The confrontation between Iran and Israel earlier this year was brief but searing, a reminder that the Middle East’s undercurrents of hostility never truly subside. Iran’s volley of missiles and drones, launched in retaliation for Israeli strikes on its military assets and senior commanders, was meant to project strength and resolve. It did but only partially, because it also revealed the limits of Tehran’s current military model -- one that depends on proxies, technology and audacity, but not on conventional military power. Israel’s defences, bolstered by American and regional cooperation, intercepted most of the incoming fire. For Iran’s leadership, which thrives on narratives of deterrence and defiance, it was a moment of deflation and forced introspection.
However, Iran has rarely remained subdued for long. The rhythm of its strategy has always been cyclical; a pause to absorb the blow, a period of tactical recalibration, and a slow, deliberate return to pressure through its network of proxies. Beneath the apparent restraint lies a regime skilled at adjusting its methods while preserving its core intent -- to remain a pivotal power in the Middle East, capable of unsettling adversaries and shaping outcomes far beyond its borders.
At the heart of this design stands the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the IRGC, and its elite Quds Force. Its influence runs through Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Iraq’s Shia militias, Syria’s strategic corridors and Yemen’s Houthis -- a web of quasi non-state actors that together form what Tehran calls the “axis of resistance”. These groups earlier gave Iran reach without exposure, power without responsibility, and the ability to bleed its adversaries without risking direct confrontation. The missile and drone programmes remain the technological enablers of this strategy, offering precision and intimidation in equal measure. This is how Iran fights -- not with fleets of aircraft or mechanised divisions, but through proxies, missiles and psychological warfare.
The recent conflict, however, shook confidence within the Iranian establishment. The IRGC’s much-vaunted missile prowess appeared blunted by Israel’s layered air defences and Western support. The Iranian public, long accustomed to rhetoric of victory and divine protection, witnessed instead a demonstration of vulnerability. For the clerical regime, which rests as much on ideology as on coercive power, that was unsettling. But the lesson Iran draws from such reverses is rarely defeatism. It harps less on defeatism and more on recovery.
The first step in Iran’s recovery will likely be a calibrated reassertion -- the quiet push to proxies to restore deterrence without provoking full retaliation. Tehran has already signalled this through Hezbollah’s provocations on Israel’s northern border and the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. The next move will be to deepen partnerships that enhance technology and legitimacy: Russia gets cheap, reliable hardware, while Iran gains battlefield validation and strategic cover. Finally comes the ideological thrust -- reclaiming leadership of the anti-Israel narrative as Arab states drift toward accommodation. Much as Egypt’s retreat after Anwar Sadat’s assassination in 1981 ceded that mantle, Iran now seeks to wear it again.
All this unfolds against the backdrop of Iran’s steady nuclear advance. The International Atomic Energy Agency has reported that Iran now possesses uranium enriched up to 60 per cent --perilously close to weapons-grade. The time needed to produce sufficient fissile material for a bomb has narrowed dramatically. As of mid-May 2025, the IAEA’s own verification report confirmed that Iran had accumulated roughly 400 kg of uranium enriched to 60 per cent purity -- a figure that indeed placed it perilously close to weapons-grade material. However, following the US strikes on the Fordow, Natanz and Esfahan complexes in late June 2025, the IAEA and independent analysts noted extensive physical damage to sensitive centrifuge and conversion equipment; assessments now vary on how far this has set back Iran’s nuclear programme, ranging from a few months to as much as two years of delay in full-scale enrichment capability. This in no way dilutes Iran’s intransigence, if it may be so called, to remain the dominant force opposing US-Israel hegemony in the Middle East.
Washington and Jerusalem now appear less alarmed, relying on intelligence confidence and Israel’s proven capacity to strike or sabotage. Years of shadow warfare have bred a belief that Iran’s nuclear ambitions are manageable. That complacency could be risky. Tehran treats its programme as ultimate insurance, leveraging ambiguity to keep its adversaries perpetually in a state of uncertainty about its intentions.
Beyond the Middle East’s main theatre, Iran’s gaze turns eastward to its long border with Pakistan and Afghanistan -- a volatile triangle where instability threatens its own security and trade. The recent Afghanistan-Pakistan clashes worry Tehran, which prefers coexistence with the Taliban over confrontation. It seeks to block extremist safe havens near its frontier while keeping open land routes linking Central Asia and India through Iranian soil. The turbulence between Islamabad and Kabul also gives Iran a diplomatic niche to exert influence without entanglement.
Within this landscape, Chabahar has emerged as Iran’s strategic lifeline. India’s decision to operationalise a 10-year agreement to run part of the port has revived its promise.
“Within this landscape, Chabahar has re-emerged as Iran’s strategic outlet. On May 13, 2024, India’s IPGL signed a 10-year agreement to develop and operate the Shahid Beheshti terminal, and -- following a US warning -- Washington granted a six-month waiver in late October 2025 allowing Indian operations to continue.”
For India, it opens access to Afghanistan and beyond. Sanctions and financing delays persist, yet Chabahar remains Iran’s key to turning geography into leverage.
As Iran regains balance, a direct clash with Israel is unlikely, but the shadow war will persist through proxies, drones and cyber strikes. Israel’s edge ensures control, while Iran’s ideology keeps the conflict alive in shifting forms. Iran stands at a familiar crossroads -- neither defeated nor dominant. Sanctions bite, and a restless Generation Z, connected and assertive, challenges the old order. What shook Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan in 2024 could well echo in Iran if the discontent grows. The regime knows patience is power, but must temper rigidity with limited reforms in order to endure.
It will persist in its grey-zone warfare, avoiding direct conflict, while keeping its adversaries uneasy, but it cannot ignore the pressures from within. Its Islamic world aspirations too will persist, especially with Saudi Arabia under ideological dilution.