Put players in position to succeed. Have answers to the test. That’s the ultimate goal of a coaching staff and a game plan. For at least one play Sunday, and surely many more, the Pittsburgh Steelers’ coaches failed.
That was clearest on Chicago Bears WR DJ Moore’s second touchdown of the day. A score that gave Chicago a 24-21 lead, one the team would not give back. Almost all touchdowns come with the defensive desire for a do-over. But this one was especially egregious.
In simplest form, Pittsburgh’s issue is a math problem. Three can’t cover four. Moore’s touchdown was a four vertical concept against the Steelers Cover 3 defense.
Here’s a look at the play.
Chicago is in a 3×1 formation with the tight end backside and three wide receivers to the field/trips side. With the cornerbacks following, the Steelers are showing potential man coverage pre-snap but are actually playing true Cover 3. A three-deep, four under zone defense. Here’s the assignments.
Kyle Dugger, Jalen Ramsey, and James Pierre have the deep responsibilities. The other four are working underneath.
In spot drop coverage, the defense reaches landmarks instead of people. Areas of the field like the top of the numbers, the hashes, etc. Meaning, the defense doesn’t respond to the routes that are run. In match zone coverage, players’ assignments adapt and change based on the route combinations. Pittsburgh doesn’t do that, leaving them one man short to carry all four vertical routes. Dugger takes the tight end to the top, Pierre the No. 1 receiver to the bottom, and Ramsey the No. 3, the inner-most slot receiver to the bottom. There is no one to take Moore, the No. 2, down the seam.
This play is exactly why match coverage was invented and popularized in the first place. To solve one big problem: four verts. In a twist of irony, it was the Pittsburgh Steelers’ offense that forced the change. Nick Saban and the Cleveland Browns of the 1990s helped create the concept of “match coverage” after realizing running “country” Cover 3, the spot drop calls seen above, was no match against four downfield receivers.
“Saban and his head coach Bill Belichick were two guys cut from the same cloth; they loved coaching defense, fixing problems and shutting down the sports most prolific attacks,” as outlined by Oliver Connolly in 2016. “The pair ran their Browns defense out of a base cover-3 look (three deep defensive backs) which was incredibly effective for the time. Then along came the big bad Pittsburgh Steelers, who began to run more spread looks, with multiple wide receiver sets and attacking the Browns cover-3 defense with four receivers all running streak or go routes — “Four Verticals”.”
So Saban and the others Browns coaches, including Belichick, made a change. Combining man and zone principles for something in-between. “Rip/Liz” Match coverage to combat four verts out of Cover 3.
As this article on Scribd outlines.
“The easiest threat to victimize Cover 3 is the #2 receiver in the seam. The defense must be able to account for this threat or it will spend much of the game seeing the free safety “wrong” on a 4 vertical threat…to accommodate for this deficiency, Saban’s defenses have evolved through the last decade with a “Rip/Liz” match…”
Effectively, if No. 1 and No. 2 run vertical routes, the coverage matches. From Sunday’s example, James Pierre would still carry No. 1 vertical. But Brandin Echols would also carry No. 2 vertical instead of dropping into his curl/flat zone.
Instead, the above description is exactly what played out. The No. 2 receiver down the seam gets open with the free safety “wrong.” And if Ramsey had taken No. 2, No. 3 would’ve just been open instead. It’s a lose-lose, the perfect situation for an offense. The worst for a defense.
“I was just so wide open. I really didn’t know what to do,” Moore said recalling the play to reporters post-game.
There are other variations. Rip/Liz is mostly called versus 2×2 formations. Chicago ran 3×1. The equivalent for those formations is Mable/Skate, which is simply match principles against 3×1 looks. As one example as shared by James Light, the deep safety takes No. 2 vertical while the weakside hook defender carries No. 3.
That’s a little more complicated with the Bears running three wide receivers to one side but the point is clear. The defense is flexible and adapts to the routes the offense is presenting.
Pittsburgh didn’t do any of that. Instead, it fell into the trappings of the early 1990s. The Steelers do run some match coverage, more than they used to, but the scheme is still slanted towards playing fast and free. Simple rules in order to maximize talent and reduce communication breakdowns. But that doesn’t win against the best offensive coaches, schemes, and top-end quarterbacks. Saban once joked that when Dan Marino is ripping it, the “old break on the ball shit don’t work.” Williams isn’t Marino but he has a live arm.
In context, the Steelers jumped offsides on this play. A signal to the offense to run deep. Patrick Queen made the point post-game even while lamenting the defense’s outclassed schematics, chalking it up to the “what-if” of football. Were the Bears going to run four verts if Pittsburgh didn’t jump?
Maybe. Maybe not. That’s the point. Defenses have no control over what an offense runs and when they run it. They must have the answers to the test. If the offense does X, the defense does Y. When defenses don’t do that consistently enough, they’re bound to lose reps. The Steelers lost this one, the game, the division, and a current place in the AFC playoff picture.
Recommended for you