Shifting loyalties: understanding fighter motivations in Syria’s transitional phase
XCEPT Policy Brief
By Dr Rahaf Aldoughli
Following the fall of the Assad regime, and the establishment of a new transitional government in Syria, Ahmad al-Sharaa announced the dissolution of SNA factions, and the integration of their fighters into the Ministry of Defence (MOD), a move framed as a step toward military unification. However, this integration remains fragile and largely symbolic, as many factions continue to operate with significant autonomy. Understanding the motivations of fighters in the SNA up to this point is crucial for predicting and influencing how armed groups may act in Syria’s next phase, including whether these fighters will align with national military discipline.
This Policy Brief explores the personal experiences of fighters within non-state military factions, examining SNA factions to provide deeper insights into their motivations and trajectories.
Soldiers stand in six orderly groups behind soldiers holding the Syria flag
Syrian army preparations to eliminate Bashar al-Assad’s remnants. Taken February 4, 2025. Credit: Shutterstock/Mohammad Bash.
Key Findings:
Factions within the SNA display a diversity of motivational patterns. In addition to rivalries over power and influence, tensions and clashes between factions may also arise from divergent and potentially conflicting fighter motivations.
Emotional motivations and solidarity drive some fighters, reflecting a complex interplay of personal experiences and collective identity that supports retention of fighters. These bonds foster cohesion of groups and reinforce loyalty and a commitment to armed struggle.
Ideological motivations are central to groups affiliated with the Third Corps, such as Sham Front, where fighters are driven by convictions and the pursuit of a particular vision of society. This manifests as a commitment to revolutionary ideals and resistance to authoritarian structures.
Material incentives are a primary motivation for some fighters, particularly in the Second Corps. This has been seen, for example, in economic exploitation of the local population and involvement in illicit economies.
Tribal affiliations play a crucial role in fighter motivations, characterised by asabiyyah (strong group solidarity rooted in kinship and tribal bonds). These localised power dynamics have implications for how these actors engage with leadership, with these fighters’ loyalty and trust in leadership rooted in perceptions of their commanders as protectors of tribal honour and regional interests.
Among fighters, fear of accountability for war-time violations, concerns about political marginalisation, and the need for institutional trust-building are all critical issues which may prevent Syria’s unification.
Policy Implications:
Factions within the SNA have different motivations that have driven them to fight; in the current context of reconstruction, policy and governance decisions not recognising this diversity may risk increasing tensions between groups and reigniting greater instability.
Managing spoiler risks: Factions reliant on illicit economies may resist meaningful integration into a centralised state structure, posing risks to stability. Targeted interventions to provide alternative livelihoods could mitigate this threat. Understanding local dynamics and economic factors and opportunities will be key in this process.
Supporting transitional justice: Addressing fears of accountability among commanders through credible transitional justice mechanisms is essential to promote reconciliation. On the other hand, reconciliation efforts addressing emotional grievances like personal loss and disillusionment can help prevent remobilisation and promote long-term stability without undermining justice.
Fostering inclusive governance: Recognising the diverse motivations within armed groups can inform strategies to build inclusive governance structures that accommodate both ideological and material interests. For example, groups prioritising ideological visions are unlikely to be swayed by material incentives. An alternative for these groups would be to offer symbolic, diplomatic gestures that demonstrate willingness to engage with them. This has been seen, for example, in the ‘Revolutionary Military Council’ proposed by some SNA commanders. Recognising the diverse motivations within armed groups can inform strategies to build inclusive governance structures that accommodate both ideological and material interests.
Building trust in post-conflict governance: Given the divergent motivations highlighted in this paper, many fighters fear that integration into centralised governance structures, dominated by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), will erode their influence. Addressing these concerns through phased, inclusive security sector reform, coupled with confidence-building measures, will be essential to prevent fragmentation and clashes between factions.
Read the Policy Brief here.
This publication was produced as part of the XCEPT programme, a programme funded by UK International Development from the UK government. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies.