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Trump should embrace the Egyptian Gaza plan. It’s his best chance to secure peace.

MENASource March 10, 2025 • 5:14 pm ET Print this page

By Ahmed Nabil

Only hours after Egypt unveiled its plan for Gaza’s reconstruction last week, US National Security Council spokesman Brian Hughes rejected it, saying it does not “address the reality that Gaza is currently uninhabitable.” But days later, US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff seemed to walk back that rejection, saying that the new plan is a “good faith first step from the Egyptians.”

Trump indeed should take a close look at the Arab plan as a starting point for negotiations, as there is no other realistic plan on the table. Trump’s proposal for forced displacement is counterproductive; a group of 144 Democrats in the US House of Representatives pointed out that Trump’s plan undermines the United States’ principled moral position. Trump’s plan also threatens the long-standing peace between Egypt and Israel, according to Egyptian officials. But beyond the fact that the Egyptian plan is the only realistic one on the table, it is still in the United States’ interest to embrace a version of this plan, because it is politically and financially affordable for Washington.

The Egyptian plan, swiftly endorsed by Arab leaders last week, allows Palestinians to remain in the Gaza Strip while reconstruction takes place. Such reconstruction includes three phases: interim measures (six months), which would include the clearing of damage and initial construction overseen by a group of Palestinian technocrats paving the way for the Palestinian Authority to return to Gaza; reconstruction (two years), which would involve building additional housing and restoring services such as water and electricity; and governance (three years), which would see industrial zones built and would ensure that the technocratic committee has oversight over aid and governance.

The plan’s $53 billion price tag would be sourced from international organizations and investments. In calling for a group of Palestinian technocrats to manage the reconstruction, and for the Palestinian Authority to eventually lead Gaza, the plan stresses Palestinian ownership of the process. The Arab leaders who have backed the plan have committed to making their case for this plan internationally and for hosting an international conference in Cairo in April dedicated to Gaza’s recovery and reconstruction, in cooperation with Palestinians and the United Nations.

On the other hand, Trump’s plan neglects the Palestinians, echoing policies and plans he released during his first term. But the Palestinian question remains pivotal in the Middle East and can’t be disregarded in favor of broader regional peace that doesn’t include the Palestinians. Trump’s Gaza plan also fails to answer many questions about the logistics of moving two million Palestinians out of the Gaza Strip (likely against their will) and about strategies for the countries that will receive them and how to secure Arab cooperation. Meanwhile, the Egyptian plan answers critical questions, specifically ones about Gaza’s political future (one without Hamas in power).

The Trump administration would benefit from supporting the Egyptian plan. Throughout his campaign and initial months in office, Trump has vowed to bring peace to the Middle East; backing the Egyptian plan would enable him to keep his word. Any attempted forced removal of Palestinians from Gaza, as implied by the Trump plan, would likely lead to armed resistance—and a return to war. That war would be costly for the United States, at a time when the Trump administration has prioritized reducing the government’s expenditures. The resumption of war would likely lead to more US aid to Israel: Since the start of the Israel-Hamas war, Israel received at least twelve billion dollars in military aid from the United States. This estimation doesn’t include the cost of the US military operations in the wider Middle East (including around the Red Sea) or any economic assistance to Israel. Trump’s plan would be costly morally, politically, and financially, not only for the United States, but any other party that would cooperate to implement this plan. Given that the White House has said that the United States won’t pay for this plan, it will be challenging to find partners to fund it.

Witkoff’s comments on the Egyptian plan last week reflected two main sticking points for the Trump administration. The first is the timeline. While the Egyptian plan outlined reconstruction that would take place over five years without displacing Gazans, Witkoff suggested a longer period between ten and fifteen years and reiterated the administration’s concerns that the Strip would be uninhabitable during that time. A joint technical committee of engineers from Gaza and other parties could help resolve this issue by recommending what is possible in terms of the reconstruction timeline and process. The second point is the future of Hamas. Witkoff has concerns about the future of Hamas as a militant group. The Egyptian plan did not deal with this point, but it did suggest a political process in Gaza that results in the return of the Palestinian Authority. US officials should engage with different Palestinian groups, including the Palestinian Authority, as they did with Hamas. This may carry the promise of a long-term security arrangement in parallel with a political horizon to settle this conflict.

Israel also dismissed the plan last week, arguing that it “fails to address the realities of the situation,” in a statement that focused on the political and security future of Gaza. Although the Egyptian plan emphasizes the Palestinian ownership of this process, it does overlap with Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid’s vision for Egypt to assume responsibility of Gaza for eight to fifteen years. That echoes an Israeli request from 2005—when Israel said it disengaged from Gaza—to no longer bear responsibility for the Gaza Strip. With the Egyptian plan, Arab countries have taken a leadership role that will likely amount to taking de facto responsibility of Gaza, even if the Palestinian Authority is in power.

The Egyptian plan offers a base to secure many parties’ interests and create the required regional stability to buy time for diplomacy. US backing would help in the implementation of the plan and in addressing threats to the plan such as the resumption of war in Gaza, tensions resulting from the Israeli military operations in the West Bank, Israeli rejection of Palestinian power in Gaza after the war ends, and Israeli refusal of a Palestinian state. Trump should support the Egyptian plan or at least engage with it, both for the plan’s political and financial benefits and also for regional peace.

Ahmed Nabil is an adjunct lecturer at the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies at Wayne State University.