By Vasil Sikharulidze
(FPRI) — Russia’s influence operations in Georgia represent one of the Black Sea region’s most comprehensive hybrid warfare campaigns. The Kremlin has employed military intervention and territorial occupation, economic embargos, energy leverages, political co-optation, corruption, and information warfare. The Kremlin’s objective is clear: to undermine Georgia’s statehood and derail the country from its democratic and economic development and Euro-Atlantic integration path, as well as entrench Russian strategic dominance.
While Russia’s military occupation of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali remains a direct challenge to Georgia’s sovereignty, Moscow has expanded its influence through political co-optation, economic dependency, and information warfare. In Georgia, Russia has penetrated the ruling elite, manipulated public discourse, and fostered internal divisions, allowing it to exert control without open military action but with deeply embedded instruments of influence.
While Georgia has demonstrated strong public resistance to these efforts, the growing authoritarian tendencies of its ruling elites—aided by Russian interference—pose a severe risk to the country’s future.
Security Dimension
To understand Russia’s influence in Georgia, we must begin with the security dimension. In 2008, Russia launched an open military invasion of Georgia. Currently, in violation of the EU-mediated ceasefire, Russia continues to occupy 20 percent of Georgia’s territory, establishing permanent military bases in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali. This occupation is a deliberate instrument of coercion aimed at limiting Georgia’s strategic choices.
One of Russia’s hybrid tactics is “borderization”—the gradual shifting of the occupation line deeper into Georgian-controlled territory. This tactic fosters insecurity, keeps border communities under constant pressure, disrupts local economies, and tests Western reactions.
However, Russia’s influence in Georgia extends far beyond military pressure. Since 2012, following the electoral victory of the Georgian Dream – Democratic Georgia Party (GD), founded by Bidzina Ivanishvili (a billionaire with deep ties to Russia), Georgia’s political alignment has gradually shifted as a result of Kremlin narratives and financial incentives. It has accelerated in recent years, most actively after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. What began as a “normalization policy” with Russia has evolved into a systemic rollback of democratic institutions and growing alignment with Kremlin objectives. Eventually, it developed into a Kleptocratic authoritarian governance system that had many similarities to the Kremlin regime.
Another key turning point came in 2023 when the European Union granted Georgia candidate status. Instead of embracing this historic opportunity, the ruling party reintroduced the Russian-style “Foreign Agents’ law,” a measure designed to silence civil society and independent media. This move sparked massive protests that were met with brutality from the government. Yet the government doubled down on Kremlin-style rhetoric, accusing the West of orchestrating unrest and attempting to drug Georgia into the war with Russia. The GD party even came up with a unique conspiracy theory of the “Global War Party,” framing all critics as part of this “party” that was pushing Georgia towards war. GD has echoed Moscow’s narrative on the 2008 war, blaming past Georgian leaders instead of Russia. The Kremlin’s propaganda promotes appeasement as the path to stability while portraying the West as a disruptor.
Economic Leverages
Beyond security and politics, Russia maintains substantial economic leverage over Georgia through trade dependencies, energy supply, and penetration into Georgia’s financial System.
Despite a trade embargo from Russia that started in 2006, Georgia had remarkable economic growth thanks to effective economic and governance reforms undertaken. Georgian exports to Russia resumed in 2013. Despite Georgia’s stated policy of economic diversification, trade data shows a steady increase in economic ties with Russia.
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the structure of Russian business activities in Georgia underwent significant changes. Large Russian enterprises were compelled to exit the market, leading to a rise in small and medium-sized enterprises. Given that 38 percent of foreign investments in Georgia originate from offshore zones, accurately assessing the extent of Russian oligarchic influence remains challenging.
In 2022, Russian foreign direct investment in Georgia reached a record $105.6 million, followed by a slight decline to $103.3 million in 2023. This increase has raised concerns among policymakers regarding Georgia’s long-term economic sovereignty. A particularly notable trend is the surge in real estate acquisitions by Russian citizens, which grew by 115 percent between 2022 and 2023, raising concerns about financial penetration and long-term economic influence.
In 2023, the officially recorded trade turnover between Georgia and Russia reached $2.39 billion—a 47 percent increase compared to 2021, the year before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s share of Georgia’s total trade turnover fluctuated over the past three years, rising from 11.4 percent in 2021 to 13.1 percent in 2022 before declining to 11.2 percent in 2023. This increasing economic interdependence poses risks, particularly for Georgian manufacturers who face growing competition from Russian imports, which now constitute approximately 39 percent of Georgia’s total imports.
Energy Dependence: A Strategic Vulnerability
Georgia’s dependency on Russian natural gas remains very low—Georgia mainly relies on natural gas from Azerbaijan since the 2006 South Caucasus Pipeline (or the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Pipeline). While Georgia receives natural gas from Azerbaijan, Russian pricing mechanisms remain opaque, raising concerns about potential energy coercion.
However, Georgia has become heavily dependent on Russia for liquefied petroleum gas controlled by Moscow-backed enterprises. Furthermore, Georgia relies entirely on imported petroleum, and current trends show that Georgia is becoming more dependent on Russian oil products such as gasoline and diesel again, which wasn’t the case a few years ago. In 2023, Russian fuel imports declined by 11 percent ($70 million) due to supply disruptions, but overall, Georgia’s dependence on Russian petroleum has increased since 2021.
One of the most concerning aspects of Georgia’s energy policy is the absence of a strategic gas reserve, which places the country at risk of severe supply disruptions. Despite receiving €120 million in funding from European institutions for the construction of a strategic reserve, the Georgian government redirected these funds during the COVID-19 pandemic, delaying the project until 2025. As a result, Georgia remains the only country in the region without a strategic gas storage facility, making it highly vulnerable to supply shocks and potential Russian coercion.
Strategic Connectivity and the Anaklia Deep-Sea Port
Georgia’s geostrategic position makes it a vital link between Europe and Central Asia, with great potential for strategic connectivity crucial for trade, energy, and transportation. By bypassing Russia, this network may reduce Moscow’s leverage over regional commerce and strengthen economic ties between Central Asia and Europe, contributing to EU energy security.
The Anaklia Deep-Sea Port was designed to enhance Georgia’s role as a key transit hub, attract Western investment, and integrate the country into global supply chains. However, the GD government undermined the project by canceling contracts, delaying implementation, and handing it over to a Chinese firm. This move sidelined Western investment and raised concerns about Chinese and Russian influence over Georgia’s infrastructure.
By obstructing Anaklia, the government weakened Georgia’s strategic connectivity, reinforcing economic dependencies that serve Moscow’s interests. The project’s failure highlights how political decisions, influenced by pro-Russian narratives and geopolitical pressures, continue to limit Georgia’s long-term economic potential.
Soft Power: Intelligence & Propaganda Networks
Russia has systematically invested in propaganda, disinformation, political influence, and intelligence penetration in Georgia. Beyond economic dependencies, Moscow has developed a multi-layered soft-power network designed to shape public discourse, foster pro-Kremlin sentiments, and undermine Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration.
One of the key pillars of Russia’s influence strategy is disinformation and media control. Kremlin-backed media outlets, troll farms, and social media networks actively disseminate anti-Western narratives, portraying European and NATO integration as threats to Georgia’s sovereignty and traditional values. These efforts promote the notion that Russia is Georgia’s natural economic and security partner, reinforcing dependence on Moscow. The penetration of these narratives extends beyond media platforms into Georgia’s political landscape, where the GD political class echoes Kremlin rhetoric opposing NATO and EU integration.
A particularly concerning development is the role of the GD party in advancing anti-Western narratives. Over time, the ruling party has cultivated a distinctly anti-American and anti-European political rhetoric that closely mirrors Kremlin propaganda. GD leaders and affiliated media outlets routinely claim that the West seeks to destabilize Georgia, interfere in its domestic affairs, and push the country into war with Russia. These accusations, similar to narratives promoted by Russian state media, serve to discredit Georgia’s Western allies and undermine public support for European and NATO integration.
The party has also employed fear-based messaging by portraying Western engagement as a direct threat to Georgia’s sovereignty while simultaneously advocating for “sovereign democracy”—a concept aligned with Moscow’s ideological framework, which rejects Western democratic models in favor of state-controlled governance.
Moscow has also cultivated an extensive network of non-governmental organizations and intelligence-linked entities to advance its strategic objectives. Investigative reports indicate that at least tens of pro-Russian organizations operate in Georgia, engaging in activities that whitewash Moscow’s aggression, downplay the occupation of Georgian territories, and propagate anti-Western propaganda. These organizations not only shape public opinion but serve as instruments for intelligence gathering, political lobbying, and electoral interference.
The depth of Russian influence within Georgia’s political elite was starkly revealed in April 2024 when Ivanishvili claimed that Russia’s invasions of Georgia and Ukraine were orchestrated by a “Global War Party” in the West. Similarly, statements from Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze suggesting that external forces control the United States and the European Union further illustrate the extent to which Kremlin-aligned narratives have been internalized within the ruling establishment. These statements reflect a broader effort to shift public opinion away from Western integration and to normalize closer ties with Moscow.
Beyond political and media influence, Russia uses economic and financial tools to expand its presence in Georgia. State-controlled businesses serve strategic interests, while covert funding supports pro-Russian parties, civil groups, and media outlets that amplify Kremlin propaganda. These resources also fuel electoral interference, shaping Georgia’s political trajectory.
In the digital sphere, Russian troll factories and media networks manipulate public perception, particularly during elections. They discredit Western alliances, promote pro-Kremlin narratives, and compete with national broadcasters. The GD party and its affiliates play a key role in this information warfare, pushing anti-Western rhetoric, revisionist history on the 2008 war, and policies that weaken Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic ties.
The 2024 Elections and Public Protests
The October 26, 2024, parliamentary elections marked a major setback for Georgia’s democracy. Independent observers, including the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy, the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, and international monitors, documented widespread electoral fraud, including voter intimidation, ballot stuffing, vote secrecy breaches, and suppression of election observers.
Despite clear evidence of fraud, the Central Election Commission declared GD victorious with 54 percent, an outcome immediately rejected by opposition parties, civil society, and international observers. While the European Union and United States refused to recognize the results, Russia and other pro-Kremlin leaders endorsed them, reinforcing Georgia’s political shift toward Moscow.
Mass protests erupted, now lasting for over eighty-five consecutive days, making them one of Georgia’s longest-running resistance movements. The government responded with Kremlin-style repression, including brutal police crackdowns with mass detentions and arrests, beating and torturing detainees, and smear campaigns labeling protesters as “foreign agents.”
In a further escalation, Ivanishvili’s regime enacted draconian legislation that violates fundamental rights, including freedom of assembly, expression, and due process. It also uses financial pressure as a tool of political suppression. Just one example is the weaponization of financial penalties against protesters. Authorities introduced harsh new fines of 5,000 GEL—a crippling sum in a country where the average pension is 350 GEL and salaries average 1,000 GEL. More than fifty political prisoners remain detained while a politically controlled judiciary rubber-stamps these penalties. By criminalizing peaceful protest, the GD consolidates its authoritarian rule, erodes democratic norms, and distances Georgia from its European aspirations.
Despite repression, public resistance remains strong, marking a defining moment in Georgia’s democratic struggle.
Georgia stands at a crossroads, facing a choice between preserving its sovereignty and the Euro-Atlantic path or falling deeper under Moscow’s influence. The resilience of the Georgian people and international support will be critical in shaping its future.
Russia’s influence strategy in Georgia is comprehensive, integrating political, economic, and informational tools to weaken sovereignty and entrench dependence. By portraying closer ties with Moscow as necessary for stability, the Kremlin aims to consolidate its regional dominance. Georgia’s subordination is central to Russia’s broader revisionist ambitions in the South Caucasus.
The Global Danger of Russian Influence Operations
Russia’s hybrid warfare—propaganda, disinformation, corruption, and political subversion—extends far beyond Georgia. These tactics target democratic societies worldwide, eroding trust in institutions and manipulating political discourse. The same elite capture, economic coercion, and divisive narratives used in Georgia are actively deployed against Europe and North America.
This challenge does not require military confrontation: It works silently, destabilizing democracies from within. Western nations have already faced election interference, cyber-attacks, and disinformation campaigns designed to fragment societies and weaken strategic cohesion.
Addressing this threat demands urgent, coordinated action from NATO, the European Union, and democratic allies. Strengthening resilience, transparency, and counter-disinformation efforts is essential. Georgia’s experience is a warning: If left unchecked, Russia’s tactics will be replicated elsewhere. Now is the time for proactive engagement, strategic countermeasures, and a firm commitment to defending democratic integrity globally.
About the author: Ambassador Vasil (Dato) Sikharulidze is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Eurasia Program. He is a former Georgian Ambassador to the US and former Minister of Defense.
Source: This article was published by FPRI