Hamas Political Chief Ismail Haniyeh (L) during a meeting with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei (R) in Tehran on June 21, 2023 [Iran International]
Hamas Political Chief Ismail Haniyeh (L) during a meeting with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei (R) in Tehran on June 21, 2023 [Iran International]
More than 30 years ago, UK intelligence predicted that relations between the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and Iran would grow. However, they ruled out the possibility that Tehran would influence Hamas’s policies, according to recently released British documents.
Since Hamas and other resistance groups in Gaza launched the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation on 7 October 2023, Hamas leaders have repeatedly praised Iran’s full support for their armed struggle against Israeli occupation. However, there has been ongoing controversy over allegations of direct Iranian involvement in the planning for the events of that day.
In October 1992, a Hamas delegation visited Tehran, where they held talks with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader. During the discussions, Khamenei reportedly reaffirmed Iran’s “commitment to the honourable mission of spreading the revolution around the world starting with occupied Palestine.” During this visit, Hamas established an official office in Tehran, headed by Imad Al-Alami, a senior member of the movement’s political bureau. PLO officials later claimed that Iran provided Hamas with nearly $40 million in funding and agreed to support a Hamas-run radio station.
Days after the visit, a Hamas leader reportedly stated that Iran had “offered support” for the First Intifada – between 1987 and 1993. He also remarked that Iranian officials had assured the delegation that the Palestinian cause was now “their number one priority in the region,” predicting further meetings between Hamas and Iranian leadership in the future.
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Both Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) separately sought to discourage Western powers, including the UK, from engaging with Hamas, warning of its ties to Iran. The documents reveal that, after internal discussions involving British security agencies, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Middle East Section (MES) acknowledged that Israel and the PLO had “made much of” the Hamas-Iran connection.
While MES recognised in a briefing report that there had been “substantive improvement” in Hamas-Iran relations, it concluded that the “developed links” were primarily at the political level. Addressing rumours of Iranian support for Hamas military operations, MES clarified that there was no intelligence confirming a “particular relationship” between Iran and the Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’s military wing.
Hamas’s capabilities and its relationship with Iran were key topics in a meeting involving the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Near East and North Africa Department (NENAD), the Security Coordination Department (SCD), MI5, the Ministry of Defence and the Research and Analysis division.
Hamas and Iran Documents 1
In his assessment, Mike Manning, head of the SCD, concluded that despite Iran’s “increasing attempts” to exert influence over Hamas, the group was unlikely to accept such influence. He argued that Hamas was “unlikely to target non-Israeli entities or operate outside Israel and the occupied territories”, as doing so would risk undermining the Western sympathy it had garnered — particularly following Israel’s controversial deportation of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) members to Lebanon in December 1992.
However, British security officials recommended closely monitoring Hamas-Iran relations. Manning stated: “In the long term, all agreed that increasing Iranian support and the unpredictability of the political situation warranted continued close observation of Hamas.”
Janet Hancock, head of MES in the Research and Analysis Department, warned of the potential consequences of Hamas’s evolving relationship with Iran. While she acknowledged that Iran’s influence over Hamas was still “unclear”, she cautioned that if the relationship deepened, elements within Hamas “could become radicalized” and “expand their scope of activities.”
In late November 1993, a high-level Hamas delegation, led by Mousa Abu Marzouk, then head of the group’s political bureau, visited Tehran. During this visit, they held meetings with senior Iranian officials, including the president, speaker of parliament and foreign minister.
A top-secret British embassy cable from Tehran reported that Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati told Abu Marzouk that Iran “had come under pressure to change its stance” on the Middle East peace process. However, Velayati insisted that Iran’s position was “unalterable”, describing the proposed peace solutions as “disgraceful” and predicting that they “would not bear fruit.”
Hamas and Iran Documents 2
Hamas and Iran Documents 2
Hamas and Iran Documents 3
Hamas and Iran Documents 3
On 7 December 1993 — five days after the Hamas delegation’s departure — European Community (EC) heads of mission in Tehran met to discuss the visit. The German ambassador informed the meeting that Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Vaezi, confirmed Hamas had come to Iran “simply to talk” and stressed that “Iran could not and would not give them orders.” Vaezi also clarified that the visit was not initiated by Iran and “didn’t mean a tilt on their part towards Iran”. Addressing the extensive media coverage of the visit, he remarked, “It is impossible in Tehran to keep such a visit quiet.”
By late December 1993, the FCO sought to analyse Hamas’s relations with Middle Eastern countries, including Iran. During a meeting in London with Hancock, senior Hamas member Muhammad Nazzal described the group’s relationship with Iran as “special”. He explained that Hamas’s ties with Iran were “slightly different” from its relationships with Arab states, as Iran was “the first country to welcome Hamas” and had provided an official office.
Asked about Hamas’s presence in Arab countries, Nazzal said the group had “presence” in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen, and some Gulf States, primarily “talk to press”.
He also suggested that Hamas was “useful” to many Arab and Islamic governments that “did not like” Yasser Arafat, the leader of PLO, arguing that relations with Hamas helped these governments “boost their popularity with their people by supporting the Palestinian cause.
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