One would expect Steve Kerr to speak about typical generalities when explaining the reasons behind the Golden State Warriors’ 120-110 loss against the Milwaukee Bucks, who were without their best player in Giannis Antetokounmpo. For the most part, Kerr did exactly that. According to him, it was a matter of “mental and physical fatigue,” while giving credit to a Bucks team that did not lie down once it was announced that their superstar was a late scratch due to “left knee soreness.”
Instead, the Bucks doubled down on the urgency of the situation, while the Warriors ran from it. It has become somewhat of a pattern for these Warriors to relax and approach games in a less serious manner once they know that the other team’s best player won’t be available for them. Call it a serious case of playing down to one’s competition, as it is often called. Kerr even jokingly said that they have a record of 0-12 whenever opponents sit their stars.
However, one thing Kerr snuck in during his press availability provided a window into what was a serious problem all night long for the Warriors — one that involved a defensive scheme that they did not execute all that well.
“We didn’t handle our switching very well at all,” Kerr said. “Our defense struggled tonight. They were small so we went to an all-switching coverage and lineup. We’ll have to watch the tape but I didn’t feel like we did a great job there.”
I can only wish for Kerr and the Warriors’ coaching staff to use this article as a point of reference in terms of film, nor are they compelled to do so given they have more basketball knowledge on a single finger than I’ll ever have. But on the off chance that they will come upon this piece, I will try my hand in looking at a couple of clips that Kerr may have been referencing to when he was airing his woes about the Warriors’ switching.
Switching everything has been on the Warriors’ defensive menu ever since they were hailed as pioneers of the switching revolution. Trying to generate efficient offense against a lineup that included at least four players ranging from 6’6 to 6’9” is a tough task, considering everything can be switched with little-to-no drop-off in defensive quality. Furthermore, it provides plenty of cover for Steph Curry, who the Warriors do not want to guard the ball as much as possible in order to preserve his energy for offense.
A decade after the switching revolution, switch-all schemes have lost their luster and have become passé. More and more teams have developed counters to a switch-all or switch-almost-everything scheme. The Warriors also don’t have the same kind of personnel that they previously had; the Klay Thompsons, Andre Iguodalas, Harrison Barneses, and Shaun Livingstons that they once had in bunches have been replaced with a dearth of wings and a plethora of guards (to go along with an increase in average roster age). Switch-all schemes can’t be used as freely as Kerr would want to because of a simple case of personnel issues.
Nevertheless, Kerr did try to switch everything in order to keep the Bucks’ ball-handlers contained at the point of attack and prevent them from causing damage using dribble penetration. However, a snag was encountered in that plan, which the Bucks took advantage of at points throughout the game.
An example of which was below. See if you can spot it:
A 6’9”, 250-pound Bobby Portis has 6’4”, 205-pound Brandin Podziemski sealed in the post, a precarious position to be in for the third-year guard. This situation was born out of a drag screen in transition, in which Portis set the screen for Cole Anthony, triggering a switch between Al Horford and Podziemski. Portis immediately attempts to bring Podziemski close to the basket, which draws help from two defenders: Horford and Jonathan Kuminga.
Helping/doubling from the top is risky, due to a shooter being one pass away and readily available to take a shot. Portis sees Kuzma open and gets the ball to him, while Horford tries to close the gap. However, it’s too much space given to Kuzma, who makes the most out of the advantage created by the post mismatch (born out of a switch).
On another possession, a switch by Podziemski onto the 6’11”, 250-pound Myles Turner generates another three-point shot, courtesy of AJ Green. Finding his teammate being on the wrong end of the switch, Buddy Hield helps off the corner to cover Turner momentarily. But that leaves Green open, and while Hield attempts to close out and contest, Green gets him up in the air with a fake and masterfully executes an escape-dribble pull-up.
A closer look at the possession above provides a realization that Hield may have unnecessarily jumped the gun, as Podziemski and Horford were ready to execute a “scram” switch to bump Podziemski off of Turner:
As much as the switches that weren’t executed cleanly deserve scrutiny — for example, in the possession below, where Draymond Green goes under the screen (without much effort to fight and recover in a timely manner) for former Warrior Ryan Rollins, allowing him to calmly pull up for the dribble:
It was on possessions where switches _didn’t_ happen that deserve as much examination. Portis hasn’t shot the three-ball extremely well this season with his 31% on around three attempts per game, but he profiles as a career 38.2% shooter from beyond the arc. The Bucks have continued to use him as a pick-and-pop threat throughout this season, which necessitates the use of the concept of “veer-back” switching in order to prevent a pop-out big from calmly shooting an open look.
Which is what Horford attempted to point out to rookie Will Richard on the possession below:
However, Horford’s call is unheeded. Hield tries to come over from the weak-side slot to cover for Richard, but the hesitation of having to come off of Cole Anthony makes Hield’s rotation a beat too late.
Another Horford call for a veer-back switch is ignored in the instance below:
The ignored call for Hield to veer back and take Portis results in an unwanted chain reaction: Richard having to take a possible Portis roll or pop-out, leaving Taurean Prince open on the wing for a three:
Another switch that probably should’ve happened was on the double-drag possession below. Tasked with covering Rollins, Kuminga attempts to navigate around the screen with the screen-setter being Moses Moody’s man. However, Kuminga falls behind, allowing Rollins to turn the corner and penetrate. Draymond Green is forced to come over as the low man, while Moody stays attached to the roller. With the Warriors being placed in the “blender,” Rollins hits Turner in the corner.
The switch that should’ve happened: Moody taking Rollins around the screen, with Kuminga taking Moody’s man (Kuzma):
Awareness of when to switch, when to be aggressive, and when to be conservative in their coverages was, for the most part, absent. In a possession where the shot clock was about to dwindle down — with the Bucks’ remaining recourse being a pick-and-roll possession between Kuzma and Turner — the rationale in choosing to employ an aggressive hard hedge as opposed to dropping or switching is somewhat questionable, given that in such a coverage, Curry has to come over from the left corner to cover Turner on the short roll, leaving Gary Trent Jr. open for the corner shot.
It is simply not worth it to be this aggressive against Kuzma with six seconds left on the shot clock:
These decisions at the point of attack and at the point of the switch (or non-switch) were, to be quite fair, informed by the fact that the Bucks shot a scathing 19-of-43 on threes (44.2%), some of which were of the tip-your-cap variety. Rollins — traded to the Washington Wizards along with Jordan Poole for Chris Paul during the 2023 offseason — gave the team that drafted him a glimpse of what could’ve been, dropping a career-high 32 points on 57.2% on twos, 71.4% on a 5-of-7 clip on threes, and 71.7% True Shooting, with 8 assists to boot. To see [the levels behind the potential Rollins possesses](/2022/6/30/23188382/warriors-film-study-deep-dive-ryan-rollins) finally surface is a pleasant story to witness, and one worth keeping track of throughout the season.
Rollins’ performance may have been driven by a need to exact some measure of revenge on the team that chose to ship him out (for good reason, at the time), but the Warriors did themselves no favors by being soft at the point of attack, coupled with questionable decision making from the top end of their roster. These trap games have become all too predictable whenever a marquee name from the opposing side has to sit out, and most of that predictability has to do with the fact that the Warriors are all too willing to trip the switch on those proverbial traps — in this case, by being a mediocre switch-everything team.
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