It didn’t take long for the discrepancy in defensive quality — let alone, overall quality — to make itself apparent between the Golden State Warriors and the Oklahoma City Thunder, who are now 21-1 on the season and are a threat to eclipse the Warriors’ 73-9 regular-season record set during the 2015-16 season.
At around the nine-minute mark of the first quarter, a screen set by the Thunder’s Cason Wallace forces Brandin Podziemski to switch onto the ever-dangerous Shai Gilgeous-Alexander, who decides to drive against Podziemski as soon as the switch happens. Moses Moody — the low man — decides to help off of the weak-side corner against the drive, despite Podziemski doing a decent job of keeping Shai in front of him. As a result, Draymond Green is effectively guarding two players: Moody’s man (Ajay Mitchell) and his man (Chet Holmgren). Shai immediately notices Mitchell open and makes the pass toward the corner. The pass floats just enough for Moody and Green to execute an “X-out” rotation:
Moody’s closes out against Holmgren like one would against a shooter; Holmgren is certainly capable of shooting the ball with his career 37% shooting from beyond the arc. But Holmgren takes advantage of the hard close-out by getting Moody up with a fake and putting the ball on the floor for a drive. Seeing Moody being taken advantage of, Green makes the decision to help off of Mitchell in the corner to take Holmgren — a decision known as helping off the strong-side corner and is typically considered a defensive no-no:
However, it isn’t a hard-and-fast rule. There is a way to alleviate the fact that Green is helping off the strong-side corner — a mere one pass away. It counts on Moody switching off of Holmgren and rotating toward Mitchell in the corner, a maneuver known as a “peel switch”:
However, Moody sticks to Holmgren’s back, leaving Mitchell wide open in the corner. Even for someone who isn’t known for his passing and playmaking, it’s an easy decision for Holmgren to make the pass to Mitchell, who drills the open look:
These are details the Warriors have yet to internalize as a team, a microcosm of why they allow 113.6 points per 100 possessions on the season entering the game against the Thunder. That mark places them as the seventh-best defensive team in the league without garbage time in the equation, per Cleaning The Glass. Being included within the top 1o in terms of defense would typically be the mark of an elite team, or at the very least, a competent team able to scale up should the need arise.
However, when compared to the Thunder, the Warriors’ defense pales in comparison. The defending champions have been allowing an extremely stingy 104.3 points per 100 possessions entering their bout against the Warriors — a chasm from the rest of the field (the second-best defensive team in the league — the Detroit Pistons — are allowing 110.8 points per 100 possessions, 6.5 points worse than the Thunder’s mark).
Observe how disciplined, well drilled, and unrelenting their defense is, with their effectiveness exponentially increased without the presence of a bona-fide advantage creator (e.g., Steph Curry and/or Jimmy Butler):
Notice how it took approximately 18 seconds for the Warriors to put a shot up: a hurried point-blank miss from Gary Payton II. It has become an all-too-common sight for the Warriors’ offense to burn significant time off of the shot clock, due to a failure to generate open looks off of their primary and secondary actions in a half-court setting. Per [Inpredictable](https://stats.inpredictable.com/nba/ssnTeamShot.php?season=2025&po=0&frdt=2025-10-21&todt=2025-12-02&view=off&efg=off&sort=aotts&order=ASC), the Warriors spend an average of 12 seconds before being able to get a shot up — 26th in the league. They are 18th in the league (15.4 seconds) in average time elapsed before getting a shot up off of opponent makes, 29th in the league (10.6 seconds) off of a defensive rebound, 26th in the league (3.5 seconds) after an offensive rebound, and 29th in the league (7.6 seconds) after forcing a live-ball turnover. Those marks are indicative of an offense that has largely scuffled, even whenever Curry and Butler are included in the fold: 113.9 points per 100 possessions, 22nd in the league, while scoring 98.2 points per 100 half-court possessions, 12th in the league.
A significant contributory symptom behind their woes on offense has been a glaring lack of play finishing from the supporting cast. Curry and Butler both profile as the team’s two main advantage creators, in that it is their job (besides scoring) to tilt defenses their way in such a manner that their teammates are given open looks. For the most part, the personnel surrounding Curry and Butler haven’t been consistent in drilling their open looks, especially from beyond the arc. The Warriors attempt the most threes in the game by percentage; their three-point attempt rate is 46.5%, number one in the NBA. But they make only 36.6% of their threes, 12th in the NBA.
A partial solution to that problem is acquiring a supporting player who can actually finish the open looks created by Curry and/or Butler’s advantage creation. That player may have come in the form of Steph’s younger brother in Seth Curry, whose career 43.3% mark on threes eclipses that of his more decorated older brother (albeit, on far fewer attempts per game). In his season debut, Seth tallied 14 points on 6-of-7 shooting (2-of-3 on threes), profiling as the kind of shot-making auxiliary player the Warriors have had a severe shortage of.
It didn’t take long for Seth to showcase the value he can bring to the team — primarily, as someone capable of punishing defenses placed in the proverbial blender, triggered by the decision to send multiple defenders toward Butler:
In addition, Seth can approximate the role Steph typically plays in the offense to a certain degree, in actions that involve Seth coming off of dribble handoffs and off-ball away screens:
Seth draws enough attention that it creates open looks for teammates — not unlike how Steph’s gravity draws a defense’s orbit his way:
Seth is far from being the end-all-be-all solution to the Warriors’ offensive woes. But it is a step toward a promising direction. If more shots are directed toward his way, the team can count on his dependable play-finishing ability — especially, from a version that will be more conditioned and more accustomed to the nuances of the system.
Even so, it may not be enough to come close to the formula and standard the Thunder have set. To be fair to the Warriors, perhaps no team in the league will ever come close.
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