The finances of Barcelona are very complex, but in some ways quite alarming. Continued success requires spending on players, the stadium and many other things besides (never forget utilities costs). Yet one cannot run a world class football club and a global brand without taking big risks, even if it inevitably draws you into an international financial world that looks increasingly unstable and under pressure to many analysts.
Barca tottered past €1billion (£859m; $1.1bn) in revenues last season, only the second football club ever to do so, behind rivals Real Madrid. Yet they still failed to turn a profit, losing €17.8m post-tax, while a costly remodelling of their Camp Nou home remains unfinished and debts continue to pile high.
On the pitch, they wrapped up a second consecutive La Liga title in May in the best way possible, beating Madrid 2-0 at home to ensure their El Clasico rivals couldn’t catch them. Hansi Flick’s side fell at the quarter-final stage of the Champions League but won the Supercopa de Espana again.
That latest league title came in the wake of presidential elections in March, where Joan Laporta successfully saw off a challenge from Victor Font, just as he had when ascending back to the presidency in 2021. Laporta is now into his sixth consecutive year at the helm and 13th in total, having also held the post between 2003 and 2010.
His re-election came on the back of a turbulent few years, ones where Barca’s finances were as much a story as their football. Things are a sight calmer than they were at one stage, but the actions taken by Laporta to right the ship, while still trying to compete with football’s elite, will cast a long shadow.
Barcelona have long been one of the largest earners in football, and so provide ample proof that big income isn’t synonymous with good financial health. Five years ago, they made the fourth-highest revenues in the sport, yet they also posted a world-record loss.
_Back at the Camp Nou_
The club finally returned to their famous home last November, but only at a significantly reduced capacity of 45,401. That went up to over 62,000 in March of this year, still a long way below the 105,000 the ground will welcome when works are finally complete — which Barca now hope will be in 2028.
Capacity during the first four months back at the Camp Nou was actually lower than had been available to the club at the Estadi Olimpic in Montjuic, their temporary home of more than two years, so gate receipts last season only rose by €3million (three per cent). Yet the return to even an unfinished Camp Nou meant hospitality takings rocketed, up by over €30m from the €21.1m achieved on Montjuic over 2024-25.
_The key role of commercial revenue_
By far the club’s largest earnings stem from commercial revenue streams, where income has exploded in recent years, increasing by €200million between 2019 and 2025. Huge sponsorship deals with Nike and Spotify have driven Barca’s commercial income up to €564.1million, a massive sum that, again, only shares a ballpark with Real Madrid's. The Nike kit manufacturing deal now runs to 2038 following a renewal two years ago. Spotify’s deal, which includes naming rights for the Camp Nou, was renewed in October 2025 for a further four seasons.
Alongside those, Barca make massive amounts from merchandise, reflecting the club’s global appeal. Barca Licensing and Merchandising, a commercial subsidiary, banked €189.5million last season, a €39m (26 per cent) increase in a year and up €137.8m from just five years prior.
Barca’s TV income in 2025-26 was €244.6million, hardly a small sum. Yet it sits well shy of the club-record €298.1m achieved in 2019-20, with little realistic chance of getting back there any time soon. Barca only made the Champions League quarter-finals last season, though the size of the prize pot on offer from UEFA still meant, the _New York Times_ reckons, that they earned around €99m in broadcast income from the competition.
That leaves around €145million from elsewhere, with €136m accruing to the men’s first team, principally via the successful defence of their La Liga title. Yet earnings from their domestic league are restricted by the decision, taken in 2022, to sell 25 per cent of 25 years’ worth of domestic TV money to private equity firm Sixth Street for €667.5million, a huge initial sum but one which now gets eaten into with each passing year.
_Cumulative losses_
Barca have lost €348m in seven years, even with over €1bn in gains from the _palancas_ they utilised in 2022 and 2023. The overhang of those levers employed by the club in the early part of the decade continues.
Last season saw a further €23.3million written off the value of the club’s stake in Barca Studios, since rebranded as Barca Vision and then merged with Barca Produccions, a former Barca subsidiary. In fact, without that write-off, and even without the €9.5m in PSL income, Barca would’ve broken even last season.
The costs of running Barcelona are enormous and, though transfer spending had been depleted until this summer, they’ve continued to spend heavily on their playing squad. Even with a squad laden with youth academy graduates. Barca’s wage bill is routinely one of football’s highest, reflecting how much the club must pay in order to retain its talent.
Wages lurched to €573.7million last season, a €63.7m (12 per cent) increase and second only to the club’s all-time high of €626m in 2022-23, a year when a raft of payments deferred during the Covid-19 pandemic were made. On Thursday, La Liga put Barca's latest salary limit at €582.7m.
_Debt_
Last autumn, _The Athletic_ reported that Barcelona held the highest debt in world footall. A year on, that remains true: more so. Barca’s debt, mostly attributable to the Espai Barca project, had moved up to €1.840billion by the end of June 2026.
That won’t be its high mark, either. These latest accounts detail club management’s acknowledgement that a further €300million in borrowings will be required to finish the works, having already upsized the allowed borrowing to €1.5bn in 2021. The new budget of €1.8bn, if signed off, will be three times that proposed when the project was first approved 12 years ago.
Barca’s huge debt takes two distinct forms, with over €1.2billion of it related to Espai Barca, a long-term project that should, all going to plan, pay itself back many times over in the future. The remaining borrowings are much less strategic and, in effect, are a hangover of the awful financial position the club found itself in a few years ago.
A big issue with the Espai project continually running long is not just related to revenues. Interest payments have started to bite too. Last season, Barca’s cash out of the door on interest rocketed beyond €90million, an eye-watering sum and one which will recur given continued heavy borrowing and the upward trend in global interest rates.
Though jaw-dropping financial losses have been dispensed with, they remain far from a picture of health. They desperately need their mega-project finishing sooner rather than later, and this summer’s relative splurge on players bears uncomfortable hallmarks; a president keeping fans onside by taking on further financial risk.
Most crucial to Barcelona’s long-term outlook is their success in refinancing the huge sums already borrowed to fund the project. Currently, even with the Espai commitments and accompanying interest stripped out, the club is not generating cash, save for when they sell off a future asset or receive a lump sum up front from a sponsor. Costs to compete are vast and, rather than reducing, are projected to go up.
So are revenues, with the €1.1billion mark expected to be topped in 2026-27. That will help, but those interest payments are now draining close to €100m a year from club coffers and potentially headed further north.
_Dedicated to my great-granddaughter who lives in Spain and is educated in Valencios._