Manchester United secured a surprise victory against Liverpool on Sunday afternoon. Ruben Amorim produced an astute tactical performance, but how exactly did he set his team up tactically to secure United’s first win at Anfield in nearly a decade?
Despite Liverpool’s recent form and the clear flaws in Arne Slot’s current system, not many people expected Manchester United to win at Anfield.
United started the game off strong as Bryan Mbeumo opened the scoring. It cannot be understated how important that goal was. Not only because it put United 0-1 up, but because it put Liverpool, a team who had lost their last three games, under even more pressure.
United were very good in the first-half, but Liverpool asserted complete dominance in the second-half and forced United to defend deep in their own half for large periods. That hard work eventually as Cody Gakpo found a leveller after nearly 80 minutes.
Liverpool’s joy was short-lived, though. Harry Maguire quickly restored United’s lead and United were able to hold on for the remainder of the game.
United’s on-ball approach and how they managed to win so many second balls
As usual, Manchester United used a 3-2-5 on the ball. As you can see in the image below, Arne Slot chose to set his team up to press man-to-man.
Credit: MUTV
We rarely saw this pressing shape, though, as Manchester United went long almost every single time Senne Lammens got the ball. Lammens played a total of 46 passes at Anfield, and 45 of them were long balls. This was no surprise. United have done the same all season, even against far inferior opposition.
To be clear, it is unacceptable that after nearly a year in charge, Ruben Amorim still cannot coach half-competent build-up play against teams like Brentford and Sunderland.
However, against Liverpool, especially at Anfield, and given the clear difference in quality between the two sides, going long was the sensible approach.
Credit: MUTV
Ibrahima Konate won a lot of first-balls on Sunday afternoon, particularly in the first half. United’s plan wasn’t so much to win the first ball, but to be set up as well as possible to win the second ball.
In the image above, Bryan Mbeumo contests the aerial duel. His teammates are positioned in front of him, and this gives United a very good chance of winning the second ball when it’s headed back centrally because they have a very big overload in the middle. United did win the second ball in this situation, which led to the first goal.
Often with United’s long-balls this season, the plan has been for Benjamin Šeško to win the header and flick it on for Bryan Mbeumo to run onto. The plan at Anfield, however, was to win the second ball in midfield.
When Šeško came on, he fully engaged in aerial duels, which makes sense considering his physical profile, while Mbeumo stayed closer to him.
Šeško ended up winning three out of four of his aerial duels, which shows he can hold his own against even the most physically dominant centre-back pairing in the Premier League.
Using Cunha as a false nine was a stroke of genius from Amorim
There was a sense of surprise when Ruben Amorim left Benjamin Šeško out of his starting XI at Anfield, but using Matheus Cunha as a false nine was a genius move by Ruben Amorim.
In his post-match interview, Amorim explained his decision to start Cunha ahead of Šeško. “Sometimes the characteristic of the game change way we approach. Cunha in middle, if we put Ben it is easier for these kind of centre-backs to control our striker,” Amorim explained.
Ibrahima Konate and Virgil van Dijk are two of the most physically dominant centre-backs in Europe, and even a striker like Šeško, who has such a complete physical profile, will have problems consistently winning duels against them.
Using Cunha as a false nine made it more of a tactical battle than a physical one. And it worked absolutely brilliantly in the first half.
When playing against a false nine, centre-backs have a decision to make. Either follow him when he drops deep and leave space open in the defensive line, or hold position and allow the false nine to roam freely. Van Dijk and Konate decided to hold position and let Cunha roam unmarked.
Credit: MUTV
In the image above, Cunha has dropped deep, and because Konate and Van Dijk haven’t followed him deep, he is free and can play a lovely pass out to the right wing to find Amad.
Another advantage to the centre-backs not following Cunha is that if Liverpool want to press him, a midfielder has to do that, and that would then leave either Bruno Fernandes or Casemiro free. Either way, United have a free man.
There were a few occasions where Cody Gakpo dropped in next to Liverpool’s midfield two to give Liverpool an extra body in midfield when Cunha dropped deep.
Credit: MUTV
Another advantage United had because Cunha was left unmarked is that he could make unmarked forward runs into the box. Funnily enough, Roberto Firmino did this very well at Liverpool.
In the image above, Cunha has made a run from a deeper position. He arrives unmarked and receives a pass from Bryan Mbeumo. This led to a half chance, and on another day, it could’ve led to something of even more significance.
Credit: MUTV
As mentioned, Konate and Van Dijk held their positions, but in the image above, Van Dijk engaged in a duel with Cunha, who received a pass from Bruno Fernandes. With a bit of luck, Cunha gets the ball, and Van Dijk is now out of position. That then means Konate has to move across to cover.
Just like that, both centre-backs were pulled out of position, and while this didn’t lead to a chance, it shows how effective a false nine can be by pulling centre-backs out of position to allow other players to move into that space.
United’s off-the-ball approach was key
Manchester United set up in a 5-4-1 mid/deep-block against Liverpool’s 2-3-5, which at times was also a 3-1-6. As the game went on, especially in the last twenty minutes, they became increasingly attacking and even had seven players in the final line at times, which is logical considering they were chasing the game.
Credit: MUTV
In the mid-block, United did try to keep some pressure on the ball, particularly in the first half. In particular, when Ryan Gravenberch received the ball with his back to goal, either Casemiro or Bruno Fernandes would jump onto him.
United’s 5-4-1 also became a 5-3-2 at times, as either Mbeumo or Mason Mount would sometimes jump up a line to try and get some pressure on the ball.
Credit: MUTV
United’s high press against Liverpool was poor. That Amorim didn’t want his side to press high is understandable, but the plan should’ve been to avoid pressing high altogether. That’s not what happened, though.
In the image above, Cunha and Mbeumo pushed up high to press Liverpool during build-up. The rest of the team, however, doesn’t back up the press and is far too deep. This then means that Ryan Gravenberch has all the space in the world to carry into.
Credit: MUTV
The image above is another example of how two or three players would push up high to press, while the rest of the team would be way too deep, close to the halfway line. Ralf Ragnick’s quote about ‘a little bit of pressing’ comes to mind.
In the first half, United did well to contain Liverpool. The home side had one significant chance through Alexander Isak, which Senne Lammens saved smartly. Cody Gakpo also hit the post, but apart from those two moments, United contained Liverpool well.
Credit: MUTV
In the second half, however, Liverpool pinned United back and started to commit more numbers forward. As the game went on, they desperately looked for a way back into the game. In the image above, they’ve got six men in the last line and therefore have a horizontal overload vs United’s back five. This meant they had an extra man in the last line, which caused issues for United.
United, in the end, held on, but Ruben Amorim would’ve probably been disappointed with how many chances United allowed Liverpool to create. The deep block wasn’t compact enough and United often lacked disciplined positioning.
READ MORE: Man Utd’s best quality vs Liverpool proves that their brightest stars are finally obeying a four-word instruction from Rúben Amorim
All in all, it wasn’t a perfect performance, and there is a lot of work to be done. However, Ruben Amorim deserves significant credit for certain tactical decisions, particularly using Matheus Cunha as a false nine.
United have regularly shown that they are comfortable playing against superior opposition. They can sit back, defend in a deep block, and have the forward players to produce moments of quality in the final third.
The real test comes when United have to take the initiative. United’s next test is Brighton and Hove Albion on Saturday afternoon, and that will be a good game to get an idea of how good United really are.
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