High levels of inflation, falling living standards and war weariness have seen Russians turn against the conflict, which was supposed to be completed in a few days but has dominated their lives for more than three years.
Surveys show growing numbers of Russians are unwilling to fight in the war. Some 81% of those aged between 18 and 30 opposing another round of mobilization to feed the “meat grinder” at the front, where as many as 234,000 have been killed and hundreds of thousands wounded.
Almost all have felt the economic effects of the war, with 94% saying they have noticed inflation in their everyday shopping, according to research conducted in January by the Kyiv-based Institute for Conflict Studies and Analysis of Russia, which conducts surveys of Russian citizens.
The view that Ukraine is weaker, and that it is easier to pressure Kyiv than Moscow to end the hostilities, overlooks the growing questions over how much longer the Russian people are prepared to tolerate the war and personally participate.
On the eve of possible negotiations, the Kremlin still claims that all Russians are ready for a long-term war of high intensity and are untouched by economic sanctions, despite the mounting evidence to the contrary.
As talks get closer, Vladimir Putin will demand more intensive offensive operations from his troops to strengthen his hand. Escalation before and during negotiations is an approach he has used before and will use again.
But increased action at the front costs Russia dearly in human, financial and military terms, adding to pressure at home. And each week the negotiations are postponed, the more acute the need for more troops will become.
No matter how much the Kremlin would like to ignore public opinion, Russians are feeling the effects of the war. While they are too frightened to protest in public, the level of discontent is clear in their answers to researchers’ questions.
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The majority (69%) said in January that their ability to buy goods and services has decreased over the past six months, while more than half of the respondents (57%) predicted their purchasing power would continue to decline this year.
By the end of 2023, the economy had pushed the war into second place as the most important problem for the majority of Russians, but the January 2025 survey shows a marked shift to recognizing the connection between the deterioration of their financial situation and Putin’s “special military operation.”
According to IKAR’s survey in January and February 2024, Putin’s main priorities should be solving financial problems and improving the economy, with the war in fifth place on 11%, yet by January this year, ending the conflict was their top priority, with 68% wanting its successful end.
By putting the end of the war in first place, the Russian population has demonstrated a growing understanding that other priorities cannot be dealt with until the fighting stops.
Another important indicator of the Russian regime’s vulnerability is the growing reluctance of people to participate in the war. Three-quarters of Russians oppose a second wave of forced mass mobilization following the first callup in September 2022, with only 10% now in favor of such a step, down from 24% two years earlier.
Unlike Ukrainians, Russians do not link victory to their own survival. For them this is not an existential conflict, but is associated with inconvenience and a deterioration in their own financial situation, perhaps making them more likely to accept a compromise than people fighting for their lives.
Public opinion may seem unimportant in an autocratic regime like Russia, but Putin needs soldiers to go to the front if he wants to continue the war. The increased reluctance of people to serve is a growing drag on his imperialist ambitions, and there are only so many North Korean troops that can be sacrificed in their place.
Under continued US pressure, and facing continued losses on the battlefield, Putin would have to decide whether to announce a massively unpopular second wave of mass mobilization to prolong the conflict, or find a way to end it.
With pressure from Washington easing, he may no longer have to make that choice.
Dr. Oleksandr Shulga is the head of the Institute for Conflict Studies and Analysis of Russia (IKAR), the only institution in Ukraine conducting monthly sociological monitoring in Russia. He possesses 16 years of advanced experience in the field of quantitative and qualitative sociological research. During these years, has been a supervisor, consultant, and expert on a variety of projects, including areas of potentially escalating tension and instability.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
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Europe's Edge
CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America.
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