The criminal military attacks seen in Syrian coastal regions last Thursday cannot be attributed to the remnants of the Assad regime alone. These men who did not fight when the criminal Assad had been in the Presidential Palace in Damascus would not fight now, with Bashar in Moscow.
We cannot claim that the operations had been planned internally by separatists, as there is no real popular support for such plans in coastal areas. In fact, these parts of the country, including the Assad family's stronghold, were among the first to celebrate the regime's collapse.
Accordingly, this was a foreign operation carried out by gangs tied to certain states and militias, such as Hezbollah. A month ago, according to sources familiar with the region, there had been intelligence on meetings to coordinate sabotage attacks in Syria.
These meetings took place in countries neighboring Syria, with elements of regime remnants, officials from a regional state, and Hezbollah members taking part. Statements by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, which led to a public spat between Iran and Türkiye, also point in this direction.
"Tehran has paid a heavy price to maintain its influence in Iraq and Syria, and the costs it has paid are far greater than the gains it has made," Fidan said. He added that "Iran’s foreign policy, with its ties to regional proxies, poses significant risks," calling on Tehran to abandon its "policy of monopolization in the Middle East."
Tehran hit back by calling Fidan’s remarks "brazen" and accusing Türkiye of turning a blind eye to the "hidden American and Israeli hand in the region’s developments," warning that his claims were "gravely mistaken."
So, was the Turkish minister mistaken? Absolutely not. A distinguished diplomat from the region tells me that Türkiye "sensed that a dangerous Iranian and Israeli plan to undermine Syria was being plotted, and thus chose to ring the alarm through Minister Fidan’s statements."
And so, what happened in Syria’s coastal region is a foreign conspiracy to achieve one of the following objectives. The first, if the plan succeeds and the coast is militarily isolated, is fragmenting the newly emerging regime’s control over Syria and turning the coast into a warzone.
The goal, here, would be to destabilize and weaken the new order in Syria, imposing new realities on the ground by forming a militia that mirrors Hezbollah. There is even talk, in some circles, of plans to establish an Alawite Hezbollah in coastal towns and cities.
The second objective, in the event that the first fails, would be to push a new "victimhood" campaign that demands protection for minorities in Syria. That is, to call for international intervention and thereby prevent them from lifting the sanctions that had been imposed on Syria during the reign of the criminal Assad.
Achieving either objective would mean suspending the progress being made in Syria. For this reason, genuine Arab support for Syria is essential today. Decision-makers in Damascus must be mindful of this scheme, and the best way to foil it is to assert state authority through the rule of law and just governance, not revenge and retribution.
To do so, Syria needs not only a government of competent individuals but also a competent state. The Syrian state must move faster in implementing reforms, ensure stability, and make full use of the Arab support it has received, all while remaining patient and treading wisely.