Iran’s delegation reportedly refused to attend initial Iran-US talks, citing worsening complications on the Lebanese front. The article weighs mistrust, assassinations, and whether loyalists or reformists prevail.
How much the vanguard is able to preserve
As these lines appear in print, the first round of talks between the Iranians and the Americans must have kicked off and there might have been follow-ups to take care off and debate in the respective capitals, Tehran and Washington. As per the ground information at the time of the filing, the Iranian delegation has refused to attend the meet as the complications on the Lebanese front are showing no signs of improvement from the Iranian viewpoint. For a casual reader, that might be another story amongst the headlines, but for the two negotiating entities, it is another episode of mistrust, love and hate combined; a sense of repulsion as well as longing to see each other. A love story of a sort, where in the latest episode the South Asian neighbour on Iran’s eastern borders, acted as an unsuspecting messenger pigeon, not knowing what that poor bird was doing.
The success of failure of the Islamabad round, or any other rounds, the intensity of the war from the IDF and US side and how much the Iranians are able to repeat their Iran and Iraq war resilience, will be the deciding factors for the future trajectory of the events. These events will also decide, if the revolutionary movement loyalists have the upper hand, or the reformists; and it might decide for all times, if the Iranians are so much disillusioned from the Islamic Nezam?
From the onset, came the selection of the members from the Iranian establishment to talk to the Americans, their names already making rounds in the reformist circles in Iran and amongst the Trump Administration. That type of unofficial texting between the stakeholders, the stakeholders apparently after each other’s blood in front of others, while seeking a dialogue privately was precisely the situation when the situation developed unexpectedly against all calculations. The dastardly murder of the supreme leader in a Tomahawk missile rain, which might have actually decapitated the leadership in actual sense. At that point of time Wikoff and Araghchi were very much online texting and hoping for a breakthrough in the form of removal of the sanctions and other long-standing issues.
What happened was the other way round. The social and political analysts including the ones in the Iranian corridors of power, honestly might not have even imagined that there would be a spontaneous reaction or a sympathy wave for the slain Ayatollah, who during his life was pretty conscious that he was not liked, rather despised by a broad spectrum of Iranian population; which included the rich, the ‘undercover monarchists’ and also the reformists.
It was purely the pressure of the street that the early calls for the ceasefire were not even pleaded by the reformist administration, though there were slippage of tongues here and there; especially, when the President of the Republic accommodated the Gulf states more than what was warranted forcing the Artesh (army) and the Sepah (IRGC) to issue counter statements that all was not well.
Fast forward into the war getting more and more destructive; which concerned the Iranians as well as the regional stakeholders. However, that was the time, when the on-ground situation was being pushed to the point where it would look normal and natural that negotiations should be kicked off one way or another.
Towards that end, it is a twist of events or it’s ironic that during the final weeks of the holy month of fasting, the IDF/USAF targeted assassinations were designed in a manner that the legacy leadership is done away with under the barrage of ‘enemy strikes. It was not a coincidence that the national security advisor, late Ali Larijani was tracked, till it was found he was being lodged at his daughter’s house. The strike package was so meticulously arranged that it also took out a few IRGC commanders in the process. The intelligence precision of the target killers in that scenario was such, the Israeli Air Force was supplied with the actual coordinates from spies on the ground, so that he was instantly killed with no room to evade the strike.
It may be recalled that Larijani’s death was mourned by many outside Iran as untimely, regarding him as a person, who had the legacy credentials to talk it out with the external stakeholders, not in bureaucratic fashion, as now it might be; rather a person who could articulate the dialogue with an upper hand. For obvious reasons, within the Iranian corridors of power and in the western capitals, he was likely to be a harder nut to crack. So, it is self-explanatory that friends and foes wanted him to exit the scene and that precisely happened. Linked to that, there has been a piece of information circulating on social media in the form of an informatics chart, which surprisingly lists out the casualty count across the military commanders; Artesh (Army) as well as Sepah (IRGC). Except for the Defence Minister who was present at the Bayat Rahbari on February 28 morning, most of the Artesh has been more or less intact; including senior officers like Admiral Habib Sayyari. In the case of IRGC, it was a literal slaughter.
It may be noted that when the IRGC started organizing the closure of the Strait, it was just after the week had passed that the IRGC Navy chief Tangsiri was targeted in Bandar Abbas. Though the killing had zero impact on the IRGC navy operations, the killing demonstrated a clear pattern of movement loyalists being targeted; meaning that the cadre which joined the Sepah in 1979 early or as late-teen cadres and perfected their world view, were regarded as people who would be creating trouble for the new order. It would not be out of context to compare the IRGC cadre with the nationalist foreign minister of Mossadeq National Front Hosain Fatmi, who despite being a cabinet member and not belonging to any armed group, was unceremoniously hanged by the Pahlavi system.
It may be noted that despite the breaking of the ceasefire by the IDF in Lebanon and by the UAE in the Gulf, not much action or words are being heard to counter what the bewildered man on the street smells as a steady regime change, with the shadow of Zarif lengthening with the passage of time.
The movement referred to above is actually the vanguard, who are willing to amend, but not ready to sell out. It may be pointed out that the Strait closing was not the cornerstone of the IRGC mandate; but an action forced upon to be taken. The reformist government in a bid to catch the attention of the US administration for a deal, did not handle the Strait crisis well, and as things stand, it looks like that the biggest issue at hand were not aggression on Iran by the USA and Israel, but the closure of the Strait has been projected as the major issue at hand.
The loss of so many central leaders in the movement, especially the ones who were a bridge between the warring factions in Iranian society, people who could engage the younger generation, are all gone. The calculated leaks by Trump as to who is going to be talking to the Americans, followed by a bit of posturing by both sides, especially the Iranian side, strongly suggests that the earlier deceptive behaviour by the reformist administration was nothing but a smokescreen.
Given the fact the vanguard is actually cornered and the elements of regime change of American liking are in dominance, it is a foregone conclusion that the reformist volte face will be gradual; with the assumption that the man on the street does not feel the creeping change. Going forward, any street heating up might stump the reformists. Failing which the much-awaited regime change will not be midwifed by the US-operated Pahlavi, rather the donut-eating US-educated reform group will do the needful; the wise men Trump refers to off and on.
The success of failure of the Islamabad round, or any other rounds, the intensity of the war from the IDF and US side and how much the Iranians are able to repeat their Iran and Iraq war resilience, will be the deciding factors for the future trajectory of the events. These events will also decide, if the revolutionary movement loyalists have the upper hand, or the reformists; and it might decide for all times, if the Iranians are so much disillusioned from the Islamic Nezam?