Donald Trump’s second presidency may challenge the entire security architecture of the Western Balkans, which the US has created and invested diplomatic, political, and military capital to safeguard.
Swift and easy deals between Trump and favored local groups seeking political and economic benefits may cause the first cracks in the system.
Washington has played a crucial role in shaping the security architecture of the Western Balkans. This includes the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, despite ongoing challenges from secessionist forces, remains a key framework for preserving the country’s territorial integrity.
The US was also instrumental in supporting Kosovo’s quest for independence during and after the war in 1998-1999 and mitigating later interethnic tensions in North Macedonia. By doing so, Washington has established a comprehensive regional security architecture and worked to safeguard peace and security through its contribution to NATO’s presence in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as by imposing sanctions against those threatening peace and stability, most notably Serbia.
The leaders of Serbia, Republika Srpska (Bosnia’s Serb-majority entity), and North Macedonia (and even Albania) may hope that their support for Trump will now bring political and economic benefits.
Aleksandar Vučić and Milorad Dodik, the leaders of the first two entities above, anticipate a more Serb(ia)-centric US foreign policy, believing that past administrations favored Bosniaks and (Kosovo) Albanians over their own national interests. They hope to translate their personal ties with Trump’s administration into tangible political benefits in Kosovo and Bosnia Hercegovina, respectively.
In the short run, the primary benefit local leaders can expect from the US are economic. During the Biden era, members of the Trump family showed interest in real estate opportunities across the region, notably along the Albanian coastline and islands and in downtown Belgrade. These ventures have cemented relationships to the current governments of Albania and Serbia, respectively.
The role of Richard Grenell, Trump’s presidential envoy for special missions, will also be significant. Grenell has cultivated strong relationships with Serbian political and economic elites, supported the country’s old political elite, and expressed dissatisfaction with Kosovo’s Prime Minister Albin Kurti.
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The current administration’s disdain for Kurti’s “Kosovo First” policy may serve as a basis for history to repeat itself: In 2020, the US encouraged the opposition to file a no-confidence motion against Kurti, resulting in the collapse of his first cabinet. Kurti is pro-American, but he has shown greater independence of mind than some earlier Kosovar leaders and is especially cautious about making deals with Serbia.
With Kurti out of office, it may be easier for the White House to broker another “peace agreement” between Serbia and Kosovo, as happened under the first Trump administration in 2020. The old political elite in Kosovo, along with Serbia’s Vučić, have always been more inclined to broker shady deals, especially when significant economic benefits were attached. (Both countries are mired in corruption, although Serbia is somewhat worse.)
In Bosnia Hercegovina, Dodik also hopes for more favorable treatment from Trump. This includes reintegration into a larger economic activity that has been severely limited by US sanctions imposed against his family members, business associates, and himself.
Interestingly, Dodik was added to the sanctions list a few days before Trump’s first term began and has remained there since. That may partly reflect a less close association between and US political circles than Vučić, but he may now hope either the Serbian president or Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, his key EU ally, will advocate for him in the White House.
So far, the US stands firm in its commitment to preserving the current status quo and openly opposes attempts to undermine the Dayton Peace Accords, which is much the same position it took during Trump’s first presidency. However, in recent weeks, the US has sent mixed signals: it declined to co-sign joint statements in support of the High Representative’s actions although, Secretary of State Marco Rubio has called out destabilizing forces in Republika Srpska.
Further, Dodik’s son claimed that border changes may not be completely off the table for Washington. Given the current political climate amid Dodik’s recent (and as-yet unexecuted) one-year prison sentence for defying the High Representative’s decisions, this claim might be a bluff to test reactions.
As long as the US remains preoccupied with Ukraine and the Middle East, the Western Balkans, in terms of bilateral or national issues, will not be high on its foreign policy agenda. It is also unlikely that the US will decide on a complete military withdrawal from the region. Currently, there are around 600 American troops in Kosovo, and the NATO Headquarters in Sarajevo is headed by an American commander.
While a reduced American presence at KFOR may be possible, it is unlikely to mean the closure of Camp Bondsteel, the base in Kosovo that is the region’s largest US facility and that provides Washington with an excellent geopolitical location in Europe. Although American contributions to KFOR may be easily substituted by fellow allies (notably Turkey), the absence of American boots on the ground — both practically and symbolically — would be felt and exploited by external powers.
The real risk is that the US unintentionally begins to dismantle the security and political architecture it has spent decades constructing and maintaining in the Western Balkans. Driven by Trump’s desire to achieve quick successes and his engagement with admiring local leaders, this could create the first cracks in that system, especially in Kosovo, and Bosnia and Hercegovina. These cracks would surely be used and abused by local and external groups, ultimately with unwanted and potentially serious consequences for Europe.
Ferenc Németh is a Research Fellow and Program Manager at the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs (HIIA), and a Ph.D. student at the Doctoral School of International Relations and Political Science at the Corvinus University of Budapest. He was previously a Denton Fellow at CEPA.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
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CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America.
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