Trump has a lot of leverage now; the question is to what extent he is ready to use it.
The launching of negotiations last month between the Trump administration and Russia and Ukraine for an agreement to end the war has been head-spinning, to say the least. How these talks unfold may well recast international security long into the future. This will be a case study in negotiations that will likely generate decades of debate and analysis amongst scholars and analysts of international studies.
The phone call between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin on March 18 did not significantly alter the parameters of these talks. The most significant development was the Russian agreement not to attack Ukrainian energy and infrastructure for thirty days, but their negotiating position has not altered much. In fact, it may have stiffened as they demanded that foreign military support for Ukraine be stopped. Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin still face critical questions whose answers will determine the fate of these negotiations.
Let’s start with Donald Trump’s position. Firstly, he should be applauded for trying to end the war. However, the devil is always in the details in such matters, and there are many reasons to question whether Trump and his team are sufficiently skilled and patient to execute such a challenging negotiation. Already, Trump’s team has attracted much criticism for supposedly giving away critical negotiating assets, like claiming NATO membership for Ukraine is out of the question and acknowledging that Kyiv will need to make some territorial concessions for peace. However, neither of these assets is necessary for negotiations to succeed. There will have to be Ukrainian territorial concessions, and NATO membership is, and probably always has been, off the table. It is also fair to say that after three years of brutal war, Washington’s policy of offering only sticks and no carrots needed adjustment.
This brings me to the main question regarding Trump’s negotiation strategy. The use of carrots, especially those that play on the Russian centuries-old craving for recognition as a great power and prestige, can help tilt the table in Trump’s favor. Based on recently opened archival materials, Sergey Radchenko’s 2024 book, To Run the World: The Kremlin’s Cold War Bid for Global Power, convincingly documents just how vital this vaunted recognition was for Soviet leaders.
However, for this negotiation to be successful in American eyes, the Russians will need to make significant concessions from their longstanding positions. The only possible way this could happen is if Trump is ready to arm the Ukrainians for victory—something President Joe Biden was never willing to do. Somehow, this threat must be credible in Putin’s eyes. If not, Putin would never concede much and keep on fighting.
While Ukrainians have been grateful for U.S. support, they were deeply frustrated with Biden’s persistent caution and delay in approving weapons systems and placing restrictions on their use in Russian territory. Putin needs to understand that Donald Trump will not be as fearful as Joe Biden was toward Russia’s potential nuclear escalation.
Trump has a lot of leverage now; the question is to what extent he is ready to use it. It was a very positive sign that after reaching the ceasefire agreement with Ukraine on March 11, the Trump administration immediately resumed military, logistical, and intelligence support to Kyiv.
Now, let’s turn to Vladimir Putin. The majority view in the press and social media now is that Putin believes he is on a roll. The Russian army is grinding down the Ukrainian military slowly but surely and thus has no interest now or in the near future in making any concessions to end the war. The problem with this view is that military and economic facts on the ground do not support it, despite recent Russian advances around Kursk to evict Ukrainian military forces from Russian territory.
Christina Harward of the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) made a compelling argument about the fragility of the Russian position in her recent article “Russia’s Weakness Offers Leverage.” Harward’s colleague at ISW, Grace Mappas, also argued last month that despite throwing virtually everything at Ukraine in 2024 and suffering enormous and unsustainable losses of men and material, Russia only made very minimal gains of territory. Of course, we know that Putin and his minions seek to convince Trump otherwise, so it is essential for the U.S. president to have accurate information to call Putin’s bluff, assuming the Russian president is not living in a disinformation zone himself.
Also playing in Trump’s favor is the fact that no Russian political entity has been so unbalanced in its relations with Asia and the West since its emergence from the forests of Muscovy more than 700 years ago. Throughout its history, Russia strived to be accepted by the West. Yet, today, it is isolated, serves as China’s junior partner, and includes as its main partners rogues like North Korea and Iran. This is certainly not what Vladimir Putin sought for Russia when he came to power in 2000, and at some level, I cannot believe this is what he really wants for his legacy.
Putin is wrong to think that Russians and Ukrainians are “the same people,” but he well understands Russian history. Trump, in effect, is offering Putin a way out of his dilemma. However, if Putin’s overwhelming motivation is for the history books to show him as the modern “gatherer of the Russian lands,” Trump is likely to be rebuffed.
Trump also needs to understand that if he and Putin reach a deal unacceptable to the Ukrainians, Ukrainians will continue to fight, and the Europeans will continue to support them. The crack in the Atlantic alliance may well become irreparable, one of Putin’s most cherished goals. I believe Trump wants to restructure the Atlantic alliance rather than destroy it. 35 percent of the Ukrainian military’s frontline arms are now produced in Ukraine, with Europe covering another 30 percent. With these supply lines, Ukraine could continue to defend itself effectively, though the mission would be considerably more difficult without U.S. support. This is a sub-optimal outcome but not necessarily catastrophic.
Like Putin, Trump is playing for history. Barack Obama and Joe Biden both failed to deter Russia from attacking Ukraine; Trump has a chance to correct these mistakes and seems determined to do so. Whether he succeeds or fails, I am confident Ukraine will endure. I also strongly believe the commonly voiced fears that Russia will simply use the peace, if achieved, to gear up for another attack on Ukraine or its NATO neighbors are overstated. One, this view underestimates just how debilitating this war has been for Russia.
Regarding Putin’s supposed designs on other European states, this fear fails to account for just how unique a position Ukraine occupies in Russia’s historical sense of national self-identity. No other place in Eurasia is remotely close in this regard. If Trump sells Ukraine down the river, as so many seem to think has already happened, his presidency will be deeply weakened, and his legacy as the consummate deal-maker will be shattered. But for now, there is a chance this can work out. We should all take a deep breath, cross our fingers, and pray for this outcome.
Andrew C. Kuchins is currently a senior fellow at the Center for the National Interest and an adjunct professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. He has served as President of the American University of Central Asia and the Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center as well as the Russia and Eurasia Programs at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He is the author or editor of 7 books and published columns for The Wall Street Journal*,* The New York Times*,* The Washington Post*, and many other media outlets. Follow him on X:@AndyKuchins.*
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