On the night of March 7, 2025, Ukraine faced a massive Russian aerial assault involving dozens of drones and missiles targeting multiple regions, including Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk. Amid the barrage, French-supplied Mirage 2000-5F fighter jets, recently integrated into the Ukrainian Air Force, saw their first combat action.
Dassault Mirage 2000 France
Photo credit: Pixabay
Alongside U.S.-provided F-16s, these aircraft were deployed not for air-to-air combat with Russian fighters but as part of an air defense network, tasked with intercepting Russian Kalibr-NM cruise missiles and Geran-2 kamikaze drones.
This debut has sparked discussions among military analysts about the Mirage 2000-5F’s capabilities and limitations, particularly its inability to effectively engage Russia’s advanced Su-30 and Su-35 fighters in direct aerial combat. The reasons behind this stem from a combination of technological disparities, tactical doctrine, and the evolving nature of the conflict.
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The March 7 attack was one of the largest coordinated strikes in recent months, with Ukrainian authorities reporting that Russian forces launched 67 missiles and 194 drones across the country.
According to the Ukrainian Air Force, air defenses, including fighter jets, anti-aircraft missile units, and electronic warfare systems, downed 134 targets, among them 25 Kh-101 and Kh-55SM cruise missiles, eight Kalibr missiles, and 100 Shahed-type drones, which include the Geran-2.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy confirmed the involvement of both F-16s and Mirage 2000-5Fs, stating on social media, “Today, F-16 fighter jets and Mirage aircraft provided by France were used to protect Ukrainian skies.”
In Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk, located in western Ukraine, the jets reportedly played a key role in countering low-flying threats aimed at critical infrastructure, such as gas extraction facilities and energy systems.
The Mirage 2000-5F, a multirole fighter developed by France’s Dassault Aviation, entered Ukrainian service in early 2025 following a pledge by French President Emmanuel Macron in June 2024. The first batch of these jets arrived on February 6, 2025, as confirmed by French Armed Forces Minister Sébastien Lecornu, who noted that Ukrainian pilots had trained for months in France.
Designed originally as an air superiority fighter, the Mirage 2000-5F variant boasts upgraded avionics, including the Thales RDY radar, and can carry advanced weaponry like the MICA air-to-air missile, with a range of approximately 80 kilometers.
For Ukraine, the jets were modified to also deploy SCALP-EG cruise missiles and AASM Hammer-guided bombs, enhancing their air-to-ground capabilities. However, despite these upgrades, experts argue that the aircraft faces significant challenges when pitted against Russia’s Su-30 and Su-35 fighters in a dogfight scenario.
The Su-30 and Su-35, both produced by Russia’s Sukhoi design bureau, represent some of the most advanced fourth-generation-plus fighters in the Russian Aerospace Forces. The Su-35, in particular, is equipped with the Irbis-E passive electronically scanned array radar, capable of tracking up to 30 targets and engaging eight simultaneously at ranges exceeding 400 kilometers.
By comparison, the Mirage 2000-5F’s RDY radar, while effective, has a shorter detection range—estimated at around 130 kilometers for fighter-sized targets—and lacks the same multi-target engagement capacity.
“The Su-35’s radar gives it a significant edge in situational awareness,” said John Venable, a former U.S. Air Force F-16 pilot and defense policy expert at the Heritage Foundation. “It can detect and lock onto the Mirage well before the French jet can respond.”
Weaponry further tilts the balance. The Su-30 and Su-35 carry long-range air-to-air missiles like the R-77, with an effective range of up to 110 kilometers, and the R-37M, which can strike targets at distances exceeding 300 kilometers.
The Mirage 2000-5F’s MICA missile, while highly maneuverable and equipped with lock-on-after-launch capability, falls short in range, making it difficult for the jet to engage Russian fighters without entering their missile envelopes first.
“The MICA is a capable missile, but it’s outclassed by the R-77 and especially the R-37M in terms of reach,” noted Douglas Barrie, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. “This means the Mirage pilot would need to rely on evasion and external support to survive an encounter.”
Maneuverability is another critical factor. The Su-35, with its thrust-vectoring engines, offers exceptional agility in close-range combat, allowing it to outturn many Western fighters. The Mirage 2000-5F, with its delta-wing design and high thrust-to-weight ratio, is agile and excels in rapid climbs, but it lacks thrust vectoring, limiting its performance in a dogfight.
“The Su-35 can pull maneuvers that the Mirage simply can’t match,” said Vijainder K. Thakur, a retired Indian Air Force pilot and military analyst. “In a beyond-visual-range scenario, the Russian jet has the advantage due to its radar and missiles, and up close, its agility takes over.” This disparity suggests that Ukrainian Mirage pilots would be at a disadvantage in both long-range and short-range engagements.
Tactical doctrine also plays a role in why the Mirage 2000-5F is unlikely to tangle with Russian fighters. Ukrainian Air Force Colonel Oleksandr Lykhodid, a test pilot, told Kyiv24 in December 2024 that the jets would primarily focus on ground strikes using SCALP-EG missiles, with F-16s providing air cover as interceptors.
“These planes are unlikely to participate in air battles because Russian aviation, particularly the Su-35 and Su-30SM, has superior missiles and capabilities,” he said. This approach reflects Ukraine’s broader strategy of leveraging Western-supplied aircraft to bolster air defense and strike capabilities rather than challenge Russia’s air superiority head-on.
The March 7 operation underscored this, with the Mirage 2000-5F tasked with intercepting cruise missiles and drones—targets that don’t shoot back—rather than engaging manned fighters.
The battlefield environment further complicates the Mirage’s prospects. Russia’s integrated air defense network, including the S-400 system, poses a lethal threat to non-stealth aircraft like the Mirage 2000-5F. The S-400 can engage targets at ranges up to 400 kilometers with missiles like the 40N6, forcing Ukrainian jets to operate cautiously, often at low altitudes to avoid detection.
“Even if the Mirage were to attempt an air-to-air mission, it would first have to survive the S-400 gauntlet,” said Paul Schwartz, a Russia expert at the Center for Naval Analyses. “That’s a tall order for a fourth-generation jet without stealth.”
The Su-30 and Su-35, operating under the umbrella of Russian air defenses, can exploit this vulnerability, using their long-range missiles to target the Mirage before it gets close enough to retaliate.
Historical context sheds light on the Mirage 2000’s design limitations. Introduced in the 1980s, the aircraft was built for a different era of warfare, excelling in conflicts like the Gulf War and NATO operations in Libya, where it faced less advanced adversaries.
The Su-35, a more recent design, incorporates lessons from modern air combat, including the proliferation of long-range sensors and missiles. “The Mirage 2000 is a proven platform, but it’s out of its depth against a purpose-built air superiority fighter like the Su-35,” said Barrie. Upgrades to the 5F variant have modernized its avionics and self-protection systems, but they haven’t closed the gap with Russia’s latest fighters.
Ukraine’s air force has adapted to these realities. With a pre-war fleet of aging Soviet-era MiG-29s and Su-27s, supplemented by F-16s since August 2024, the addition of Mirage 2000-5Fs provides versatility but is not a game-changer in air-to-air combat. The jets’ successful interception of Kalibr-NM and Geran-2 threats on March 7 demonstrates their value in air defense roles.
The Kalibr, a subsonic cruise missile with a range exceeding 2,500 kilometers, and the Geran-2, a low-cost loitering munition, are slow and predictable compared to fighter jets, making them ideal targets for the Mirage’s radar and MICA missiles. “The Mirage did what it was meant to do in that scenario—track and destroy low-flying, non-maneuvering threats,” said Venable. “But that’s a far cry from taking on a Su-35.”
France’s contribution to Ukraine’s war effort extends beyond the jets themselves. Ukrainian pilots trained at Nancy Air Base, while technical modifications occurred at Cazaux, ensuring the aircraft were tailored to Ukraine’s needs.
Lecornu told Sud Ouest in October 2024 that the Mirage 2000-5Fs would receive enhanced electronic warfare systems to counter Russian jamming, a critical upgrade given the electromagnetic intensity of the conflict.
Yet, analysts caution that these enhancements don’t address the core mismatch with Russian fighters. “The electronic warfare upgrades help against ground-based threats, but they won’t level the playing field in the air,” said Thakur.
As of March 10, 2025, the Mirage 2000-5F’s role in Ukraine remains focused on defensive and strike missions. Reports suggest France may deliver up to 12 jets by the end of the first quarter, though only a handful—possibly six—have arrived so far. Their integration into Ukraine’s air strategy, alongside F-16s and Soviet-era aircraft, reflects a pragmatic approach to a war where air superiority remains elusive for both sides.
Russian forces, with over 300 modern fighters according to Flight Global, maintain a numerical edge, but Ukraine’s use of Western jets has forced adjustments in Moscow’s tactics. The March 7 attack’s partial success—23 missiles and eight drones reportedly reached their targets—highlights the ongoing challenge for Ukraine’s overstretched defenses.
Looking ahead, the Mirage 2000-5F’s limitations in air combat with Su-30s and Su-35s underscore a broader truth about the conflict: technology alone won’t shift the balance without overwhelming numbers or fifth-generation stealth platforms like the F-35, which Ukraine lacks.
For now, the jets serve as a complementary tool, enhancing Ukraine’s ability to counter drones and missiles while leaving the fight for the skies to other systems. As Zelenskyy noted after the March 7 assault, “Every jet strengthens our fight for survival,” a statement that captures both the hope and the hard reality of Ukraine’s aerial campaign.
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