Photo: Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks during annual news conference in Moscow, Russia December 20, 2018. Credit: REUTERS/Maxim Shemetov/File Photo
Photo: Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks during annual news conference in Moscow, Russia December 20, 2018. Credit: REUTERS/Maxim Shemetov/File Photo
Here is the stark truth — the Kremlin will never believe in the prospect of lasting peace with the US, which it hates, no matter what gifts the Trump administration is willing to lay before the Kremlin.
What then for the peace talks? Nothing good. The Kremlin may agree a tactical disengagement from its battle against US global power for a year or two, but there will be no serious consideration of a lasting arrangement with Washington. (President Trump said on March 14 that he sees “good signals” of a ceasefire deal with Russia on Ukraine.)
Is there evidence for skepticism on the Kremlin’s intentions? There is.
The Russian intelligence agencies, fully mobilized for the war with the West, show no sign of easing the tempo of their extensive operations in Europe.
Nor do the agencies instrumental in projecting Kremlin’s soft power and running hybrid interference operations. The Kremlin makes sure that the direction and intensity of such operations remain exactly the same, judging by the most recent appointments to key positions.
Putin just made Igor Chaika a deputy head of Rossotrudnichestvo.
Rossotrudnichestvo is an umbrella agency under the Russian Foreign Ministry for a collection of foundations to support compatriots abroad, i.e. emigres loyal to the Kremlin. Since 2020, the agency has been led by Yevgeny Primakov Jr, a proud grandson of the former Russian prime minister and former head of the Russian foreign intelligence service, the SVR (the connection is demonstrated by the agency’s annual award to those artists and journalists celebrating Primakov Senior’s SVR.)
Rossotrudnichestvo operates a network of cultural centers (Russian Houses) around the world. Due to the shortage of diplomatic personnel since the mass expulsion of embassy-based Russian spies and diplomats in 2022, the centers have increasingly become bases for Russian intelligence operations, something dating back to the Cold War.
The KGB’s 1968 manual, “The Use of the Soviet Culture Committee for Cultural Ties with Compatriots Abroad in Intelligence Activity,” put it this way: “The main operational task for our intelligence to conduct through the Soviet Committee is to use the official work, propaganda and other means of influencing compatriots to prepare the ground for the deployment of recruitment and other intelligence and counterintelligence measures using emigration as an operational base.”
If anything, the activities of the Russian Houses have only become more aggressive: In January, we wrote that the Russian House in Ankara had organized an exhibition on supposed Ukrainian war crimes while proudly and openly collecting goods for Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine.
Since then, Azerbaijan and Moldova have ordered the closure of the Russian Houses in their countries. In Azerbaijan, the closure was preceded by a storyaired on Azerbaijan’s BakuTV which claimed that the Baku-based Russian House had harbored intelligence operatives. In Moldova, the official reason given for the closure was the Russian drones in Moldovan airspace, but also subversive activities.
Rossotrudnichestvo has scored some successes, too. In early March, it agreed to a partner organization deal with Ghana as part of its network.
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The Kremlin is not in the habit of apologizing and was soon able to send a message back to Moldova following the closure there. It appointed as its new deputy head Igor Chaika, 36, who is a nepo kid who comes from a family of the top Russian dignitaries close to Vladimir Putin. He also has quite a reputation in Moldova.
His father, Yuri Chaika, is a member of Russia’s Security Council and had previously served as the Minister of Justice and Prosecutor General for 17 years. He left the position only to become Putin’s envoy to the North Caucasus.
Igor’s elder brother Artem, a businessman and advisor to Ramzan Kadyrov, the head of Chechnya, has never been embarrassed to use his family connections to further his business. The father was made the target of Western sanctions in 2022 in relation to the war in Ukraine, and his other son Artem had been under US sanctions since 2017 for corruption.
Igor Chaika has happily combined government service and business, owning several companies with state contracts. He has also been the head of the Public Council of Rossotrudnichestvo since 2021.
Igor became notorious in Moldova: he was sanctioned by the US in May 2022 for developing “detailed plans to undermine Moldovan president Maia Sandu and return Moldova to Russia’s sphere of influence in advance of 2021 Moldovan elections.”
According to the US Department of the Treasury, Chaika developed his plan with the aid of Putin’s spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov. Chaika brokered the alliance between supporters of Ilan Shor, a Moldovan politician and convicted fraudster, and Igor Dodon, the former President of Moldova. Chaika’s enterprises were very useful in funneling money to collaborating political parties in Moldova.
In Moldova, and as a result, he has been banned from entering the country. But he didn’t stay idle. According to the Russian pro-war channels, Igor Chaika became involved in prisoner exchanges between Russia and Ukraine.
In other words, a new deputy head of Rossotrudnichestvo is not just any old official whose life’s work is to promote the Russian language abroad – the official objective of the agency.
Rossotrudnichestvo remains on war footing, sending a clear signal. While Putin may profess to talk peace, Europe will not be spared.
Andrei Soldatov andIrina Borogan are Non-resident Senior Fellows with the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA.) They are Russian investigative journalists and co-founders of Agentura.ru, a watchdog of Russian secret service activities.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
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