Apr 20, 2026; Denver, Colorado, USA; Denver Nuggets center Nikola Jokic (15) during the second half against the Minnesota Timberwolves during game two of the first round of the 2026 NBA Playoffs at Ball Arena. Mandatory Credit: Ron Chenoy-Imagn Images
Mandatory Credit: Ron Chenoy-Imagn Images
The Denver Nuggets figured out how to win the franchise’s first NBA championship behind Nikola Jokic, Jamal Murray, and a perfectly constructed supporting cast in 2023. The problem is that, almost immediately after reaching the mountaintop, Denver began making critical mistakes.
Some of those decisions were understandable. Bruce Brown left because the Nuggets simply couldn’t match Indiana’s offer. Others, however, were self-inflicted.
Denver moved on from proven role players, handed out expensive contracts, took gambles that didn’t work, and put itself in a financial position where it couldn’t keep one of its own best young players.
The result? A team that looked capable of winning multiple championships around Jokic has spent the years since 2023 suffering early playoff exits. After winning the title, they were bounced in the second round two seasons in a row before suffering an ugly first-round exit last season.
And after the Nuggets lost Peyton Watson in a sign-and-trade this week, the consequences of those decisions are becoming impossible to ignore. Watson’s breakout season ended with him averaging 14.6 points while setting career highs across several categories, and Denver ultimately sent him to Cleveland for an unprotected 2031 first-round pick and a 2032 second-rounder after failing to reach an extension agreement.
Here are the biggest mistakes the Nuggets have made since winning their first championship.
1. Losing Bruce Brown
Bruce Brown wasn’t one of the players who dominated the box score, but his value to Denver’s championship team was obvious every time the Nuggets needed someone to make a winning play.
He did the dirty work, including making winning plays such as getting stops, coming up with rebounds, and even getting big buckets. During Denver’s 2022-23 championship season, he averaged 11.5 points, 4.1 rebounds, and 3.4 assists while shooting 48.2% from the field and 35.8% from three.
More importantly, Brown was incredibly useful in the playoffs. Brown posted 12.0 points, 4.0 rebounds, and 1.9 assists per game on 51.1% from the field and 31.6% from deep.
Denver didn’t have to hide him defensively, and he gave Michael Malone another player who could keep the offense running when Jokic or Murray wasn’t controlling the possession.
The Nuggets simply couldn’t afford to keep him under the NBA’s financial rules. Brown eventually signed a two-year, $45 million contract with Indiana, and Denver didn’t have the flexibility to make a comparable offer.
That’s the frustrating part: this wasn’t necessarily a bad decision by itself. The mistake was what Denver did after losing him.
The Nuggets essentially asked their existing rotation to replace Brown instead of finding a legitimate replacement. The loss became especially painful during the 2024 playoffs, when Minnesota exposed the team’s lack of toughness off the bench.
Now, Brown came back after he made his money, but losing a key player too soon wasn’t the best move.
2. Losing Jeff Green
Jeff Green‘s departure doesn’t carry the same weight as Brown’s, but it was another piece of Denver’s championship team that disappeared without being properly replaced.
Green was 36 years old during Denver’s championship season, so expecting him to remain a major piece for years wasn’t realistic. But veteran players like Green matter on championship teams because they understand their role and don’t need shots to feel involved.
He averaged 7.8 points and 2.6 rebounds during the 2022-23 regular season (4.1 points and 1.6 rebounds) and gave Malone a veteran forward capable of defending bigger players and spacing the floor.
Green eventually left for Houston in free agency.
Denver kept losing experienced role players and replacing them with cheaper internal options, hoping the development curve would happen quickly enough to keep the championship window open. Green was a loss on the court and in the locker room.
3. Letting Kentavious Caldwell-Pope Walk
Kentavious Caldwell-Pope was arguably the perfect shooting guard for Jokic and Murray.
He didn’t need the ball, made open shots, and was an elite perimeter defender. And, most importantly, he fit.
KCP averaged 10.8 points, 2.7 rebounds, and 2.4 assists during Denver’s championship season while shooting 42.3% from three. In the playoffs, he averaged 10.6 points, 3.3 rebounds, and 1.6 assists per game on 38.0% from three.
He also brought something the Nuggets desperately needed: perimeter defense.
When Denver lost KCP, they lost one of the few players on the roster who could comfortably operate next to Jokic and Murray as a lockdown defender.
KCP eventually signed with Orlando on a three-year, $66 million deal.
Denver’s decision was understandable financially, but the replacement strategy was much harder to defend. This was a mistake, nonetheless.
4. Signing Russell Westbrook
This one was always going to be a tough one to stomach. Russell Westbrook is one of the greatest players of his generation. There is no question about that.
But a great player does not automatically mean a great fit.
Denver already had Jokic and Murray controlling the offense. The team didn’t desperately need another high-usage ball-handler who was most effective with the ball in his hands.
Spacing was also the concern. When your offense is built around the most gifted passing center in NBA history, creating maximum space around him should be the No. 1 priority.
Westbrook still produced moments for Denver, but the signing represented something bigger: Denver was trying to patch holes rather than rebuild the roster around Jokic’s unique strengths.
Westbrook averaged 13.3 points, 4.9 rebounds, and 6.1 assists per game on 44.9% from the field and 32.3% from deep in the regular season and 11.7 points, 3.7 rebounds, and 2.6 assists per game on 39.1% from the field and 31.7% from deep in the postseason.
This inefficient version of Westbrook was never going to work for the Nuggets, and it showed as the team was bounced in the second round.
5. Trading Michael Porter Jr. For Cam Johnson
This is the move that deserves serious scrutiny. Denver traded Michael Porter Jr. to Brooklyn in the deal that brought back Cameron Johnson, while also giving the Nuggets financial flexibility.
On paper, there was logic behind it.
Porter’s contract was enormous, and Denver needed to get out from underneath some salary. Johnson is a legitimate shooter who theoretically fits beside Jokic extremely well.
Porter played a major offensive role on Denver’s championship team and is one of the league’s most dangerous three-point shooters when healthy. He posted 18.2 points, 7.0 rebounds, and 2.1 assists per game on 50.4% from the field and 39.5% from deep in his last season with the team.
Clearly, those are fringe All-Star numbers. The problem became even more obvious when Porter had a stronger season in Brooklyn than Johnson did in Denver.
Johnson averaged 12.2 points, 3.8 rebounds, and 2.4 assists per game on 48.0% from the field and 43.0% from deep last season with the Nuggets. Those are decent numbers for a role player, but he simply could not replace Porter’s production.
6. Giving Christian Braun $125 Million
This might ultimately be the biggest mistake of them all when it comes to roster building.
Denver gave Christian Braun a five-year, $125 million extension in October 2025. At the time, Braun was coming off a breakout season in which he averaged 15.4 points, 5.2 rebounds, 2.6 assists, and 1.1 steals, while shooting 58.0% from the field and 39.7% from three.
There was a reasonable argument for keeping him.
Braun was young (23), athletic, and already had championship experience. He was a useful defender and had demonstrated that he could contribute without needing to dominate the ball.
But $125 million changed the equation.
The contract averages $25 million per year, and Braun’s 2025-26 production fell to 12.0 points, 4.8 rebounds, and 2.7 assists in 44 games while his three-point shooting dropped to 30.1%.
And suddenly Denver had a much bigger problem because Denver chose Braun as KCP’s replacement and eventually, Peyton Watson‘s replacement.
Watson’s camp reportedly wanted a deal closer to Braun’s level, while Denver was reluctant to make that commitment because of its existing salary structure. Ouch.
7. Firing Michael Malone
Firing Michael Malone was the worst mistake the Nuggets made, without focusing on the roster, in our opinion.
Malone was the winningest coach in franchise history, compiled a 471-327 regular-season record during his 10 seasons in Denver, and, most importantly, delivered the organization its first NBA championship in 2023.
And then Denver fired him with three games remaining in the 2024-25 regular season.
The Nuggets were 47-32, sitting 4th in the Western Conference and already guaranteed their seventh consecutive playoff appearance. Yes, the team had lost four straight and seven of its previous 10 games, and its defense had slipped badly.
The argument for moving on wasn’t completely ridiculous. There were legitimate concerns about the direction of the team, Malone’s relationship with the front office, and whether his message was still reaching the locker room.
The relationship between Malone and then-general manager Calvin Booth had reportedly deteriorated to the point that people inside the organization were effectively being forced to choose sides. The Nuggets decided to fire both without wasting time to choose carefully.
Why make the change three games before the playoffs?
If Denver believed Malone was no longer the right coach, there was a strong argument for waiting until the offseason and giving the organization a chance to make a calculated transition.
Denver fired Malone and moved on from Booth, meaning the two people responsible for the organization’s success were suddenly gone at the exact moment when the franchise needed stability. David Adelman stepped in as interim coach in 2024-25, and he didn’t do great last season as the Nuggets lost in the first round.
The Nuggets were essentially telling Jokic, “We’re going to change the coach, change the front office, and figure everything else out later”. That is a very dangerous move.
Malone’s Denver tenure ended with 471 wins, a 2023 championship, and the highest win total of any coach in franchise history.
You don’t have to believe Michael Malone was the perfect coach, but he was one of the best in the NBA at the time and getting rid of him was disastrous.
8. Failing To Keep Peyton Watson
Watson was drafted by Denver in 2022 and spent several seasons developing behind the scenes. In 2025-26, he finally broke out.
He averaged 14.6 points, 4.9 rebounds, 2.1 assists, 0.9 steals, and 1.1 blocks per game and established career highs in rebounds, assists, and steals while starting 40 of 54 games. He also shot 41.1% from deep.
That’s exactly the type of young player a championship contender should desperately want to keep.
Instead, Denver couldn’t find a financial solution.
And on August 20, the Nuggets ultimately moved Watson to Cleveland in a sign-and-trade.
“Cleveland, Denver, and the Clippers have agreed on a trade sending Peyton Watson to the Cavaliers, Max Strus to LA, and an unprotected 2031 Cavs first-round pick and a 2032 Kings second-rounder to the Nuggets,” reported ESPN’s Shams Charania. “Watson will sign a new four-year, $88 million deal to join the Cavaliers, plus a player option and a trade kicker.”
In return, the Nuggets received an unprotected 2031 first-round pick (from Cavs), a 2032 second-round pick via the Sacramento Kings (from Cavs), and Julian Reese (from Wizards, waived off two-way deal).
The 2031 first could become extremely valuable, but that’s not really the point.
The point is that Denver developed Watson, watched him become a legitimate rotation piece, and then couldn’t afford to keep him. Poor cap space management by the Nuggets franchise.
Eddie is a senior staff writer for Fadeaway World from Denver, Colorado. Since joining the team in 2017, Eddie has applied his academic background in economics and finance to enhance his sports journalism. Graduating with a Bachelor's degree from and later a Master's degree in Finance, he integrates statistical analysis into his articles. This unique approach provides readers with a deeper understanding of basketball through the lens of financial and economic concepts. Eddie's work has not only been a staple at Fadeaway World but has also been featured in prominent publications such as Sports Illustrated. His ability to break down complex data and present it in an accessible way creates an engaging and informative way to visualize both individual and team statistics. From finding the top 3 point shooters of every NBA franchise to ranking players by cost per point, Eddie is constantly finding new angles to use historical data that other NBA analysts may be overlooking.