Instead of unconvincingly pumping out their chests, European leaders should engage with the Trump administration in constructive diplomacy with Russia.
Last week, the chiefs of staff from 34 NATO and European Union states gathered to discuss how a “coalition of the willing’” could secure a possible ceasefire in Ukraine. The absence of any American representatives was telling. Trump’s ground-shaking Russia-Ukraine reset has led to constructive talks with Putin this week, the latter proposing a mutual cessation of attacks on energy infrastructure. Europe, however, still seems to live in a parallel universe.
European leaders have made various bold statements about their readiness to face the Russian threat. Keir Starmer has promised to “stand with Ukraine” and lead a coalition that deploys “boots on the ground and planes in the air.” Emmanuel Macron has offered to extend France’s nuclear umbrella to its European allies. In Paris this week, Macron called for a European coalition to move from “concept to plan” on how to deploy troops and air power to Ukraine as soon as a one-month ceasefire is agreed. Responding to Putin’s equivocal stance on a ceasefire, Starmer claims the coalition will give the “robust and credible security arrangements” needed for a “lasting peace” in Ukraine. In the event of Russian intransigence, the coalition will “ratchet up pressure” on Russia to force them into negotiations.
Europe’s leaders do not seem to realize that the deployment of NATO member troops as “peacekeepers” is almost certainly a non-starter for Russia in any peace deal. The same goes for creating a NATO-patrolled no-fly zone or “sky shield” in Western Ukraine. Russia has fought for three years at considerable expense to stop Ukraine’s “NATOization.” Moscow will not accept a Ukraine that is armed to the teeth with NATO military infrastructure. The Russians would rather fight on to avert such an outcome. The bold talk of this “coalition of the willing,” if adopted by the Zelensky government as conditions for the final deal, may scupper negotiations with Russia.
In the event negotiations fail due to European-backed Ukrainian intransigence, the Trump administration would surely phase out its support, passing the burden to a European coalition. The key problem—usually glossed over in bullish mainstream media coverage of European rhetoric—is if Russia could not be overcome in three years with U.S. support, how can Europe do it alone?
Repeated wild exaggerations of Russian casualties and destroyed equipment may help Western and Ukrainian morale but distort the real balance of forces in this war of attrition. More sober estimates show that, especially if the United States withholds key aid, Ukraine will run out of men, money, and materials far more quickly than Russia. The painful truth is that after decades of “free-riding” under a U.S. security umbrella, any European coalition will be woefully unprepared to step up in Ukraine.
The first problem is raising a European army and deploying it in the field to prevent a collapse in Ukraine’s frontline defenses or—in the event of a ceasefire—deter a future Russian attack. Two prominent analysts have recommended initially deploying a 15,000–20,000-strong force and relocating NATO training and logistic operations within Ukraine itself. This force would not be deployed at the frontlines but in the rear, dispersed so as not to be an easy target for Russian strikes.
Analysts at the influential Center for European Policy Analysis call for a force much larger than 30,000 to be deployed together with NATO air support, electronic warfare (EW) defenses, and reconnaissance platforms. The goal here is for Europe to “impose deterrence” on Russia in Ukraine. A European force will act as a “tripwire” that, in the event of a Russian attack, will set off the use of European air power.
These authors argue that such actions will not cause Russia to take drastic retaliatory action on any “coalition of the willing” entering Ukraine. This is an unsubstantiated hypothesis. Russia already has a battle-hardened army of 700,000 troops, which is expected to expand by 450,000 by 2025. No European country, except Ukraine, has anything resembling this. European states would have to reinstitute conscription and find the funds to recruit contracted soldiers to constitute even a force of 300,000, which a Bruegel report calculated as the minimum needed for basic deterrence.
Even if the soldiers could be found, there are a host of questions about how they would be organized and led. Previous NATO planning assumed American leadership in grand strategy, decision-making, and running military command structures and logistics. Without the United States, Europe has worked out a new system of collective leadership within the Ukraine Defense Contact Group. Devising a multinational command structure without U.S. leadership is an utterly unprecedented challenge for Europe. This new multinational command would not have access to all American intelligence platforms or receive preferential access to the best in U.S. military equipment. Much of the American intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support comes from military satellites. European Union countries today have only ten between them.
Finally, in assuming the burden of training and organizing Ukrainian forces, any European coalition must face up to previous failures, such as NATO’s role in preparing Ukraine’s abortive 2023 offensive. Approximately 100,000 Ukrainian recruits have been trained in Europe, with 45,000 going to the UK. NATO instructors lack combat experience in modern warfare. For years, Western armies and their defense industries have concentrated on counterinsurgency operations or mopping up after devasting NATO air power has crushed a much weaker opponent. Taking on a peer adversary like the Russians in a war of attrition is a totally different challenge. NATO currently has a poor understanding of the enemy they intend to confront. To put it frankly, unlike their Russian counterparts, Europe’s generals are not prepared to lead forces in an interstate conflict.
There are also stark deficiencies in European military production. This was masked across 2022 and 2023 by shipping Cold War-era equipment from former Warsaw Pact countries to Ukraine. In 2024, EU countries were unable to deliver on their promise to deliver 1 million artillery shells. It remains to be seen if they can deliver on their higher promised target of 1.5 million in 2025. Russia produces 3 million shells a year and can supplement this with North Korean imports. Over the last year, Ukraine has been sustained by U.S. shipments and its own increasing self-sufficiency in drone production. Europe is not currently able to fill the gap.
Russia’s centralized military-industrial complex is owned by the state. This means the Russian leadership can set production priorities and conduct a long war. In contrast, Europe has a decentralized and privatized military contractor model that makes a war of attrition prohibitively expensive. The Russians pay a quarter of the cost of artillery shells compared to Western allies. Europe’s private defense contractors charge a pretty penny. Rheinmetall recently sold 600,000 30mm rounds to the German Ministry of Defence at a cost of over $1,000 each. Can Europe really afford to sustain a war of attrition at these prices?
Europe’s fundamental deficiency in military production extends to other equipment. Boxer, Europe’s largest European Infantry Fighting Vehicle manufacturer, is expected to produce 200 units this year. It is estimated Europe has around 2,900 battle-ready modern tanks. In contrast, Russia produced around 1,500 tanks in 2024, along with 5,700 armored vehicles and 450 artillery pieces. Russia also has the advantage of being able to recapture and repair its damaged equipment as an advancing army, something denied to the retreating Ukrainians.
Air defense is a serious problem area. Most European air defense systems, such as the IRIS-T and NASAMS, cannot intercept ballistic missiles. Theoretically, the Franco-Italian SAMP/T can, but there is no way to produce it in sufficient amounts. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, the interception rate of land-launched ballistic missiles was just 4.5 percent, including the use of Patriot batteries. What would this number be if the United States does not continue supplying Patriot batteries? Orders for European air defense missiles such as Aster have a unit cost of $5–5.5 million—a figure that exceeds the average cost of the U.S. Patriot and SM-6 defense missiles.
There is a clear lack of strategic planning and sustainability in European military production. Orders placed over the course of this war do not adequately reflect needs. Ultimately, European leaders hope these problems can all be solved by raising unprecedented sums to spend on defense in the coming years. However, these measures will not help sustain Ukraine in the coming year, during which time Russia may apply critical pressure to break the frontlines. Under the current European defense model, it will take root and branch reform of military procurement and expand capacity to match Russian production. A realistic time frame for European states to reach Russian levels of production in armored vehicles, ammunition, and missiles is not ten months but ten years.
Europe’s leaders are seemingly unwilling to discuss these complex problems. They stick to a simple discourse in which Europe must not “appease” Russian aggression. In recent years, Europe has been stuck in a reactive posture, always one step behind events. This is an obvious legacy of Europe’s long reliance on the U.S. security umbrella. European elites have grown unaccustomed to thinking strategically about hard security in unemotional and non-ideological terms. In contrast, Russia has a strategy and the hard power to support it. Trump’s America also has a strategy, albeit one that is more transactional and ad hoc. Europe is not just a ship without a rudder in strategic terms; it is also not a unified actor like the United States or Russia. How its numerous collective action problems will be solved is an open question.
Despite all this, powerful vested interests lobby for rapid militarization of Europe and the deployment of a “coalition of the willing” in Ukraine, even if it risks dangerous escalation and prolongs the war. Even though European leaders have responded with brave fighting talk, they are surely aware that European states are not capable of shifting the balance of forces in Ukraine. A European coalition would be too weak to stand on its two feet.
If it came to a showdown with Russia—or with America on NATO spending or trade tariffs—there is every reason to expect Europe to blink first. All of this makes it very likely that European leaders will continue to defer to Washington in the coming years. Meanwhile, there are cautious grounds for optimism on securing a deal in Ukraine. Trump’s new diplomacy massively reduces the risk of full-scale U.S.-Russia conflagration. All actors involved, including Russia, have strong incentives to prevent Ukraine’s collapse as a state.
Instead of unconvincingly pumping out their chests, European leaders should engage in constructive diplomacy. While they are understandably reluctant to talk openly about their hard power impotence, there is a yawning gap between rhetoric and reality that must be bridged sooner or later. The reluctance to come clean may reflect hedging until the outcome of talks becomes clear or simply a fear that a major narrative shift will wreck European unity.
While it may be painful and distasteful, the way out of European fear and hesitancy is diplomacy and compromise. This means reestablishing direct contact with Moscow. Europe’s leaders owe their electorates an overdue reality check on the Ukraine war. Bluffs and empty threats must not be allowed to close the current narrow opening for a diplomatic end to this war.
Matthew Blackburn is a Senior Researcher at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs who studies the politics of contemporary Russia and Eurasia, including both domestic politics and interstate relations. Follow him on X:@MJMBlackburn81.
Patricia Marins is an independent analyst focusing on defense and security in Europe and Eurasia. Follow her on X:@pati_marins64.
Image: Frederic Legrand / Shutterstock.com.