Liverpool went from dismantling Man United in Arne Slot‘s first visit to Old Trafford to being forced to mount a comeback in his second, so what changed?
Slot could ‘see plenty of positives in Liverpool’s defeat’ at the weekend. Is anyone else frankly fed up with that sentence?
Nineteen losses in one season (and counting) has made for a bruising campaign. Whoever is at Liverpool next season will have to build on the lessons learned.
So what does this latest defeat teach us?
2024 vs. 2026: How Liverpool set up vs. Man United
Slot was facing off against his third Man United manager in two seasons, but Michael Carrick’s approach bore more resemblance to the other Old Trafford opposite number, Erik Ten Hag.
For the battle of the Dutchmen in 2024, Slot lined up in a 4-2-3-1, pressing out of a diamond shape, with wingers looking to use the space behind United’s full-backs on the counter.
This time around, he lined up in a 4-2-3-1, pressing out of a diamond shape, with wide players that looked to use the space behind United’s full backs:
So why did we win the first game 3-0 and lose the second 3-2?
Firstly, look at the difference in starting players. From Alisson to Freddie Woodman, Trent Alexander-Arnold to an out-of-position Curtis Jones, from a front three of Luis Diaz – Diogo Jota – Mo Salah to one of Cody Gakpo – Florian Wirtz – Jeremie Frimpong.
For a club that has spent so much money, the drop-off is stark.
MANCHESTER, ENGLAND - Sunday, May 3, 2026: Liverpool's Florian Wirtz and Dominik Szoboszlai (R) react to conceding the second goal during the FA Premier League match between Manchester United FC and Liverpool FC at Old Trafford. (Photo by David Rawcliffe/Propaganda)
Secondly, the pressing approach being the same matters little when the personnel is so different. Pep Lijnders, speaking during his tenure working under Jurgen Klopp, made a crucial distinction about pressing:
“Our idea is not to chase. Our idea is to steal the ball.”
Pressing isn’t just about moving towards the opponent; it carries a psychological element. Put the opponent under pressure and they will make a mistake that you can exploit.
If you run towards them, but they feel no pressure, all you do is give them space behind you which they can exploit.
We saw that in the build-up to United’s second goal. Liverpool are pushed up the pitch, looking to build an attack, but the attempt to find Wirtz out wide is intercepted.
Alexis Mac Allister knows United’s first pass will be to Bruno Fernandes, so he rushes towards him hoping to put him under pressure.
But when he does so, Fernandes simply lays the ball off in one touch to Casemiro, who can now find Bryan Mbeumo running into the space Mac Allister left behind.
The United man can then find Fernandes running off the blind side of Virgil Van Dijk, and the move ends in a second United goal.
Look at a similar situation from that previous game at Old Trafford. Again, a Liverpool attack breaks down, and again Casemiro is close at hand, with Bruno Fernandes the danger man free to receive it.
But unlike Wirtz, Diaz is hassling the Brazilian as he attempts to find Fernandes.
The United man, an experienced Champions League winner no less, is concerned enough by this pressure to take an extra touch. That allows Diaz to make a challenge from behind…
…leading to a counter that Diaz finishes off for 2-0.
Same approach, different players, opposite outcome. But does that mean to say Liverpool now have ‘worse’ players?
One key difference is that, in the recent example, Liverpool are 1-0 down, whereas in 2024 they were already 1-0 up. Goals change games, and Liverpool are too often chasing games after conceding goals, with this match the 21st time they’ve conceded the opener.
How Liverpool went forwards at Old Trafford: Then and now
MANCHESTER, ENGLAND - Sunday, May 3, 2026: Liverpool's Cody Gakpo during the FA Premier League match between Manchester United FC and Liverpool FC at Old Trafford. (Photo by David Rawcliffe/Propaganda)
This applies to how Liverpool set up in possession for both games.
The winning gambit in 2024 was Slot instructing both wingers to “cheat” and lurk in positions behind the United full backs.
This meant that when United lost the ball, Liverpool’s winger would already have disconnection from the full-back and could get free at the back post.
Against Carrick’s United, Liverpool conceded early, and it meant they needed to break United down and create that space behind rather than getting it for free.
Time and again in the first half, we saw Liverpool try the same gambit to do this.
With settled possession outside United’s block, they would fire a pass to a free man on the inside…
…only for him to set it back first time, allowing a teammate to hit the space in behind.
Unfortunately, as you can see from the above images, when the free man sets the ball back, he’s not under pressure at all, so there is no space in behind to hit.
This was probably something Liverpool prepared on the training ground, planning to manipulate United’s defence and create room for the pace of Gakpo and Frimpong to attack.
But again, every tactic carries a psychological element; if United’s defence aren’t taking the bait, the sequence doesn’t work. Yet Liverpool kept trying it vainly right through the first half.
How did Liverpool come back from 2-0?
Slot did change things to respond, starting with a swap of roles for Gakpo and Wirtz at halftime.
Almost immediately, it paid dividends. Wirtz showed Amad inside the block, allowing Dominik Szoboszlai to intercept his poor pass.
With Gakpo now threatening to run beyond the centre-backs, they backed off him, allowing Szoboszlai the space to calmly carry the ball forward and slot it into the corner.
Another of Slot’s changes then reaped rewards, as Liverpool switched up their approach to United goal kicks. Early in the first half, they held their 4-2-4 shape, looking to show the ball wide before falling on any passes inside.
In the second half, Slot had Mac Allister jump up to press United’s pivot players.
This left Gravenberch isolated if Senne Lammens went long, but, under pressure from Szoboszlai, the United keeper played an easier pass, which Mac Allister could intercept and tee up the equaliser.
Unfortunately, in pursuit of a winner, Slot kept tweaking. He brought on Rio Ngumoha for Jeremie Frimpong initially, playing the 17-year-old on the right wing and maintaining the ‘wingers track back’ approach.
Cue a 76th-minute United winner crossed in by Luke Shaw, who made a run off the back of his teenage marker.
Slot moved Ngumoha over to his preferred left wing shortly after, but the mistake had been made and the damage was already done.
How do we interpret this?
MANCHESTER, ENGLAND - Sunday, May 3, 2026: Liverpool's head coach Arne Slot during the FA Premier League match between Manchester United FC and Liverpool FC at Old Trafford. (Photo by David Rawcliffe/Propaganda)
It’s worth putting into perspective that Liverpool’s defeat saw them remain fourth in the league, six points behind third-best team United, and they could easily have stolen a winner despite missing two goalkeepers and three starting attackers.
But too often these players and their coach have not coalesced into a winning performance this season.
There’s enough evidence across these two games to show that, with the right players at his disposal, Slot’s setup can succeed.
We’ve also seen that it can fail, and this group of players may need something different to succeed.
One thing is for sure: before Liverpool go to Old Trafford again, something has to change.
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