Introduction:
The fall of the Assad regime marked a seismic geopolitical shift in Syria, dismantling decades of entrenched political and military structures that had eroded regional stability. This came after more than a decade of devastating civil war and five decades of Assad family dictatorship, defined by authoritarian consolidation of power and the systemic marginalization of Syria’s heterogeneous societal and political components.
The new U.S. presidential administration cannot afford to abandon its engagement in Syria and leave a fragile geopolitical and security vacuum that could be exploited. Russia, for example, could use the opening to reassert its regional presence; Iran could alter the power balance; and Türkiye could intensify its incursions into Syria, collectively undermining U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East. To alleviate the risks of these outcomes, the White House should maintain the strategic U.S. presence, strengthen regional alliances, advance humanitarian intervention, and employ disruptive measures to counter adversaries.
Recent reports have indicated that the U.S. Defense Department is creating contingency plans for a potential troop withdrawal from Syria. If those are put into action, it could create strategic openings for adversaries. In October 2019, President Donald Trump initially ordered the withdrawal of U.S. forces from northeastern Syria before subsequently revising this decision, agreeing to retain a residual force of approximately 500 troops in the area. Despite broad assumptions of a decline of Russian and Iranian strength in Syria and the notion that the provisional government under Ahmad al-Sharaa has not yet seemed friendly toward those countries, both Moscow and Tehran remain well positioned to exploit existing fault lines in Syria and undermine not only the political transition but also its long-term stability.
As U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio astutely noted during his Senate confirmation hearing, the Russians and Iranians have been pushed out of the region, but as “pragmatic foreign policy operators,” they may inevitably find a way back the U.S. failure to seize this opportunity.
Thus, maintaining a robust U.S. presence in Syria is crucial to prevent adversaries from exploiting the geopolitical void and threatening regional stability and American strategic interests.
The Erosion and Potential Resurgence of Russia’s Influence in Syria
Syria had been Russia’s most steadfast ally in the Middle East, providing Moscow with a crucial geopolitical foothold in the region. The Assad regime not only enabled Russia’s projection of power in the Eastern Mediterranean but has also served as a linchpin for its broader Middle East strategy. The regime’s fall, however, significantly disrupted this alignment, diminishing Russia’s influence in regional decision-making and prompting a partial withdrawal of military personnel and equipment. This could be an opportunity for U.S. to limit Moscow’s regional power-projection capabilities, reinforce U.S. leverage with regional allies, and limit the operational freedom of Iran and its proxies.
Russia’s involvement in Syria serves strategic and political aims. Control of the Tartus port secures critical maritime access to the Mediterranean, supporting broader regional reach. Unlike the sprawling Soviet campaign in Afghanistan, Moscow’s more targeted approach in Syria bolsters defense ties, validates military capabilities, and strengthens Russia’s standing as a regional power broker.
The Assad regime offered Moscow a reliable partner through which it could leverage regional dynamics to its advantage. With Assad removed, however, Russia has lost this crucial alliance, eroding its capacity to shape outcomes in the region. This loss is not merely symbolic but represents a tangible decline in Moscow’s ability to influence events across the Middle East, from negotiating regional security arrangements to balancing against Western powers like the United States and the European Union. For decades, Russia used Syria as a strategic bargaining chip in its negotiations with Western powers. Assad’s fall, therefore, weakens Russia’s capacity to leverage Syria to advance its global and regional objectives.
Further complicating Russia’s regional decline is the possible loss of its critical military installation in Syria: the Tartous naval base, established during the Soviet era, has served as a cornerstone of Russia’s naval presence in the Mediterranean, providing it with a vital warm-water base, ensuring year-round naval operability and a sustained presence in the strategically important region. The loss of Tartous and change in Russia’s troop presence would represent a strategic setback for Moscow, diminishing its ability to project hard power and sustain regional influence. However, Syria is willing to allow Russia to maintain its air and naval bases on the Mediterranean coast provided that any deal with the Kremlin aligns with the nation’s interests, current Syrian Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra said.
The erosion of Russia’s presence in Syria has also delivered it a reputational blow. The Assad regime’s collapse tarnished Moscow’s image as a reliable power broker and provider of patronage in the region. This loss of credibility limits its ability to attract future allies or partners in the Middle East, undermining its long-term strategic ambitions.
Nevertheless, Russia is actively seeking opportunities to reassert its influence in Syria and beyond. Reports suggest that Moscow has initiated exploratory engagements with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), including “direct contact,” in an effort to maintain its bases in Syria. Such engagement, while risky, highlights Russia’s pragmatic approach to restoring its regional presence.
Another theoretical avenue for Russian re-engagement in Syria could involve a joint effort with Iran to reassert influence through a strategic partnership. On Jan. 17 Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a “comprehensive strategic partnership treaty,” encompassing areas such as trade, military cooperation, science, culture, and education.
The loss of their mutual ally in Assad likely provided the key impetus for the deepening of these ties, as both powers have seen their influence in the Middle East weakened. This alliance features the growing convergence of Russian and Iranian interests, with Syria serving as both a symbol and a battlefield for their broader ambitions to counter U.S. influence and reshape the regional order.
Furthermore, Russia’s ambitions in Syria extend beyond securing a foothold in the Middle East. Moscow views Syria as a critical node in its broader strategy to project power into the Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa. By regaining control over Tartous and leveraging its future arrangements in Syria, Moscow strives to challenge NATO’s dominance in the Mediterranean.
A U.S. disengagement in Syria could provide Moscow with a potential opening to restore its regional presence. Through mechanisms of military pragmatism, diplomatic maneuvers, and engagement with different actors, Russia could, in the longer term, exploit any geopolitical vacuum left by the United States. While the loss of Assad was undoubtedly a setback, the evolving dynamics in Syria could present Russia with new opportunities to reassert its influence and challenge U.S. strategic interests.
Iran’s Strategic Setback and Potential Revival
Assad’s fall also dealt a strong blow to Iran’s fortunes in Syria. Its once-dominant influence in the region has been severely curtailed, and it now appears desperate for any prospect of reentry. It spent billions of dollars and deployed thousands of military personnel and allied fighters to Syria following the Arab Spring uprising in 2011, only to see most of them flee after Assad’s fall, leaving behind weapons and equipment.
A U.S. disengagement in Syria would give Iran the opportunity to fill the resulting vacuum and recalibrate the regional power balance in its favor.
After all, Iran took advantage of a diminished U.S. presence in the Middle East when the U.S. drawdown in Iraq gave Tehran an opening to consolidate power in 2011. In a Syria without a U.S. presence, Iran could replicate this strategy in an effort to restore its influence, entrench its presence, and reassert its geopolitical clout.
Syria has long served as a critical transit hub for Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” a network of proxy forces that enables Tehran to project power across the Middle East and counterbalance regional rivals, particularly Saudi Arabia and Israel. However, the fall of the Assad regime disrupted this alignment, eroding Iran’s foothold in the Arab world, and weakening its ability to channel support to its proxies, most notably Hezbollah.
This vital conduit had facilitated Iranian arms transfers to Hezbollah and Hamas, both integral to Tehran’s broader regional strategy. However, this logistical lifeline has been significantly disrupted, undermining Iran’s ability to sustain its patronage campaigns and diminishing its capacity for regional power projection.
Furthermore, the loss of Assad undermined Iran’s political and military infrastructure in Syria, which had been integral to its strategy of deterring Israel and projecting power across the Levant. The dismantling of this infrastructure represents a significant blow to Iran’s ability to maintain its regional posture and execute its long-term strategic aims. However, Tehran often finds ways to exploit chaos to claw back influence, regaining lost ground in ways that further destabilize the region.
In Syria, one potential strategy Iran could employ to facilitate its reentry would be to exploit its historical ties with the Alawites as a pathway back into the country’s power structure. The Alawites, who long served as the backbone of the Assad regime, share a sectarian alignment with Tehran’s Shiite identity, making them a natural ally. In the current atmosphere, where the Alawites seem to fear retribution, Iran could seize the opportunity to reestablish its sway in Syria.
Another potential scenario for Iran’s return to prominence involves speculation about its
“ties” to the SDF. Media outlets close to Türkiye’s president have claimed Iran is “sending drones to the Kurds” in Syria, fueling narratives about potential alignments. While some analysts claim that the absence of U.S. forces could compel the SDF to seek alternative partnerships to shield themselves from Turkish hostilities, it is suggested that Iran might attempt to position itself as a prospective partner by offering support in exchange for strategic concessions. However, SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi has categorically rejected the idea that it has any ties to Iran, stating, “we have neither public nor secret relations with Iran, and we do not need Iranian weapons.”
Iran’s reemergence in Syria would have far-reaching implications for the region, particularly in the Iranian relationship with Israel. Tehran had utilized its presence in Syria to enhance its deterrence against Israel, deploying militias and missile systems to challenge Israeli security. Any revival of Iranian influence in Syria would heighten tensions with Israel, increasing the likelihood of broader regional confrontations.
But ramifications of Iran’s reentry to Syria extend beyond its direct rivalry with Israel and prolong its efforts to undermine U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East. Tehran’s ability to reassert its influence in Syria would reverse gains achieved through years of U.S. counterterrorism and stabilization efforts. It would also embolden Iran to pursue more aggressive policies across the region, from Iraq to Yemen, further destabilizing an already fragile geopolitical environment. Likewise, the reestablishment of Iran’s military and political presence in Syria would represent a direct challenge to U.S. allies, particularly Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and Israel, that may complicate Washington’s ability to shape outcomes in the region.
A U.S. disengagement in Syria would generate a vacuum that Iran is well positioned to exploit. By leveraging its remaining network of proxies and seeking other potential alliances, Tehran could reestablish its influence, restore its logistical capabilities, and alter the regional power balance in its favor. Such a development would heighten tensions with Israel and undermine broader efforts to stabilize the Middle East, posing a significant challenge to U.S. strategic interests.
Türkiye’s Opportunistic Maneuverings and Ambitions
Türkiye has played a significant role in shaping the outcome of Syrian conflict, particularly through its support of HTS and the Syrian National Army (SNA). Ankara provided both direct and indirect support that has been crucial in sustaining HTS’s operations and enabling key territorial advances.
Rather than simply responding to shifting dynamics, Türkiye’s involvement has been proactive, directly contributing to the success of HTS-led offensives. Furthermore, Ankara’s outsized influence over the SNA ̶ a potential rival to HTS in the emerging transitional landscape, provides Türkiye with substantial leverage over the HTS-led government.
For Türkiye, however, this seems insufficient. Its aggression in Syria is cloaked under the justification of targeting the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which Türkiye labels as a “terrorist group.” This categorization has fueled Türkiye’s hostility toward the SDF, particularly given the group’s role in maintaining a de facto semi-autonomous region in northeastern Syria. In the absence of a U.S. engagement, Türkiye would likely escalate its military incursions into Syria and against the SDF, undermining the de facto governance structures and further destabilizing the region.
Such aggression by Türkiye would have profound humanitarian and security consequences. A further military intrusion into Syria would likely exacerbate instability, displacing millions of people and disrupting the fragile borders and delivery of services to local populations that the SDF has established in areas under its control. The power vacuum could also provide fertile ground for extremist groups like the Islamic State to exploit, undoing years of progress in stabilizing northeastern Syria.
The implications of further Turkish aggression extend beyond the immediate conflict with the SDF, the United States’ primary ally in the fight against the Islamic State. The SDF has been indispensable in dismantling the terrorist group’s territorial control and remains a cornerstone of the ongoing Defeat-ISIS campaign.
Any escalation by Türkiye risks destabilizing this critical alliance, thereby undermining U.S. counterterrorism objectives and jeopardizing the fragile balance of power in the region. The prospect of Türkiye opening a second front against the SDF would divert its forces, shift attention away from detention center security, and reduce both the number and the effectiveness of counter-ISIS raids, training, and operations.
Türkiye faces mounting domestic pressure to address the presence of over 3 million Syrian refugees within its borders. A post-Assad Syria opens the door for a significant portion of these refugees to return, alleviating domestic economic strains. Such a repatriation would likely depend on Ankara’s ability to influence Syria’s reconstruction process and shape a political environment favorable to its interests.
Moreover, Syria’s reconstruction would provide Ankara with a strategic opportunity to expand its economic footprint in the region. Turkish companies, particularly in the construction and development sectors, are well-positioned to capitalize on lucrative investment opportunities tied to rebuilding Syria’s war-torn infrastructure. Data from the Türkiye Exporters Assembly shows that Turkish exports to Syria grew by nearly 20 percent year-on-year in December, exceeding $150 million. This upward trend underscores Türkiye’s growing economic influence in Syria, positioning Ankara as a key player in the country’s reconstruction in the post-Assad period.
Türkiye’s reliance on proxy forces, such as the Syrian National Army (SNA), has emerged as a central pillar of its strategy in Syria. This blend of conventional and non-conventional strategies enables Turkey to sustain a flexible and cost-effective presence in Syria while minimizing the risk of domestic political fallout from significant Turkish military casualties.
Türkiye’s win in Syria underlines the complexity of the regional landscape and the challenges posed by a potential U.S. abandonment. By intensifying its incursions, Ankara risks exacerbating instability, reversing counterterrorism progress, and complicating efforts to achieve a sustainable resolution to the conflict. At the same time, Türkiye’s domestic imperatives and strategic ambitions highlight its determination to shape Syria’s future in a manner that serves its agenda.
The fall of the Assad regime and the prospect of any U.S. disengagement in Syria represent a critical inflection point in the geopolitical dynamics of the Middle East. A power vacuum in Syria created by a U.S. withdrawal would undoubtedly provide strategic opportunities for Russia, Türkiye, and Iran to expand their influence unchecked, undermining U.S. interests and destabilizing the region further. The U.S. administration must remain actively engaged in Syria to avoid a precarious geopolitical and security vacuum. Failure to do so would allow Russia the chance to solidify its regional influence, provide Türkiye with an opportunity to escalate its incursions, and enable Iran to shift the regional power balance, all of which would significantly erode U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East.
Failing to address these dynamics would not only diminish U.S. strategic leverage but also risk the resurgence of extremist groups and deepen regional chaos. A continued, proactive U.S. presence in Syria is essential to counterbalance these adversarial moves and stabilize the region. To achieve this, the U.S. must implement a robust strategy centered on maintaining a military footprint, strengthening partnerships, advancing humanitarian interventions, and employing innovative measures to disrupt adversarial plans.
Policy Recommendations
Sustain and fortify U.S. strategic posture
Maintain the strategically significant presence of U.S. troops and current bases in northeastern Syria to deter Russia, Iran, and Türkiye from exploiting any power vacuum.
Reassess the planned 2026 withdrawal from Iraq and sustain presence there to ensure the continued functionality of Operation Inherent Resolve in Syria.
Enhance surveillance and intelligence-gathering capabilities to detect and disrupt any attempts by Russia and/or Iran to re-enter the space.
Strengthen partnerships and regional coordination
Bolster the partnership with the SDF to maintain regional stability and prevent the resurgence of ISIS and other extremist groups.
Conduct regular joint military patrols with local partners, particularly the SDF, to assert control over key regions and disrupt any Russian or Iranian intentions in Syria.
Create a multilateral intelligence-sharing hub in the region, integrating U.S., current provisional government, SDF, and allied nations to counteract adversarial influence and improve operational synergy.
Advance humanitarian intervention and protective measures
Push for increased humanitarian intervention to stabilize communities and address urgent needs.
Consider establishing a no-fly zone in areas under the control of the SDF to constrain Türkiye from further incursions.
Employ disruptive measures
Urge the Iraqi government to secure border areas, particularly along traditional smuggling routes used by Iran to deliver weapons and personnel into Syria.
Utilize cyber capabilities to disrupt communications, logistics, and financial transactions supporting any Russian- and Iranian-linked groups attempting to operate in Syria.