The Department of the Treasury’s sanctioning of Iranian Petroleum Minister Mohsen Paknejad marks a U.S. return to the “maximum pressure” tactic of targeting top Iranian economic officials. At the same time, the State Department announced sanctions on three entities and three vessels for their role in shipping Iranian oil to Asia.
Restoring Maximum Pressure
The renewed actions by both the Treasury and State Departments suggest a deliberate and unified strategy aimed at increasing pressure on Iran. Targeting senior Iranian economic officials also parallels tactics employed during President Donald Trump’s first term.
Paknejad, a veteran of Iran’s oil industry, became Iran’s minister of petroleum in August 2024 and now oversees the export of tens of billions of dollars of Iranian oil each year. The U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned him under Executive Order 13902, issued by Trump during his first term, which targets individuals and entities that contribute economically to Iran’s nuclear, ballistic missile, and terrorism programs. Treasury alleges that under Paknejad’s stewardship, the Ministry of Petroleum diverted billions of dollars’ worth of Iranian oil to the country’s armed forces, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The Biden administration had neglected to sanction either Paknejad or his predecessor, Javad Owji. By contrast, during Trump’s first term, Treasury sanctioned Owji’s predecessor Bijan Namdar Zanganeh while targeting Owji himself for his role as an executive at a regime-controlled energy firm.
How to Expand Sanctions
Paknejad knows Iran’s oil ministry well. He previously served as its deputy minister and as the deputy chief executive officer of Naftiran Trade, a Swiss-based subsidiary of the U.S.-sanctioned National Iranian Oil Company. The fact that this is the first time the United States has sanctioned Paknejad despite his extensive experience in the sector highlights a gap in U.S. sanctions’ effectiveness.
To rectify this gap, the Trump administration should broaden its targeting of essential personnel. Simply sanctioning the oil minister is insufficient; it is also necessary to target his deputies, as well as the CEOs of key subsidiaries, their board members, and other C-level executives.
It is also necessary to expand sanctions beyond the oil ministry. Other government entities, including the Central Bank of Iran, the Ministry of Finance, Iran’s Planning and Budget Organization, and the Majlis, play significant roles in exporting oil, repatriating funds, and allocating money to prohibited activities.
Further, Iran’s oil accounts for less than half of Tehran’s export revenue. Other entities, such as the Ministry of Industry, Mine, and Trade, the Ministry of Energy, and the Ministry of Science, Research, and Technology, play significant roles in Iran’s non-oil exports. Reducing this revenue stream is as crucial as limiting Tehran’s oil exports. The United States should focus on these ministers, their key staff members, and the essential subsidiary entities associated with each. The United States must also target high-ranking business officials who partner with each ministry. Without such measures, U.S. pressure cannot approach a true maximum.
Saeed Ghasseminejadis a senior advisor on Iran and financial economics at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he contributes to FDD’sIran Program andCenter on Economic and Financial Power (CEFP). For more analysis from Saeed and FDD, please subscribeHERE. Follow Saeed on X@SGhasseminejad. Follow FDD on X@FDD and@FDD_Iran and@FDD_CEFP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, non-partisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
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Iran Iran Politics and Economy Iran Sanctions Sanctions and Illicit Finance U.S. Defense Policy and Strategy