The Green Bay Packers defense is showcasing a variety of unconventional blitz packages, and in Week 2, Jonathan Gannon called a specific blitz package at least five times, one for an incompletion and a few that the Jets were able to gain minimal yards on.
But in large part, these blitz packages helped keep the Jets offense mostly stale and allowed the offense to eventually seize the lead late and win.
The blitz called is commonly known as an overload blitz. It is a pressure scheme built around creating a numbers advantage on one side of the pass protection. Rather than rushing evenly across the formation, the defense sends four rushers to the same side, overloading it against whatever blockers are responsible for that side — typically the tackle, guard, and running back in man protection, or a zone-slide combination.
Because so many rushers commit to one side, the defense will often drop the rusher who would normally attack the opposite edge into coverage instead, playing zone behind the pressure rather than sending four true edge threats.
A common variation has an interior lineman, such as a nose tackle, take over as the contain rusher on the backside — replacing what would normally be a traditional edge rush with a slower-developing but still disciplined rush lane.
Here, the blitz sends five rushers by bringing four from the weak side against the pass protection and one that slants away from the call. There’s two rushers through the A-gap to break the running back in protection.
Zaire Franklin and Brenton Cox are the low zone droppers off the line of scrimmage with Evan Williams adding to the rush as the safety walking down.
The concept works because it attacks protection rules directly. Most pass protections are built to handle a standard four-man rush distributed evenly across the line, so overloading one side breaks those assignments, puts the running back in conflict, and forces hurried, often incorrect decisions from blockers and forces errant throws from the quarterback.
It also forces the offensive line and running back into a protection slide, shifting blockers toward the overloaded side, which can leave the opposite side thin or create confusion over who picks up the extra rusher. Defenses can disguise which side will actually be overloaded until very late, showing pressure to one side before the snap and then bringing the extra rusher from the other side entirely.
This approach is especially effective on passing downs, since it pairs well with tight man or zone coverage behind it — the defense can sell out on stopping the pass, bait certain throwing lanes by showing favorable-looking coverage, and then rally to the football once the quarterback is forced into a rushed decision.
Because the exact rush lane and coverage rotation can vary from snap to snap, even well-prepared offensive lines have trouble consistently identifying where the free rusher will come from.
At its core, the concept is about manufacturing a 4-over-3 numbers mismatch, either to the man-protection side or the zone-protection side, using scheme, disguise, and coaching rather than raw talent alone to generate free rushers.
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