www.nbcsportsboston.com/nba/boston-celtics/kevin-o-connor-avoid-jaylen-brown-derrick-white-trade-hearing-offers/714211/).