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Trump’s Middle East strategy is all about striking an Iran deal. Gaza could get in the way.

Do US President Donald Trump and his advisers have a comprehensive strategy for the Middle East, or are they engaged in ad hoc efforts to put out the fires that continue to burn in the region? This is an important question brought to the fore by the White House’s recent decision to conduct air strikes against the Houthis, an Iranian-allied militia in Yemen, for their role in attacks on Red Sea shipping and Israel. But the answer to his question will have ramifications far beyond Yemen.

Some commentators have alreaded rendered their verdict on the question by calling Trump’s foreign policy toward the Middle East improvisational and chaotic. But if one understands the centerpiece of Trump’s policy to be securing a nuclear deal with Iran and curbing its malign influence in the region, then the actions the administration is taking toward Iran, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon can be viewed as supporting this central objective. By contrast, the administration’s support for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s decision to resume the war in Gaza appears ill-advised because it risks undercutting the regional support Trump will need in confronting Iran.

Yemen: It’s all about Iran

The US strikes against the Houthis that began on March 15 appear to have multiple objectives. The immediate aim is to get the group to halt its attacks on shipping and Israel. US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth articulated this goal in an interview, stating, “When the Houthis stop their attacks, we will stop.” But US officials also have made clear that they hold Iran—which has armed and trained the Houthis and provides them with intelligence on ship movements—responsible for the Houthi attacks. Trump himself recently warned that Iran could pay a price, presumably including a military strike against Iran itself, if the Houthis do not stand down.

US success in silencing Houthi missiles and drones would reduce the threat from the Iranian proxy militia that has remained the most active against US and Israeli interests since Hezbollah and Hamas—both badly weakened by Israeli military successes—agreed to cease-fires with Israel, though the Hamas war has since flared up again.

The US show of strength against the Houthis and warning to Iran that it could be next also appear aimed at reinforcing Trump’s goal of getting Tehran to engage in negotiations on its nuclear program and destabilizing regional behavior. The campaign against the Houthis came little more than a week after Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, rejected Trump’s offer to enter into negotiations. It also comes after the Houthis’ threat last week to resume attacks against Israeli ships in the Red Sea in retaliation for Israel’s cut off of aid to Gaza.

Iran: Talk or risk war

The attacks against the Houthis put teeth into Trump’s thinly veiled warning that if no progress is made in halting and rolling back Iran’s nuclear advances, which appear to have brought the country to the nuclear-weapons threshold, the United States, Israel, or both could carry out devastating military strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities. The Trump administration has sought to buttress the message that it is prepared to strike Iran’s nuclear program by conducting joint air exercises with Israel in which a US B-52 bomber—able to carry bombs that could penetrate Iran’s underground nuclear facilities—and Israeli F-15I and F-35I aircraft “practiced operational coordination . . . to enhance their ability to address . . . regional threats.” Iran recognizes that its ability to counter a US-supported Israeli strike has been substantially diminished since Israel destroyed Iran’s most-sophisticated air defense systems in a strike in October 2024.

The United States is also squeezing Iran economically by renewing its “maximum pressure” campaign of sanctions against the the country’s already weak and struggling economy and promising to enforce them vigorously. For example, the Trump administration has indicated that it intends to close the loopholes in the sanctions regime against Iran by going after the network of ghost ships and secondary companies that China and Iran have developed over the last four years to circumvent sanctions on Iranian oil deliveries to China. The billions in revenue Iran realizes from selling oil to China have been a lifeline for Iran’s economy, helping the regime resist pressure to compromise on its nuclear program.

Syria and Lebanon: Stability helps counter Iran

Even as the Trump administration engages in military action in Yemen and threats against Iran, US officials have been quietly seeking to promote stability in Syria and ensure that the cease-fire agreement in Lebanon does not unravel. US military officials played an important role in brokering a March 10 agreement between the new government in Syria and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, a US ally in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). This deal is an important step toward integrating the Kurds into the new Syrian military, which will help stabilize the new Syrian government by removing the threat of conflict with the Kurds. This is necessary if the government is to gain access to important energy resources in Syria’s north and advance its goal of restoring control over all Syrian territory.

For the United States, the agreement reduces the threat of instability in Syria that could provide an opening for Iran and its proxies to begin rebuilding a military presence there or use Syria as a route to ship weapons from Iran to Lebanon for use by Hezbollah. The deal also allows the Kurds and the groups allied with them to continue working with US forces in eastern Syria to counter the threat from ISIS, which has been seeking to reestablish itself near the Syria-Iraq border and has increased its attacks over the past two years.

Similarly, in Lebanon, a US envoy plans to bring Lebanese and Israeli officials together to resolve outstanding issues between the two countries that have prevented full implementation of the November 2024 cease-fire agreement. The US goals are threefold. First, the United States would like to resolve persistent disputes over the Israeli-Lebanese border. Second, it wants to facilitate a full deployment of Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and United Nations peacekeepers in southern Lebanon to prevent Hezbollah from reestablishing itself. Third, the United States wants to make sure conditions are in place for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the five positions they are currently occupying in southern Lebanon to protect Israelis returning to their homes in northern Israel.

To bolster the LAF’s ability to assert itself effectively in the face of threats from Hezbollah, and demonstrate US confidence in new President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, the US State Department has approved an exception to the freeze on US foreign aid to provide $95 million in funding to the LAF.

The US efforts to prevent the cease-fire agreement from unravelling and strengthen Lebanese leaders and institutions demonstrate a recognition that such steps are important to prevent a return of the instability and state weakness that allowed Hezbollah and Iran to thrive.

Gaza: US support for Israel undercuts Iran efforts

By contrast, when it comes to Gaza, the Trump administration’s backing for Netanyahu’s decision to resume the war is likely to work against its larger goal of countering Iran. Israel’s large-scale aerial attacks on Hamas and the reintroduction of ground forces into the enclave this week, which were followed by a Hamas rocket attack on Tel Aviv, risk creating an open-ended conflict with the terrorist group. As is already apparent in street protests in recent days, this renewed conflict will also likely heighten internal divisions in Israel given widespread opposition among Israelis to resuming the fighting. In turn, this tension and Netanyahu’s resumption of the war in Gaza risk distracting Israel from focusing on how to deal with Iran.

Netanyahu may seek to perpetuate the war to avoid a political reckoning with the Israeli public over his perceived responsibility for the security failures that resulted in Hamas’s horrific October 7, 2023, assault on Israel. For now, continuing the war keeps him in power because far-right members of Netanyahu’s coalition have threatened to leave his government, potentially causing its collapse, if he ends the war with Hamas still in power in Gaza.

US support for continuing the war in Gaza is likely to strain relations with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other Gulf states whose populations overwhelmingly support the Palestinians and are horrified at the large loss of Palestinian life and destruction of much of Gaza. This further complicates securing a united front for US policy toward Iran.

Moreover, while the war continues, the United States will not be able to pursue its coveted goal of brokering Saudi-Israeli normalization because the Saudis have made it clear that they won’t contemplate such a step while the war continues—and absent an Israeli commitment to an eventual Palestinian state.

What could go wrong? Plenty.

So, while the Trump administration does have many of the elements of a coherent strategy toward the Middle East, there is much that could go wrong with US policy toward the region.

How might that happen? To begin with, the Houthis could prove hard to suppress despite a prolonged military campaign. Tehran may call Washington’s bluff by refusing to negotiate on its nuclear program until the United States begins easing sanctions. These scenarios could in turn force the White House to significantly intensify its operations against the Houthis and resort to a major military attack on Iran or back down and appear weak. Efforts to foster stability in Lebanon and Syria could unravel, leaving both countries vulnerable to renewed mischief-making by Iran and Hezbollah. And Gaza could prove a long-term quagmire for Israel and a significant source of friction hampering US efforts to forge stronger cooperation with partners in the region.

To the Trump team’s credit, coming in with a plan is always preferable to the alternative. But success in the Middle East requires adaptation to fast-shifting events. If all else fails—a situation almost all previous US administrations found themselves in—then the Trump team will need to improvise.

Alan Pino is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. He previously served for thirty-seven years at the Central Intelligence Agency, covering the Middle East and counterterrorism.