When Sir Jim Ratcliffe paid the Glazers over £1bn for a minority stake in 2024, it reaffirmed the belief that Manchester United are one of the world’s most valuable clubs. But new analysis from Kinnaird Sports Intelligence suggests that their true worth has been overstated.
In finance, a ‘bubble’ is when the value of a good surpasses its inherent worth. And bubbles burst, leading to a sharp drop in value.
For decades, United’s value as appraised by analysts and the club themselves has trended relentlessly up and to the right, but what is it exactly that is fuelling that optimism?
Man United have lost £359m since they last turned a profit in 2018-19. Much of that shortfall has been underwritten by debt and, more recently, equity contributions from Sir Jim Ratcliffe and Ineos.
Ineos CEO Sir Jim Ratcliffe in the aftermath of Manchester United's 2025 Europa League final defeat to Tottenham
Photo by Michael Regan – UEFA/UEFA via Getty Images
Ratcliffe’s programme of job cuts, intentions to re-base the playing squad, and masterplan to build a new stadium are a tacit admission that the club is not where it should be.
And that’s before we get to the issues on the pitch under Ruben Amorim.
United’s brand is still strong – but is it a sticking plaster?
The club’s brand has an insulating effect, of course. United’s global cache has allowed them to withstand the strongest headwinds of the post-Sir Alex Ferguson and David Gill era, when six successive managers have tried and failed to return the Red Devils to former glories.
Financially, their commercial and matchday income have allowed them to remain one of the dominant players in the transfer and wage markets, even if those resources have been poorly allocated historically.
Chart depicting Manchester United's matchday and commercial income over the years, with United in Focus logo
Man United commercial and matchday income chart Credit: Adam Williams/United in Focus/GRV Media
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Even after Amorim’s side finished a pitiful 15th in last season’s Premier League, they received more prize money than four clubs who finished above them, courtesy of appearing on TV more frequently. Again, that is thanks to their brand – whether they win or lose, United are must-watch.
Speaking exclusively to United in Focus earlier this summer, Hugo Hensley of Brand Finance said: “By their standards of coming first or second every season, their recent record on the pitch has damaged them. But they’re still an amazing commercial machine, one of the first properly sophisticated and organised football brands.
“They’ve still got a blue-chip technology front-of-shirt partner. That reflects that they’re actually still a very strong brand. They can continue to ride on that heritage. Whereas it’s not as forgiving the other way. You can get to a Champions League final like, say, Spurs have, but it doesn’t cement in the same way.”
United’s business in the summer transfer window cost them almost £150m on a net basis meanwhile. In Benjamin Sesko, Matheus Cunha, and Bryan Mbeumo, United leveraged their brand to sign prize assets ahead of teams who could offer them European football and stonking wages.
Player Direction Club Fee
Bryan Mbeumo In Brentford £71m
Benjamin Sesko In RB Leipzig £73.7m
Matheus Cunha In Wolverhampton Wanderers £62.5m
Senne Lammens In Royal Antwerp £18.2m
Diego Leon In Cerro Porteño £3.3m
Harley Emsden-James In Southampton £1m
Enzo Kana-Biyik In Le Havre Free
Alejandro Garnacho Out Chelsea £40m
Antony Out Real Betis £21.6m
Marcus Rashford Out Barcelona Loan
Jadon Sancho Out Aston Villa Loan
Victor Lindelöf Out Released Free
Christian Eriksen Out Released Free
Jonny Evans Out Released Free
Elyh Harrison Out Shrewsbury Town Loan
Radek Vitek Out Bristol City Loan
Ethan Wheatley Out Northampton Town Loan
Manchester United’s summer transfers 2025
Reports of the demise of the United brand are perhaps exaggerated, therefore. They have pulling power with players, sponsors and the kind of floating fan outside the UK that underpins their commercial operation.
But are these status symbols actually a fig leaf for a weaker set of business fundamentals? And is United’s trophy-asset premium disproportionately inflating their true value as an enterprise?
Kinnaird Sports Intelligence’s alternative view of Manchester United’s real value
United’s value as an asset matters. How the market views the club will ultimately decide who owns it.
And as 20 years under the Glazers demonstrates, who owns Man United shapes the soul of the club and its ability to compete on the pitch.
Ratcliffe committed £1.25bn to acquire 29 per cent of the club, split across an initial fee paid to the six Glazer siblings and some Class A shareholders who bought into United on the New York Stock Exchange, as well as a further funding commitment, which has now been satisfied.
Diagram showing the ownership and voting structure of Manchester United, broken down between Ineos and Sir Jim Ratcliffe, the Glazers, and the NYSE shareholders
Manchester United ownership diagram Credit: Adam Williams / United in Focus / GRV Media
That implied a valuation of £4.3bn in total, which was significantly short of the Glazers’ reported £6bn quote for a full takeover. Even Sheikh Jassim, the Qatari banker backed by hundreds of billions of petrodollars, balked at that price tag.
For context, Forbes, Football Benchmark, Sportico have pegged United’s enterprise value in the £4.4bn to £4.9bn range, while Brand Finance are less bullish at £3.2bn.
But Kinnaird Sports Intelligence, a free-to-use data-driven platform that provides financial insights into sports clubs, uses a different model to appraise clubs and has arrived at a valuation of £1.75bn.
A graphic breaking down the enterprise valuation of Manchester United, per Kinnaird Sports Intelligence
Man United Kinnaird Sports Intelligence valuation Credit: Joe Roberts/Kinnaird Sports Intelligence
“The fundamental difference between the Kinnaird Valuation Model [KVM] and valuations from the likes of Forbes lies in what they’re actually measuring: intrinsic worth versus market price,” says Joe Roberts, founder of Kinnaird, in exclusive conversation with United in Focus.
“For example, Forbes calculates ‘enterprise values based on historical transactions and the future economics of each league and each team,’ essentially estimating what someone would pay by analysing recent sale prices and market sentiment, which explains why their valuations often appear inflated due to factors like billionaire prestige-seeking, geopolitical motivations, or speculative market conditions.
“In contrast, the KVM focuses on determining a club’s actual economic value based on its assets, profitability, and long-term revenue generation potential.”
Red Devils deemed to be worth the least of the ‘Big Six’ clubs
Kinnaird Sports Intelligence’s analysis, which uses 2023-24’s statements as the last full published financial year, notes that United’s revenue has grown by just 5.5 per cent since 2019, compared to peers like Arsenal (55 per cent), Manchester City (33.6 per cent) and Liverpool (15.2 per cent).
Meanwhile, United’s net assets – that’s their total assets minus total liabilities, ranging from their cash reserves, property and player registrations to their debt, transfer instalments due, and accrued expenses – have fallen from a high of nearly £500m in 2015 to just over £100m at the last count.
These are among the factors which, according to their model, give them the lowest value in the so-called ‘Big Six’.
Graphic showing Manchester United's value compared to the rest of the Big Six - Manchester City, Tottenham, Chelsea, Arsenal and Liverpool
Manchester United’s value compared to the Big Six Credit: Joe Roberts/Kinnaird Sports Intelligence
Read on for a detail of Kinnaird’s methodology in arriving at this valuation.
The value of the Glazers’ investment over the years, per Kinnaird
Whichever way you cut it, the six Glazer siblings are way, way up on the investment their father, Malcolm Glazer, made via leveraged buyout back in June 2005.
After dividends, management fees, directors’ salaries and cash directly from Ineos, the owners have made north of £1bn out of the club. And that is before one considers the appreciation of Man United as an asset, which by any measure has risen dramatically since their debt-financed takeover.
But Kinnaird’s analysis suggests that the markup on that £790m deal might not be quite as significant as some have deduced.
Manchester United's value over the years, per Kinnaird Sports Intelligence
Man United’s value over the years, per Kinnaird Sports Intelligence Credit: Joe Roberts/Kinnaird Sports Intelligence
According to their formula, United’s value actually dipped as low as £1.4bn in 2022, from a high of £2.72bn four years earlier.
How to value a club like Man United: Kinnaird’s methodology explained
Balance sheet valuations, recent comparable transactions, revenue multiples and discounted cash flow are often used to value traditional businesses – but Kinnaird argue that these approaches aren’t suitable for a club like Man United, nor indeed any football team.
They hypothesise that balance sheet valuations, for example, fail to recognise the worth of academy players, who have a book value of zero. That’s why United make ‘pure profit’ when they sell a homegrown player like Alejandro Garnacho, incidentally. A club’s intangible brand too is incompatible with a balance sheet valuation.
Analysis based on recent comparable transactions meanwhile – such as benchmarking against Chelsea’s £2.5bn sale to a consortium led by Todd Boehly and Clearlake Capital three summers ago – don’t take into account buyers’ different motives.
Sheikh Jassim, backed by the sovereign wealth of a Gulf state, probably wants something different out of owning a football club than the Glazer family, who are focused on a financial return, for example. They therefore have different valuations.
Discounted cash flow analysis – which arrives at a value based on expected revenues, adjusted for time and risk – isn’t adequate because of the inherent volatility of football, Kinnaird suggests. Relegation, European qualification, transfer market volatility and myriad other factors mean discounted cash flow is too speculative and assumption-driven for football.
A closeup shot of the Manchester United badge in a hallway at Old Trafford
Photo by Wolverhampton Wanderers FC/Wolves via Getty Images
Football-specific valuation methods like Markham Multivariate Model – which estimates a club’s value by combining its revenue and net assets, adjusting for profitability, stadium utilisation, and wage efficiency – are a step in the right direction.
However, Kinnaird argues that the Markham formula doesn’t sufficiently consider strong academy systems, intelligent recruitment or, at the other end of the spectrum, poor cost control. It also said to give too much weight to low-quality revenue and so-called ‘soft’ owner loans, though the latter is not a factor with United specifically.
The Kinnaird Valuation Model by contrast uses three-year averages of revenue, commercial income, EBITDA [earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, amortisation], and wages. This smooths out one-off financial spikes which distort valuations.
KVM also employs net assets as the base for its calculations but excludes ‘soft’ owner loans. It then introduces a squad value uplift provision which accounts for hidden value in academy-produced players and consistent player sale profits.
A profitability multiplier is applied using a three-year EBITDA average, with a contingency that mitigates for short-term operating losses as a result of long-term investment.
Finally, Kinnaird utilise a brand strength multiplier calculated using a three-year average of commercial income offset against wages. That is how they arrived at their £1.75bn valuation of Man United.