Adem Yavuz Arslan*
US-Turkey relations have always been turbulent. At times, they have improved significantly — rising from an alliance to a “strategic partnership” under former President Barack Obama — while at other times, they have reached a freezing point, as seen during former president Joe Biden’s time in office. During Biden’s presidency, despite all his efforts and expensive lobbying campaigns, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was never invited to the White House. While the strategic importance of Turkey prevented a complete breakdown in relations, ties were maintained at the lowest possible level.
Now, with Donald Trump returning to the White House after a decisive election victory, Erdoğan sees an opportunity to reset relations with the US. During Trump’s first term, Erdoğan enjoyed a strong working relationship with him and hopes to do the same this time around.
Trump has now been in office for nearly two months, and his actions have already shaken both the US and the world. From trade tariffs to NATO’s future, numerous policy issues remain uncertain — including the direction of Trump’s approach to Turkey.
Publicly, Trump has expressed positive sentiments toward Erdoğan, even offering words of support. However, it is important to remember that this is the same Trump who once called Erdoğan “my friend” while simultaneously sending him a diplomatic letter urging him, in unusually blunt language, not to be “a fool.”
Erdoğan has approached Trump’s second term cautiously. For instance, he remained silent on Trump’s controversial proposal for relocating Palestinians from Gaza — an issue that Erdoğan had previously made a focal point of his political discourse. Given his history of vocal advocacy for Palestinians, a strong reaction would have been expected. Instead, he chose to ignore the issue entirely. Insiders in Ankara suggest that Erdoğan wants to avoid drawing attention from Trump’s administration.
This stance signals Erdoğan’s willingness to repair ties with Washington. However, significant obstacles remain. Over the past decade, US-Turkey relations have suffered serious setbacks. Tensions escalated due to Erdoğan’s crackdown on the 2013 Gezi Park protests, increasing human rights violations, a shift toward authoritarianism and most notably, Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 missile systems. In response, the US removed Turkey from the F-35 fighter jet program and for the first time in NATO’s history, imposed Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) sanctions on a member state.
Repairing relations will not be easy. During Trump’s first term, Erdoğan bypassed traditional diplomatic channels, choosing instead to deal directly with Trump. He avoided engaging with key power centers in Washington, including Congress, where bipartisan skepticism toward Turkey has only grown. Under Biden, traditionally anti-Turkey lobbies, such as Greek and Armenian interest groups, gained further influence. Even under Trump, Erdoğan has faced opposition in Congress, albeit to a lesser extent.
One recent example of this strained atmosphere came with a new bipartisan legislative proposal. Republican Representative Gus Bilirakis of Florida and Democratic Representative Brad Schneider of Illinois introduced a bill that would reclassify Turkey as a Middle Eastern country within the US foreign policy framework. The proposed legislation seeks to move Turkey from the State Department’s Europe and Eurasia Bureau to the Near East Affairs Bureau. While this might seem like an administrative adjustment, it carries significant symbolic weight — placing Turkey diplomatically alongside countries like Iran, Syria and Libya.
Bilirakis openly stated that the bill aims to send “a clear message” to Ankara. The justification for the proposal includes Turkey’s alleged pivot away from Europe, deepening ties with Russia, China and Iran, and actions in the eastern Mediterranean that contradict Western security interests. The bill also cites concerns over Turkey’s stance toward Hamas and its support for Russia, which some argue undermines NATO unity.
With both Republicans and Democrats backing the bill, its passage is a real possibility. Whether it becomes law, however, depends on Trump’s position. Given the Republican majority in Congress, the bill could advance quickly if Trump does not intervene. However, Trump could also implement the change through executive action without needing new legislation.
While the proposal sends a strong political message, its implementation remains unlikely. Given the complex geopolitical landscape in Turkey’s region, the US is unlikely to seek a further strain in relations. On the contrary, Trump’s administration appears eager to maintain a working relationship with Erdoğan.
However, beyond the immediate political maneuvering, there is a deeper issue at stake. US policymakers must recognize that Turkey is not just Erdoğan and his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). More than half of Turkey’s population does not support Erdoğan’s policies. Turkey’s natural and historical alignment remains with Europe and the West.
Reclassifying Turkey as a Middle Eastern country would not only be an unfair generalization of its people but also a significant political gift to Erdoğan. His long-term goal is to transform Turkey into a security-driven intelligence state, similar to ousted Bashar al-Assad’s Syria. Instead of reinforcing this trajectory, US and European leaders should focus on encouraging Turkey’s return to democratic norms and universal values.
*Adem Yavuz Arslan is the Washington, D.C., correspondent for the TR724 news website.