Reto Mitteregger examines the voting choices amongst young and old Germans in the recent election and the reasons surrounding this.
Germany’s election on February 23 exposed a strong age divide in voting behavior: a quarter of voters under 25 cast their ballots for the radical-left Die Linke, a stark contrast to the mere 5% support the party received from voters over 45. Among young women, the Linke even got 35% of votes, far more than any other German party.
Meanwhile, though the far-right AfD saw similar support among young voters as it did across the general population, the party gained more new voters from the youngest age group than from any other. The AfD’s appeal was particularly strong among young men, with around a quarter voting for the far-right, making it the strongest party among young men for the very first time in a nationwide election.
In contrast, the once-dominant ‘Volksparteien’, the CDU/CSU and SPD – likely to form Germany’s next coalition government – struggled to gain support from young voters. Combined, they secured only 25% of the under-25 vote, only just matching Die Linke’s support in this age group. Instead, their path to securing a governing majority was made possible only by voters over 60, as they failed to reach 50% in any younger age group.
That young and old vote differently in Germany is not a new phenomenon. Already in earlier elections, a majority of young voters neither voted for the SPD nor the CDU/CSU.
However, at the previous general election in 2021, young people’s top choices were neither Die Linke nor the AfD, but rather the left-leaning Greens and the market-liberal FDP. In contrast, this election saw both parties experience significant losses among young voters – the FDP’s share among the under-25s plummeted from over 20% in 2021 to just 5% in 2025, while the Greens fell from nearly a quarter of the youth vote to only 10%.
These shifts in voting behaviour highlight that newer generations tend to vote more often for parties at the political poles, a phenomenon that is increasingly visible in many European democracies. This also underlines the greater electoral volatility of younger generations. Compared to older voters, they tend to be less attached to a single party, making switching in between elections more likely.
This appears to have played a role in 2025’s election results – many young voters may have moved from the Greens to Die Linke, as aggregate data suggests. Polls just before the election indicated that Die Linke could surpass the five percent threshold, which is required to enter the Bundestag. This last minute buzz might have led several young voters to vote for Die Linke instead of the Green party.
The AfD and Die Linke also both profited from dissatisfied young voters. Both parties have never been part of a federal government before and represented a credible politicial opposition to the unpopular traffic-light coalition. This trend is not unique to Germany – young voters in many countries have gravitated toward opposition parties, whether on the left or right.
Programmatic stances are another key factor explaining the age divides. On the highly contested issue of immigration, Die Linke positioned itself in direct opposition to all other German parties. It was the only major party in parliament that openly rejected restrictive measures on immigration. This stance may have resonated with young voters seeking a more progressive and liberal immigration policy – a position that neither the Greens nor the SPD fully embraced.
Beyond immigration, costs of living and rent prices were key concerns for young Germans – issues that Die Linke made central to its campaign. This strategy appears to have paid off. The party achieved notable success in Germany’s urban centers, particularly in Berlin. In Germany’s capital, Die Linke won four districts and emerged as the strongest party in the city – a historic first. And only a week after the federal elections, the Linke again got a strong result among the young in the Hamburg regional elections – Germany’s second biggest city.
And, after year-long debates leading to an internal split of the party, the Linke portrayed itself as a rejuvenated party, with 36-year-old co-leader Heidi Reichinnek as the most prominent example. Their targeted campaign, including a strong presence on social media, could have particularly appealed to young progressive people.
On the other side of the political spectrum, the far-right AfD promoted a drastic halt to immigration, making it the core issue of their campaign. Alongside the widespread concerns about costs of living, the AfD capitalised on feelings of insecurity and fear of status loss, which many young Germans experience as they grow up in an era of geopolitical upheaval and inflation. This was particularly visible in (rural) East Germany, where the AfD likely gained notable support among young voters, continuing a trend already seen in previous elections.
The AfD may have also benefited from the normalisation of its positions, as other parties partially echoed some of its rhetoric ahead of the elections. As a result, young right-leaning voters entering the electorate may no longer see the far-right AfD as a ‘pariah party’, making it a more viable option in their eyes. The party also campaigned visibly for first-time voters, with some party members, like the newly elected MP Maximilian Krah, repeatedly appealing to young men on social media platforms specifically. Thus, while Die Linke primarily appealed to young women in cities, the AfD seems to have become the party of young men in rural areas—especially in the East.
It is important to put these age divides into context- elections are not decided by voters under 25: In 2025, a record 40% of German voters were over 60, and older demographics tend to turn out in higher numbers than younger voters.
However, as the struggles of the SPD and CDU/CSU demonstrate, failing to engage younger generations can weaken a party’s standing in the long run and erode a party’s electoral basis. In that regard, young voters’ electoral behavior might even be more informative for future election outcomes than for current ones. The 2025 elections could have already offered a glimpse into the future: with electoral behavior likely to remain volatile, we can expect even further declining support for the formerly big-tent ‘Volksparteien’. Instead, Germany’s young voters gravitate to the poles.
By Reto Mitteregger, Postdoctoral Researcher at the Department of Political Science, University of Zurich