In Russia, we learn early that power corrupts absolutely, strongmen wear their worst intentions like badges of honor , and atrocities spiral from seemingly minor threats. Where I grew up, we hold these truths to be self-evident.
Having spent most of my life watching Putin’s Russia take shape, I recognize familiar patterns in American politics today. There is a theory, expressed only half in jest, among some who analyze Donald Trump—as he undermines traditional alliances and creates havoc within the federal government—that he must be a Russian asset. I understand what they mean. Trump consistently parrots Putin talking points, and Russian state media celebrates Trump with unusual enthusiasm. As American presidents, whether left or right, are rarely cheered in Russia, one might suspect some kind of collaboration.
But there is a simpler explanation: Trump and Putin are remarkably similar men who naturally understand each other. No conspiracy required—Trump would feel right at home in Moscow.
This isn’t to suggest moral equivalence. Trump, after all, has not waged a genocidal war claiming hundreds of thousands of lives. He aspires to dictatorship but hasn’t succeeded in achieving it—yet. He hasn’t killed his political opponents or nationalized major companies to enrich his friends. Given America’s robust institutions, he is unlikely to ever have the opportunity to do these things. In any case, he likely doesn’t harbor such aims—he seems much more jovial than Putin.
Still, the parallels between them are unmistakable:
Both men emerged in the moral ambiguity that followed World War II’s short-lived moral clarity. They share a worldview in which only large, feared countries deserve respect. Trump famously told Bob Woodward that “real power is… fear.” In both domestic and foreign affairs, neither operates appears to believe that promises matter or that empathy should guide decision-making. While many politicians behave similarly, few presidents so openly belittle neighboring countries and their leaders as Trump and Putin routinely do.
Both men consider loyalty—even feigned loyalty—to be the only true virtue. Trump’s pardoning of the January 6 insurrectionists demonstrates his adherence to this principle. Unlike in his first term, when staffers frequently defected or expressed dissatisfaction, Trump now trades competence for loyalty in those he employs, exactly as Putin does.
Just observe JD Vance’s transformation. During Trump’s first term, he was a clean-shaven intellectual on a book tour who compared Trump to Hitler. Now, he resembles a Central Asian heir to the throne and his almost comically masculine posturing mimics his boss’s style. This shapeshifting ability shouldn’t surprise anyone who read Vance’s memoir, “Hillbilly Elegy,” in which he described his childhood talent for adapting to different father figures. “With Steve, a midlife-crisis sufferer with an earring to prove it,” Vance wrote, “I pretended earrings were cool… With Chip, an alcoholic police officer who saw my earring as a sign of ‘girlieness,’ I had thick skin and loved police cars.” For men like Trump and Putin, loyalty isn’t optional, it’s existential, and Vance has mastered the art of becoming whatever his current patron requires.
Both Putin and Trump harbor a profound distrust of democratic institutions. Trump’s fixation on the “stolen election” of 2020 mirrors Putin’s trauma from his failed bid to manipulate the 2005 Ukrainian election to his advantage. For both men, personal political losses were transformational. In Putin’s case, every challenge to his authority has turned him into a different, usually worse, person.
It may seem paradoxical that a man who never faces competitive elections changes with each successive term, but it’s true – and each iteration is more dangerous than the last. Trump too has changed since his last term. He may still be erratic, may still be a lying, megalomaniacal, overconfident salesman. But those of us who have seen authoritarian evolution up close recognize a fundamental transformation. Trump’s rage at institutional betrayal has calcified into conviction, into a doctrine founded on distrust. The trauma of defeat in 2020 didn’t just wound Trump’s ego; it convinced him to view the entire democratic apparatus as illegitimate. This shift, this hardening of his position should not be underestimated.
Another thing Trump and Putin have in common is that both believe corruption is universal. I recognize in Trump a mindset common in Russia—indeed, it’s fundamental to how power operates in Moscow. Trump doesn’t just call opponents “crooked” as a joke, he seems to genuinely believe that graft, and graft alone, motivates everyone. For Trump, corruption is not merely personal enrichment but is the only effective means of governance, of exerting control. This approach makes dealing with Putin convenient—negotiations are simpler when you believe everyone has a price. But I’ve seen in my country how such transactionalism ultimately backfires, creating whole new avenues of institutional corruption that involve orders of far greater magnitude than simple personal enrichment ever could.
Apart from an intrinsic understanding of corruption, both Trump and Putin also understand, crave and deliberately create chaos. Whether through war, nuclear threats, dismantled treaties, or bureaucratic upheaval, disorder provides leverage. When Elon Musk is tasked with destroying the civil service, the goal is to make government employees more pliable for whatever comes next. The damage, of course, will extend beyond Trump’s tenure—after he leaves office, American civil servants will have lost their trust in the entire American system, the whole edifice of government, and it won’t be easy to restore that faith.
And now If Trump and his all-too-loyal allies seem detached from reality, then the joke is on reality.
Many American observers now hold out hope that constitutional guardrails and democratic institutions will do their job. These observers believe checks and balances will contain Trump’s excesses until the midterms or the next presidential election bring relief. They’re not entirely wrong—America is certainly better positioned to withstand authoritarian creep than Russia was in Putin’s early years.
America’s independent judiciary, free press, federalized power structure, and long democratic tradition provide genuine protective layers that Russia lacked. But I’ve also seen how institutions crumble not through frontal assault but through slow erosion, as bureaucrats, judges, and legislators become complicit through fear, ambition, or simple exhaustion.
When I read pundits like Ezra Klein argue we shouldn’t believe Trump’s threats because his power is more limited than he pretends, I recognize a familiar pattern of wishful thinking. Klein suggests that since Trump lacks congressional control and broad public support, his power exists mainly in our collective imagination of it. This analysis assumes Trump operates within the traditional boundaries of American politics. But that’s precisely what authoritarians never do. Those who dismiss Trump’s ability to transform America make a fundamental error of perspective. They judge his capabilities by the system’s rules, while he succeeds by dismantling those very rules.
Trump has few constitutional powers, true. But autocrats rarely acquire power through constitutional means—that’s precisely why they want to become autocrats: to avoid this hassle. They find cracks in the system—a corrupt judge here, a sycophantic legislator there, a couple of overworked bureaucrats willing to look the other way.
Worse, those who can most effectively prevent state capture are least equipped to recognize it. Trump isn’t trying to subdue coastal liberals and activists; he’s going after unelected civil servants, military officers, and corporate stakeholders. Whatever their qualifications, these aren’t people prepared for civil disobedience—that’s not in their job descriptions. They advance their careers by executing orders without overthinking them, not by questioning authority. Whatever resistance they might offer has been further diminished by Musk’s crusade against the “deep state.”
Meanwhile, the elected officials who can resist often voluntarily surrender. Many Republican congressmen, whatever their real feelings and opinions, have meekly knelt before Trump’s throne. Autocratic systems actively select for the unprincipled and obedient. Compare Trump’s second administration to his first—adverse selection is already evident.
And now If Trump and his all-too-loyal allies seem detached from reality, then the joke is on reality.
So far, Trump has twice won the most competitive elections on the planet, and Musk is officially the world’s richest man, having built businesses few thought possible. JD Vance, in addition to becoming VP by 40, wrote a bestseller at 31. They all have a history of making their ideas come true. If you think the world isn’t crazy enough to follow them further into the abyss, you might want to reconsider your assumptions. In my part of the world, at least, it’s always been just crazy enough.
Even though nearly every statement Trump makes is false, he remains deeply true to those falsehoods. His fictions, which share so much with those invented by Putin, have given both men control of their nations’ narratives – false or not. So, when evaluating Trump’s threat, consider Pascal’s wager: If we spend four years on high alert over dangers that never materialize, we’ve endured unnecessary stress. If we relax and let his worst ambitions come to fruition, we face a potential catastrophe. The first scenario is clearly preferable.
Americans often ask how ordinary Russians can support Putin’s regime. Perhaps now you’re getting a clearer picture. The path from democracy to autocracy isn’t marked by tanks in the streets but by the slow erosion of norms, the replacement of competence with loyalty, and the methodical exploitation of institutional vulnerabilities.
Trump has given us plenty of advance warning. Authoritarians announce their crimes long before they commit them. Even the most unprincipled men hold deep convictions and manifest character traits that rarely change. That’s not advanced political theory—it’s Russian History 101. The question remains, though, now that we know – what are we going to do?