In January 2025, just a few days after Donald Trump was inaugurated for his second Presidential term, the European Leadership Network (ELN), with support from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund (RBF), convened a roundtable to discuss ways forward for a resumption of Iran-US nuclear negotiations.
The roundtable brought together a range of European, American, Asian, and Middle East experts who debated the role of Gulf actors in developing a new deal, Iran’s shift in priorities under the reformist leadership of President Masoud Pezeshkian, and the implications of the changes in the regional architecture, including Syria and Lebanon, as a result of the war in Gaza. Critically, a theme that ran throughout the meeting was Trump’s own goals for a deal and his proclivity for quick victories that validate his presidential capacity to surprise and achieve the unexpected. As the JCPOA approaches its tenth year and expiration, the White House is sending clear signals vis other conflicts (Ukraine, Gaza) that diplomacy is the only way forward, suggesting a deal between the US and Iran could be reached.
As the JCPOA approaches its tenth year and expiration, the White House is sending clear signals vis other conflicts that diplomacy is the only way forward, suggesting a deal between the US and Iran could be reached.
Panel experts highlighted six areas of opportunity:
US priorities for a new agreement: The new Trump administration, despite its focus on acute areas of conflict such as Ukraine and Gaza, has reached out to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to begin negotiations on a ‘Verified nuclear peace agreement’, a clear indication that Iran nuclear talks are a top US priority. Yet Khamenei earlier scotched engagement when Trump reinstated the policy of maximum pressure in a National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM). If and when negotiations do take shape, the talks will likely be bilateral, emerge from back-channel preparation, and enable the US President to claim a deal as a victory and landmark.
Iran’s openness to negotiations: Economic malaise, the loss of Syria, and the erosion of Hezbollah are contributing to Iran’s openness to begin talks with Trump. However, Tehran remains cautious of his mercurial agenda, particularly following his spat with Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky and his suggestion that Russian President Vladimir Putin act as a mediator. President Pezeshkian, elected on his promise to negotiate with the US, has backtracked in line with Khamenei’s directive. However, this could change, as a reformist government offers the Supreme Leader cover, as well as options in supporting moves toward a new deal.
Europe’s role in negotiations: Even if final talks are bilateral, the EU is well positioned to help jumpstart the process, as Iran’s Supreme Leader has not closed off negotiating initial steps with Europe. Further, the EU can provide technical input in the absence of specialist experience among Trump officials.
The EU’s activation of snapbacks: The EU is uniquely positioned to trigger snapbacks and could use them as leverage to push forward the negotiations. This could be as early as April to enable deal-making to start prior to the JCPOA’s expiry or as late as September, before limits on Iran’s nuclear programme permanently sunset.
Gulf States’ Contribution: Ill-disposed toward the original JCPOA because they were shut out of the talks, Gulf states support a revised deal and are keen to be part of new negotiations. This could lead to a broader diplomatic and economic agreement that directly engages the Gulf neighbourhood, something Iran appears to favour., especially if Saudi Arabia is tapped to mediate.
Israel and the prospects of an outright attack: Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu is keen to militarily obliterate Iran’s nuclear facilities but will unlikely do so without Trump’s support. Though Trump’s letter to Khamenei stated clearly that a military option remained on the table, a critical window has opened for negotiations between the US and Iran, despite Israeli sabre-rattling. In Israel’s view, Iran is ripe for attack after being weakened by the shift in regional architecture since the Gaza War and the IDF’s attacks on its military infrastructure. Yet, as Iran has yet to reach breakout even though it continues to near-threshold status, Netanyahu’s hands are tied in light of Trump’s disinclination to support war.
Action points
The meeting’s strategy discussion was structured around the following action points:
Identify common areas of compromise and new ways into nuclear diplomacy
Advance new thinking on linking different challenges and arenas
Provide opening thoughts on new structures for a deal or a larger regional agreement
Offer insights on Europe’s positioning
Assess prospects for a Saudi-Israel-US security agreement
Consider Israel-Iran military confrontation scenarios
Read the meeting report
The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated in this report represent the views of the author rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.
Image: Composite of Pictorial Press Ltd / Alamy Stock Photo and Associated Press / Alamy Stock Photo