As the Tatmadaw/military junta in Myanmar loses more territory to Ethnic Armed Groups, some are becoming increasingly important in the geopolitics of the region. Tin Shine Aung looks at how the Arakan Army’s capture of Paletwa in Chin state raises important questions for India.
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Myanmar’s ongoing civil war has significantly altered the country’s internal power dynamics, with ethnic armed groups gaining ground against the ruling military junta. Among them, the Arakan Army (AA) has emerged as a dominant force in Rakhine state, leveraging Myanmar’s multi-front conflicts to expand its control. By the end of 2024 the AA had reportedly seized over 80 per cent of the state, leaving only the capital Sittwe, the Chinese-backed Kyaukpyu port, and Manaung Island under military control.
This shift in power raises critical questions for India, which has strategic and economic interests in Myanmar mainly through its Act East policy and infrastructure projects like the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project in its north-eastern states. Control of Paletwa (in Chin state) bordering India gives the AA direct access to these states, a crucial location for enhancing regional connectivity and bolstering India’s influence under its Act East policy. As the AA consolidates its influence, India faces a dilemma: should it engage with the AA to secure its regional interests, or would such a move come at high geopolitical and humanitarian cost?
The Arakan Army’s Strategic Calculations and India’s Stake
To avoid facing similar pressure from China as experienced by other members of the Three Brotherhood Alliance based in Shan state, the AA took a proactive step by announcing its willingness to engage in political dialogue with the junta. This strategic decision for ceasefire appears to have been influenced by several critical factors: the desire to avoid a direct dispute with China over its investments in Kyaukphyu, the impracticality of capturing Manaung Island due to the AA’s lack of naval capabilities and the need to prevent the destruction of Sittwe from military bombardment by the junta.
As the AA demonstrates its aspirations for independence or, at a minimum, confederation status in Arakan Dream, its proactive approach toward a ceasefire reflects its focus on consolidating AA governance and rehabilitation in newly occupied territories within Rakhine state. Recent confrontations between AA troops and the junta along the Rakhine–Irrawaddy and Rakhine–Magwe border areas suggest a strategic shift to move direct military conflict with the junta outside Rakhine territory. This strategy could include establishing a buffer zone in parts of the Irrawaddy and Magwe regions, with support from Local People’s Defence Forces (LPDF) and Burmese youth fighters, many of whom have gained military training and experience under the AA.
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As the AA consolidates power and seeks greater autonomy from Myanmar’s central government, India’s role could become pivotal in shaping Arakan’s future. A possible underlying motive for the AA’s capture of Paletwa in Chin state (outside Rakhine territory) might be to establish a direct connection with India’s north-eastern region.
In February 2024, India’s Upper House delegation from Mizoram reportedly met with AA representatives by crossing the Myanmar border, highlighting India’s awareness of the group’s rising influence. Maintaining regional connectivity is paramount for New Delhi, particularly as Bangladesh, traditionally a key regional partner, undergoes political changes that could impact bilateral ties and India’s influence in the Bay of Bengal.
A Potential Strategic Partnership?
India has long maintained a careful balance in Myanmar, engaging both with the ruling military and ethnic armed groups to protect its interests. However, the possibility of closer ties with the AA presents a new strategic consideration.
China is successfully engaging the United Wa State Army (UWSA) in Myanmar’s north-east, allowing it to carve out an autonomous region while still maintaining strategic relations with the junta. A similar arrangement with the AA could help India counter China’s influence in Myanmar, particularly in the Bay of Bengal. Additionally, the AA’s control over Rakhine’s trade routes could facilitate India’s economic ambitions in Southeast Asia.
India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has long embraced a nationalist, Hindu-centric political ideology, often identified with the interests of other nationalist movements, particularly those closer to Hindu identity. The AA, with its Rakhine–Buddhist nationalist agenda, shares several ideological similarities with the BJP, particularly of prioritising ethnic and religious identity, especially via anti-Muslim sentiments.
In a webinar hosted by the Stimson Center on ‘Developments in India’s Foreign Policy Toward Myanmar’, Angshuman Choudhury discussed how Hindu nationalist entities, through the Indian diaspora in Myanmar, have supported Buddhist nationalist movements in Myanmar, particularly during the rise of anti-Muslim sentiments. By aligning itself with the Arakan Army, the BJP could strengthen its image as a champion of Hindu-centric values and identities against Muslims.
For the AA to fully establish itself as an autonomous entity, it must gain financial and economic independence from Myanmar’s central government, much like the UWSA. The AA requires a reliable financial system not tied to Myanmar’s currency to operate effectively; it could seek an alternative currency — the Indian Rupee — rather than relying on Myanmar’s Kyat.
However, aligning with the AA significantly risks India’s and Bangladesh’s geopolitical relations. Bangladesh, a long-standing ally, has recently experienced a dramatic change in its political landscape with the replacement of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina by an interim government led by Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus. The interim government’s demand for India to facilitate the return of the ousted leader to Bangladesh has further strained India–Bangladesh relations. This change signals a potential departure from India’s sphere of influence and a move toward greater unpredictability.
The Rohingya Question
Another major obstacle to any engagement with the AA is its stance on the Rohingya issue. A Federal Court in Argentina issued an arrest warrant for both General Min Aung Hlaing (of the junta) and opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi for the Rohingya genocide. In addition, the Jamestown Foundation reports that genocide scholars have condemned AA leader Twan Mrat Naing for promoting an imperialist vision to revive the former Arakan Kingdom and for dismissing the Rohingya minority. This reflects his inconsistent stance, as he supports aiding Rohingyas stranded in Bangladesh while denying their participation in building an inclusive Rakhine state. Reports from Fortify Rights and analysis from The Washington Post suggest that the AA has violated human rights, raising concerns that any Indian partnership with the group could damage New Delhi’s global standing as the world’s largest democracy.
Furthermore, Bangladesh, which hosts nearly a million Rohingya refugees, would likely oppose any alignment between India and the AA unless a clear pathway for Rohingya repatriation is established. Given the shifting dynamics in Dhaka–New Delhi relations, such a move could push Bangladesh further from India’s strategic orbit.
If pursued, India’s engagement with the AA would be a high-risk, high-reward strategy. On one hand, it could strengthen New Delhi’s influence in Myanmar, counterbalance China’s presence in the Bay of Bengal, and secure crucial infrastructure projects in the region. On the other, it risks entrenching India in Myanmar’s complex ethnic conflicts, straining relations with Bangladesh and the junta, and risking India’s global image as the world’s largest democracy over the Rohingya genocide.
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India should have only limited engagement with the AA for border security, ensuring that any diplomatic or economic ties are contingent upon the AA’s action regarding Rohingya repatriation, Rohingya ethnic rights and the protection of Indian infrastructure projects like the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project. To mitigate regional instability, India must collaborate with the UN, ASEAN and Bangladesh to establish high-level conferences for all stakeholders, encouraging inclusive governance in Rakhine. Without addressing the Rohingya issue clearly, India’s potential risk is higher than the reward.
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Banner image © Sam Wunna, ‘Rakhine Flag, Yangon’, 2021, Unsplash.
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