In Istanbul on 27 February, Abdullah Öcalan, imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, commonly known as the PKK, called on the organisation to dissolve itself and its militants to abandon their weapons. It marked an extraordinary moment in a more than 40-year conflict, but was overshadowed globally by the drama that unfolded between Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the White House the very next day.
The PKK emerged in 1984 targeting Turkish military installations with the goal – later abandoned – of creating an independent Kurdish state. The ensuing guerilla conflict has resulted in an estimated 40,000 deaths, hobbled Türkiye’s political development and devastated parts of Kurdish-populated southeastern Anatolia. Resolving this hitherto intractable security issue would have widespread domestic implications for Türkiye and considerable geopolitical repercussions.
Attitudes towards the PKK in Türkiye generally adhere to one of two poles. Many Turks revile it as a terrorist group, even as it enjoys considerable support among Kurds, who see it as a proponent of Kurdish identity and political rights. The United States, the European Union and Australia also designate the PKK a terrorist organisation, although it has recently shored up its international reputation through its protection of Yazidis in Iraq, and the role its Syrian affiliate, the Syrian Democratic Forces, played in defeating ISIS.
These developments bring Türkiye stability and more clout in its immediate neighbourhood, something that will also irk Iran.
Öcalan’s February statement did not come out of the blue. The political ground in Türkiye has recently shifted. Despite adopting an increasingly authoritarian posture, President Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan earlier this year stressed Turkish-Kurdish fraternity, and his hardline nationalist ally, Devlet Bahçeli, despite long denouncing Kurdish political activities and organisations, stated that Öcalan should be allowed to speak in parliament.
Initial responses to Öcalan’s call were generally positive. PKK military leaders promptly declared a ceasefire, imprisoned Kurdish politician Selahattin Demirtaş hailed an opportunity for “historic Kurdish-Turkish peace”, and prominent Turkish newspaper Cumhuriyetemphatically stated the “Kurdish question is resolved”. Erdoǧan has subsequently signalled his willingness to engage directly with the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democracy and Equality Party (DEM) to further negotiations. Nonetheless, suspicions linger, with some Turks remaining wary of the PKK and some Kurds sceptical of Türkiye’s intentions.
In a parallel development, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces reached an agreement with the new Syrian administration, which ousted Bashar al Assad in December. The agreement is a win-win, bringing Kurdish-controlled territory in northeastern Syria under Damascus’ jurisdiction while also allowing the SDF to retain some autonomy and instituting constitutional recognition of Kurds for the first time ever. Kurds in the northeastern city of Qamishlo signalled their jubilation at this turn of events.
The agreement between Damascus and the Syrian Kurds follows massacres of Alawites in Latakia in Syria’s west, allegedly at the hands of pro-government militia. In reaching an accord with Kurdish forces, Syria’s interim President Ahmed al-Sharra has alleviated a potential flashpoint in a still-restive political landscape. Yet the agreement can only have proceeded with the approval of Türkiye, which is a key backer of the newly formed Syrian administration.
Ankara has long decried the alliance between the United States and the SDF, which it – alone – deems a terrorist organisation, viewing it as an arm of the PKK, thus a threat to its national security. The Turkish military has made multiple incursions into northern Syria since 2016, striking SDF positions and occupying a strip of land along the Türkiye-Syria border. Some Kurds had feared that after the demise of Assad, Türkiye would step in again to completely crush the SDF and the autonomous political entity it supports.
In greenlighting the agreement between the SDF and the new administration in Damascus, Ankara has simultaneously alleviated Kurdish concerns in Syria and removed an irritant in its relationship with the United States, while also demonstrating a newly found confidence in its own geopolitical position. Fostering dialogue at home with the PKK and encouraging links between Damascus and the SDF also allows Türkiye to forestall its regional rivals, Iran and Israel. Tehran has at times used the PKK as leverage against Ankara, an option no longer available if a PKK ceasefire holds. Meanwhile, the Damascus-SDF agreement will bring an end to any putative Israel-Kurdish alignment in Syria.
These developments, which bring Türkiye stability and more clout in its immediate neighbourhood, something that will also irk Iran, afford Ankara an opportunity to play a larger role in wider geopolitical events. Türkiye, which maintains relations with both Russia and Ukraine, has several times offered to host peace talks. Only recently, concerns were raised about Türkiye’s increasingly militaristic outlook and its purported turn from the West, but the ongoing war in Ukraine has seen warming of relations between Ankara and the European Union. And as Donald Trump’s foreign policy postures become more erratic, Türkiye, boasting the second-largest military in NATO, looms as an increasingly important element of European security.
At home, however, enduring peace with the PKK is far from assured. Öcalan’s call is significant, and the PKK’s ceasefire encouraging, but under Erdoǧan’s rule earlier attempts at resolving the conflict ultimately unravelled. Some suggest the current overture is a cynical ploy by Erdoǧan to garner Kurdish support to allow him a third term as president rather than a genuine opening of the political arena, a theory lent credence by ongoing repressive measures against manifestations of Kurdish culture and opposition voices. Recent airstrikes in northern Syria, allegedly by Turkish forces, that killed Kurdish civilians, also raise questions about Ankara’s intentions.
What is certain is that solving the PKK crisis would bring untold benefits to Türkiye’s citizens of all ethnic and political persuasions.