**The war in the Black Sea is often characterised as the surface drone’s arena. Ukraine has gained the upper hand, against the odds, and now denies Russia sea control. It is an aspect of the war where Ukraine holds the cards.**
Ukraine’s Navy, vastly out gunned and overmatched by Russia’s Black Sea Fleet at the beginning of the 2022 invasion, has been fighting back. Together with the country’s intelligence agencies, the HUR and SBU, it has pushed the greater power back to its own coast. Russia has, despite the odds stacked in its favour, lost sea control.
Ukraine can continue to dominate the Russian Navy in the Black Sea. It has the means to inflict serious damage if the Russian fleet re-enters the open waters, and at the same time has the ecosystem to continue innovating and stay ahead. It is a space where most of the cards are now in Ukraine’s hand.
Whereas Russian warships shelled Ukrainian targets from within eyeshot of Odesa, they are now largely confined to the eastern Black Sea. And it is now the Ukrainian Navy who are striking Russian targets on Crimea. Initially this was driven by the deployment of shore based anti-ship missiles in spring 2022. The watershed came when two indigenous Neptune missiles sunk the Russian flagship, Moskva in April 2022. Together with subsequent strikes, this effectively [**pushed the Russians back**](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2024/01/11/7436682/) over the radar horizon.
It was the arrival of uncrewed surface vessels (USVs), together with Storm Shadow and later ATACMS missiles which could hit ships inside Sevastopol, which pushed them further east. Only the USVs can really hit Russian ships in the furthest reaches of the Eastern Black Sea. The Russian fleet is now confined to the port of Novorossiysk, far away from Odesa.
The Russian Navy for its part has continued to launch Kalibr cruise missiles against Ukrainian cities. And at sea they continue to develop defences against the Ukrainian USVs. Thus although the situation is largely reversed, the Russian Navy remains a serious threat.
Russia’s grip on Crimea is about more than just the famous naval base at Sevastopol. That is a strategic asset, but so are the natural resources in the waters around the peninsular. The borders of the EEZ (exclusive economic zone) could give Russia a vast swathe of Ukraine’s natural gas reserves. Thus the lines on the map, even at sea, are thus consequential. This had made the withdrawal of the Russian Navy from Sevastopol all the more significant.
Politically the situation is developing fast. One scenario may see Ukraine pressured into a lop-sided deal which amounts to a surrender. In which case building capabilities to deter Russia’s next wave of invasion, which many believe will be inevitable, will be key. But another scenario to consider is that Ukraine fights on, without American support.
The fight would be more challenging for Ukraine. Although some Ukrainian USVs have varying level of U.S input, it is not the hardware which will be most affected. The loss of American intelligence sharing could make it safer for Russian Navy ships to return to open waters.
Russian warships might for example feel safer in the Northwest Black Sea, an area where they haven’t been active for months. Ukrainian USVs and naval forces would equally feel less aware of approaching Russian assets.
However, these capabilities can be largely replaced by other allies, and can be further developed in-country. Ukraine’s uncrewed platforms will continue to have a cost and disposability advantage over the traditional crewed Russian Navy. Possibly Russia will also [**increase the use of uncrewed platforms**](http://www.hisutton.com/Russian-Katran-USV.html). There are signs that Russian weaponized USVs are already on the battlefield, but so far not visibly. Even in that future however, the cards remain in Ukraine’s hands.