Now, it should be clarified that the actual claim takes different forms. One is that Trump is literally an ‘intelligence agent’, who has been recruited by Russia, by fair means or foul, and is willingly doing its bidding. Another is that Trump is an ‘asset’ who has not been formally recruited, but is still serving Russia’s interests. The least conspiratorial, but no less damaging, charge is that he is a ‘useful idiot’, who is following Russia’s script out of either ignorance or a desire to please. Each of these variations boils down to a claim that is, if you think about it for even one second, utterly extraordinary – namely, that the president of the United States is working for Russia.
The always flimsy case for the prosecution is that Trump made various visits to Russia between 1987, in the early stages of Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika, and the 2010s. It is said that he was consistently received at a very high level, that he may have been compromised during one or more of these visits, and that he, or members of his team, met an unusual number of Russian officials or go-betweens during the 2016-17 transition ahead of his first presidential term. Overlaid on all this are accusations that Russia rigged the 2016 US presidential election to keep its enemy, Hillary Clinton, out of power.
An unedifying footnote is the suggestion, made in some quarters, that Trump’s taste for Slavonic women – his first wife, Ivana, was Czech and first lady Melania is Slovenian – could also have drawn him to the attention of the KGB and its post-Soviet successor, the FSB.
The Russia narrative seemed to largely take a backseat until just before the 2024 election, when up popped ex-MI6 agent Christopher Steele with a new book. Unredacted reprises some of the accusations in Steele’s infamous dossier – including the claim that Trump was supposedly caught in a honeytrap in a Moscow hotel in 1987.
Since Trump made his 90-minute phone call to Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, last month, the ‘Russian asset’ claims have resurged with a vengeance across the political, think-tank and media worlds.
Why else, so the argument goes, would the US president, as one of his first diplomatic acts, pick up the phone to a Russian leader who had been widely ostracised in the West since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine? President Biden had made no move to contact Putin, so why on Earth would Trump?
The Trump-Russia narrative has been further reinforced by Trump’s dealings with Ukraine. First, he called Ukraine’s heroic leader, Volodymyr Zelensky, a ‘dictator’ Then Trump initially appeared to exclude the Ukrainians from the envisaged peace process. Most recently, he ‘paused’ all US military and intelligence support to Ukraine.
The ‘Trump is a Russian asset’ line plays well in certain sections of the political, media and academic worlds, and proving a negative is always hard. This does not, however, make a bad argument true. To me, there are three fatal weaknesses of the claims.
The first is that the charges in the Steele dossier, and his sources, have largely been discredited. As has the accusation that Russia rigged the 2016 election – although the ‘Russiagate’ claim still stirs resentment in Trump, as he showed when he brought it up during his infamous row with Zelensky in the Oval Office.
Trump himself says he was well aware of the risks of being compromised during his Soviet-era visits to Russia. More to the point, there is no evidence that he gained anything, business-wise or in any other way, from his Russia trips. He made no investments in Russia. There were no Trump hotels and no golf courses. If there were inducements from the Kremlin for him to do business there, they were clearly not good enough.
The second weakness is that a malign Russia connection is far from the only – or best – explanation for Trump wanting to talk to Putin. Before his first term, as per his own words, Trump saw Putin as a key global figure. He said he admired him as a strong leader representing the interests of his own country (a statement widely misconstrued as saying he admired Putin, full stop). But he appears also to have identified Russia as a country that was becoming a geopolitical headache. Improving US relations with Russia was an attempt to reach the heart of a problem that was affecting many parts of the world.
The same logic would apply this time around – many times over. Trump campaigned on a platform that included ending the war in Ukraine (he initially blustered that it would take just 24 hours). Why did he want to do this? Because, he said, he wanted to stop the killing in a war that, in his view, should never have happened. Is this really such an implausible motive?
For Trump, getting Russia on board with talks is the key to ending the war. This is not the same as taking Russia’s side. When Trump said, as he did at the fateful Oval Office meeting with Zelensky, that there is no point in saying ‘terrible things about Putin’ if the West wants him to do a deal, he was only stating the obvious.
Trump knows how powerful people work. He knows that Russia is currently in a position to shun talks and continue the war, which Ukraine may not be. He also knows what Russia wants – namely, assurance from the US about its own security. Ending the war will certainly take a lot of assurance, not least as Russia sees the war as a proxy war with the West, based on who has been training and supporting Ukraine’s troops. Putin sees this as a security risk in his own backyard, and Trump has similar fears when it comes to China and the US. This is the same reason Trump has an eye on Greenland and does not want Chinese interests in the Panama Canal.
The third weakness of the ‘Trump as Russian asset’ claim is the idea that Trump would make a reliable, biddable asset for anyone. Putin may be gratified that Trump made that first phone call. He may have raised a glass after the Trump-Zelensky bust-up. But he must also have noticed how well Trump embodies the dictum that nations do not have permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests.
When Trump said that it did not make sense for him to badmouth Putin one minute and propose a deal the next minute, he went on: ‘I’m not aligned with Putin, I’m not aligned with anybody, I’m aligned with the United States of America…’
Trump sees that alignment as best served by ending both US involvement in the Ukraine war and, if possible, the war itself. As his election victory shows, there are plenty of Americans out there who agree with him. They can’t all be ‘useful idiots’ for the Kremlin.
Mary Dejevsky is a writer and broadcaster. She was Moscow correspondent for The Times between 1988 and 1992. She has also been a correspondent from Paris, Washington and China.