Even though many believed a second Trump presidency was unlikely or even impossible, his re-election last November demonstrated how many people prefer to favour dreams over reality, transforming fears into self-fulfilling prophecies. This is a situation that can best describe how Track II diplomacy in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict has been conducted over time. As a result, there is little to no agreement between the sides, the blatantly obvious is ignored, and meetings become performative at best or simply a continuation of the conflict at worst.
In many cases, participants are not even inclined to work towards solutions but to instead articulate partisan positions that shut down all possibility for real discussion. In the case of Armenia and Azerbaijan, any resolution of the three-decades-long conflict thus remains the sole preserve of governments. Instead, what civil society initiatives exist simply regurgitate the same approaches of old even if they hardly succeeded then let alone would fare differently today. Few are willing to think out of the box or even ask the right questions.
Following the Second Karabakh War this is again an issue. Though it was anyway going to prove difficult to get regional analysts and conflict practitioners together in the same room, by now it should have become the norm. As a result, vital questions remain unanswered and others are simply not asked let alone discussed. What occurs instead is repetition of ideas that amounted to nothing before and are likely to do so again.
In the world of business, this is called the _Dead Horse Theory_, a metaphor for continuing to invest time, effort, or resources into a failing or outdated process, even after it is clear that it will not succeed. It emphasises the irrationality of persisting with something that has already proven to be beyond recovery.
Even in 2021, when that should have changed, almost nobody listened to concerns that Karabakh hardly had a future, precariously encircled by Azerbaijan proper unless some kind of integration was to occur. Instead, the de facto authorities declared the seven surrounding regions as “occupied” despite paradoxically razing them to the ground in the 1990s. Even in the year preceding its dissolution, reciprocating the then Lachin Corridor with the unblocking of a land route between Azerbaijan’s exclave of Nakhchivan was considered taboo.
Even worse, few in Yerevan listened to those such as Gerard Libaridian who warned that the priority was to discuss how an ethnic Armenian presence could be maintained in this new reality. The former foreign policy advisor argued that the most Karabakh could hope for was some kind of _non-territorial cultural autonomy_ within Azerbaijan in a best-case scenario. In a White Paper co-penned with two others, Libaridian recommended that a number of scenarios be prepared for, including one where Russian peacekeepers were to leave in 2025. Nobody did.
Even at some meetings, such critical questions were ignored by facilitators who appeared to believe Armenia and Karabakh could return to the situation prior to the 2020 war. As a result, that the conflict was now transforming into a domestic matter for Azerbaijan, where minority rights was the issue, was ignored by participants cherry-picked from only the closest of social and political circles. As one Armenian political scientist, coincidentally excluded from such meetings, opined, this should have been considered as an _engineering problem_ but wasn’t.
Meanwhile, most discussion between Armenian and Azerbaijani participants remains adversarial rather than professional. Zoom meetings, that do not require funding, generally only occur when money is made available and remain more theatrical than actual. Crucial issues such as changing the Armenian constitution are suppressed as if by ignoring them they will disappear never to return again. Anyone begging to differ is targeted online and attacked with the aim of ostracising them domestically.
This shouldn't come as a surprise. “The Armenian polity is lacking well-articulated frameworks within which to debate internal differences,” Libaridian and his co-authors wrote in their 2021 paper. Sadly, as one opposition-leaning Azerbaijani commentator recounted, when he told an Armenian associate that there was no _freedom of speech_ in Azerbaijan, the response was that while it nominally exists in Armenia, the real issue is that there is no _freedom of thinking_. Such a reply, however, does indicate that this isn’t the case for everyone.
Meanwhile, there are also those in Azerbaijan eager to engage in genuine discussion. The issue of the constitution is an example. Many in analytical circles in Baku have actively addressed this issue based on solutions in other conflict zones. These attempts are never reported in the Armenian media or discussed by analysts in Yerevan, however. Instead, self-proclaimed ‘expert circles’ in Yerevan have become “thought police,” silencing others with a barrage of troll-like tactics intended only to prevent and monopolise discussion.
This is perilous and has proven counter-productive in the past. Since the November 2020 ceasefire agreement, both the region and the world have undergone significant changes. The return of Donald Trump to the U.S. highlights this perfectly, underscoring the need for more problem-solving and risk-aware approaches. Track II dialogue should focus on developing a range of short, medium, and long-term recommendations to decision makers taking into account potential challenges and scenarios along the way, allowing adaptability and scalability with that in mind.
Arguably, only this can arguably prevent continued disappointment and its likely consequences. Moreover, a genuine discussion that is public, transparent, and inclusive, including among the populations, must start. It is already late.
##### **source: Onnik James Krikorian is a journalist, photojournalist, and consultant from the U.K. who has covered the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict since 1994.**
##### **Photo:** AI Grok-generated image. **Onnik James Krikorian**
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