Turkey has once again positioned itself at the center of diplomatic efforts regarding the Ukraine conflict. Following high-profile visits to Ankara by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan reaffirmed Turkey’s willingness to mediate. He praised United States President Donald Trump’s initiative to end the war and emphasized Turkey’s unique role in shaping what he called a “new equation” for peace.
Despite these declarations, Turkey’s true motivations remain unclear. Is Ankara genuinely committed to securing Ukraine’s sovereignty, or is it leveraging its role to gain strategic advantages?
Turkey as a Mediator in the Ukraine War
Turkey hosted direct peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine in Istanbul in April 2022, shortly after Russia’s invasion. While these talks led to a temporary deal securing grain exports through the Black Sea, they ultimately failed to curb Russian aggression. Since the war began, Turkey has sent mixed signals—providing Ukraine with armed drones and closing its straits to Russian naval vessels while simultaneously refusing to impose sanctions on Moscow.
Turkey has also deepened its economic ties with Russia, including collaborating on a Russian-built nuclear power plant on Turkish soil. This partnership has raised concerns that Ankara may have ambitions beyond energy cooperation, potentially including the development of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Turkey has been accused of facilitating Russian money laundering and supplying critical materials to Russia’s military, further muddying its stance on the war.
From the perspective of NATO allies, Turkey’s actions suggest an unreliable partner. Ankara’s resistance to Finland and Sweden’s NATO accession and the country’s refusal to relinquish the Russian-made S-400 missile system only reinforce these suspicions. Erdoğan portrays Turkey’s closeness to NATO’s adversaries—particularly Russia and China—as an asset, positioning himself as a vital negotiator in global conflicts. Yet, despite often opposing Russia in conflicts across Ukraine, the Caucasus, Syria, and Libya, Erdoğan has carefully maintained open communication with Vladimir Putin, aiming to cement his role as a mediator.
Turkey’s Relations with Russia
During Lavrov’s visit to Ankara on February 24, he met with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and later appeared alongside Erdoğan. In a joint press conference, Fidan reiterated Turkey’s willingness to support a diplomatic resolution, arguing that Russia’s exclusion from previous negotiations—except for the Istanbul talks—had prolonged the war.
Lavrov echoed this sentiment, blaming Western interference for preventing a peace deal. He claimed Ukraine had come close to agreeing to abandon its NATO aspirations and accept security guarantees from Germany and Turkey. Lavrov also emphasized the resilience of Turkey-Russia relations despite ongoing geopolitical tensions.
This stance reinforces Ankara’s delicate balancing act—maintaining ties with Russia while trying to assure NATO allies that it remains committed to Ukraine’s sovereignty.
Turkey’s Relations with Ukraine
While engaging Russia, Turkey has also sought to maintain strong ties with Ukraine, positioning itself as a potential peacemaker. In a symbolic move, Zelensky traveled to Ankara on the same day that U.S.-Russia talks took place in Saudi Arabia. With concerns that Trump’s potential return to office could shift US support away from Ukraine, Turkey’s ambiguous stance on the war has drawn further scrutiny.
While Fidan refrained from publicly reaffirming Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity during Lavrov’s visit, Erdoğan took a different tone in his meeting with Zelensky. At the Crimean Platform Leaders’ Summit, he reaffirmed Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, calling its fight against Russia a “just cause under international law.”
However, Erdoğan’s rhetoric has historically outpaced his actions. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Turkey pledged to protect the rights of Crimean Tatars, yet did little to prevent Russia’s grip on the region. The same pattern may be unfolding again.
A Strategy to Gain EU Concessions?
Erdoğan’s recent remarks on the European Union provide insight into Turkey’s broader strategy. At the joint press conference with Lavrov, Fidan blamed Turkey’s stalled EU membership negotiations on European identity politics, claiming the bloc was reluctant to accept a Muslim-majority country. Turkey’s EU candidacy, which began in 1999 and saw negotiations start in 2005, has been stalled since 2016 due to concerns over democratic backsliding and disputes with Greece and Cyprus.
By elevating its role in the Russia-Ukraine peace talks, Turkey may be trying to pressure the EU into making concessions—such as visa liberalization and expanding customs agreements. Alternatively, Ankara may be exploiting growing European fears of a diminished US security presence, hoping to position itself as a key geopolitical player.
This was evident in Fidan’s recent assertion that reducing reliance on the US would make the EU “more resilient to economic and geopolitical crises.” However, Erdoğan is unlikely to jeopardize relations with Russia by fully championing Ukraine’s cause. Turkey’s economic dependence on Moscow—ranging from energy imports to agricultural exports—gives Putin leverage over Ankara.
Erdoğan’s balancing act is unlikely to change: he will continue offering verbal support for Ukraine’s sovereignty while simultaneously facilitating talks between Moscow and Washington. However, Turkey’s actions remain far from reassuring when it comes to easing European concerns about Russia’s growing threat.
Sinan Ciddi is a non-resident senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he contributes to FDD’s Turkey Program and Center on Military and Political Power (CMPP). Follow Sinan on Twitter @SinanCiddi. Sophia Epley is an intern at FDD.