Over the last two weeks, I have had the opportunity to attend foreign policy conferences in both India and China. First, the Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi and then the Boao Forum for Asia in Hainan. Both events highlight how these two rising global powers – the world’s most populous countries and the world’s second (China) and soon to be third (India) largest economies – see the world and their place in it, with some alarming implications.
The Raisina Dialogue, an annual event hosted by the Observer Research Foundation think-tank along with India’s Ministry of External Affairs, is fast becoming an annual fixture for the world’s foreign policy elite, perhaps on par with Davos and the Munich Security Conference. However, while almost every topic under the sun appeared on the agenda – from the Ukraine and Gaza conflicts to AI and space governance – there was a notable absence of discussion on India’s neighbourhood. (The foreign ministers of Bhutan, the Maldives, and Nepal spoke, as did the former Maldivian president, but they were on panels discussing climate and tourism, respectively.)
In a way, this is commendable. Where other countries are reverting to a “spheres of influence” mentality – look no further than President Donald Trump’s calls to take over Canada, Greenland and the Panama Canal – New Delhi still views the world through a global lens. This is reflected in the Modi government’s rhetoric of “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam” (the world as one family) and India as a “Vishvamitra” (friend of the world).
The absence of any discussion on South Asia implies this region is a beacon of stability when the reality is the opposite.
External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has referred to India as a “south-western” country in that it seeks to be a bridge between the West and the rest. However, the Raisina Dialogue gives the impression that India prefers the West over the rest. Jaishankar indicated as much when he noted (from 31:50) that India’s free trade negotiations with the European Union, United Kingdom and United States indicate that these are India’s “growth markets, technology partners…connectivity partners and strategic partners”.
Contrast this with the fact that India is not part of any of the multilateral free trade arrangements in Asia, with India having exited negotiations to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in 2019 along with it not being part of the CPTPP (the successor to the Trans-Pacific Partnership) or the trade pillar of IPEF (Indo-Pacific Economic Framework). The Indian government has also pushed to renegotiate an existing FTA with ASEAN. This seems somewhat counterintuitive considering that Asia is the world’s most dynamic economic region, while the West faces slowing growth, an aging population and a climate of growing protectionism and economic nationalism (notwithstanding its continued importance as an innovation and financing hub).
Moreover, the absence of any discussion on South Asia implies this region is a beacon of stability when the reality is the opposite. India’s neighbourhood comprises three countries in the midst of IMF bailouts (Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka), two that are near-failed states (Afghanistan, Myanmar) and two countries with which India maintains active territorial disputes and a history of difficult relations that also happen to be nuclear weapons states (China, Pakistan).
External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has referred to India as a “south-western” country in that it seeks to be a bridge between the West and the rest (MEAphotogallery/Flickr)
External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has referred to India as a “south-western” country in that it seeks to be a bridge between the West and the rest (MEAphotogallery/Flickr)
While there was discussion at Raisina about providing Indian peacekeepers (from 13:00 onwards) to enforce a possible ceasefire agreement in Ukraine, there was no talk about what India was doing to stabilise its own neighbourhood. A terrorist attack on a train in Baluchistan earlier this month threatens to enflame tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which could spill over into India amid Islamabad’s claims that New Delhi has been aiding the Baluch separatist movement. Bangladesh is a powder keg under the unelected interim government that replaced the India-friendly regime that was ousted in August.
There was no discussion of any of these developments or if they undermine India’s security or global aspirations. New Delhi may argue that they do not, and yet one need only look to how the United States sees the border with Mexico or how Europe views the war in Ukraine to highlight that most countries’ primary source of instability is their periphery. When the world talks about India today, the focus is on its global aspirations – its space program, its G20 presidency and relations with major powers – while its neighbourhood appears to have fallen off the radar.
Part of this reflects New Delhi’s proclivity to “transcend” its region, de-hyphenate relations with Pakistan, and ensure that the Kashmir issue remains free from external interference. But how can India’s leading foreign policy conference not discuss a region that accounts for a quarter of the world’s population and is the world’s least economically and institutionally integrated?
Contrast this with the Boao Forum for Asia. Here it is the other way round, with the regional taking precedence over the global. I spoke on a panel discussing developments in the South China Sea. This alludes to Beijing’s foreign policy of battening down the hatches as it seeks to stabilise its periphery while preparing for a more volatile relationship with the United States. It also reflects Chinese President Xi Jinping’s conservative and risk averse approach, which has been evident from the slow implementation of economic stimulus measures to the slowdown in China’s overseas investment over the last decade.
In some ways, these two conferences demonstrate that China and India are two sides of the same coin. One country has global aspirations while playing down developments in its neighbourhood while the other has increasingly global capabilities but is focused on its periphery. While there is a lot of bluster – India seeks to be a “voice” of the Global South while China’s “Global Development/Security/Civilisation” Initiatives have not gained much traction since they were unveiled three years ago – neither country is willing or able to fill the void in governance left by the US retreat from global leadership.