**Peter Slezkine, Host:** I’m Peter Slezkine, Director of the U.S.-Russia-China Trialogue Project at the Stimson Center. Since the middle of the 20th century, relations among the United States, Russia, and China have had an enormous impact on each country separately and on the world as a whole. The purpose of the trialogue is to better understand this extraordinarily complex and consequential relationship by directly engaging with experts from all three countries.
My guest today is Zhao Long, Deputy Director of the Institute for Global Strategic and Security Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies. Long is an expert in every area, but he is particularly knowledgeable about Russia and is a fantastic Russian speaker, which I have tested over many rounds of vodka.
Long, welcome to the podcast.
**Zhao Long, Guest:** Oh, thank you, Peter, for having me here.
**Peter Slezkine:** So, just to make clear in a world that has been spinning very fast of late that we are recording this on March 12th in the evening in D.C., March 13th in the morning Shanghai time. So, just yesterday, the U.S. and Ukrainian delegations met in Jeddah and proposed a renewable 30-day ceasefire. Putin will react in some fashion in the days to come. This episode will be released after that, so we won’t speculate as to what his counteroffer may be. But we will talk, sort of, in broad terms about the Chinese reaction to the developments of the last several weeks, mostly emanating from Washington. So, how has Beijing reacted to Witkoff’s visit to Moscow, Trump’s phone call to Putin, the scandal in the Oval Office, and all the meetings in Saudi Arabia?
**Zhao Long:** Well, I would say that Beijing is currently navigating in those very fast changing landscape on the global scale. And especially, I won’t say that Beijing is, kind of, shocked by the Trump’s outrage to Putin, but definitely, China is watching it quite closely.
Look, China has, I think, always been wary of the Trump’s unpredictability, especially during our experiences with his first term. So, the recent developments surrounding Ukraine, Middle East, U.S.-Russian relationship, I think this aligns with a broader pattern of how Trump is being perceived by Beijing.
So, I think that the key question here is, what will be the strategic endgame here? Is it about de-escalating in Ukraine, that’s the one thing, and is it about splitting Russia from China? That’s a whole other ballgame.
So, I think, during his first term, Trump had the tendency to question NATO to seek direct engagement with Russia, to push more transactional approach to alliance. But I think, currently, the context is quite different because the war in Ukraine has really fundamentally changed the whole thing. So, from Beijing’s perspective, I would say one possibility is U.S. is seeking to de-escalate the tension with Russia to prevent Moscow from abstracting Washington’s broader global agenda. But I think Beijing’s concern is more about the so-called ambitious objective of Trump, which could be the attempt to recalibrate the U.S. strategy of dual containment and offering Putin some, let’s say, greater-than-expected incentives and the hopes to wakening this Russia reliance on China.
However, I think, whether Trump possesses both political will and capability to deliver such settlement, I think there’s still open question for that.
**Peter Slezkine:** But couldn’t it be both? On one hand, it may be true that Trump wants peace in Ukraine on its own terms, that he has called it a stupid war, he has promised during his campaign to end it as soon as possible, and he seems to have made it a priority. On the other hand, there is clearly an understanding of geopolitics in Washington, in which China plays the preeminent role. And so, an attempt to peel Russia away from China is clearly part of, it seems, D.C.’s calculations. So, these things are not, obviously, alternatives. They are part of a single package, probably.
**Zhao Long:** Yes, I think you’re right, it could be both. But I think there’s still a gap between his intention and his capability. The nature of the China-Russian relationship, the big part, was based on the internal demands and the shared vision about the world order, especially about the U.S. hegemony. I think Beijing does not believe that Russia will easily shift this kind of gravity from Beijing to Washington because there’s a fundamental distrust between the establishment of Washington and Moscow.
Let’s just assume that, because I’ve heard of the argument during my latest visit to Washington, that people are arguing that, perhaps, Trump has more of a geopolitical concept of sphere for influence. So, he may think that the future world order would be decided by U.S., China, and Russia, and the U.S. would more rely on the Western hemisphere and let others deal with the Europeans and Asia Pacific.
**Peter Slezkine:** Is that not an appealing vision to China?
**Zhao Long:** Yeah. I think something really surprised China is when Secretary Rubio just agreed on those tendency of multipolarity. But I think there’s a significant difference between those three countries who are really differently interpreting so called multipolarity.
So, I think there may be some grand vision of Trump administration on this new triangle and somehow to reshape those asymmetrical nature of Sino-Russian relationship, but I see very little leverage of Trump on Russia, which could offer something except relief those sanctions or just having ceasefire Ukraine. I think Russia would demand much more and really, perhaps, a new round of the Yalta model negotiation, which I think Trump could very difficult to deliver. I think there will be fightbacks, even internally, in the Republican campaign
**Peter Slezkine:** But so, you think Trump does want peace in Ukraine and maybe intending to pull Russia out of its asymmetrical relationship with China, but that he doesn’t, in fact, have much leverage with Russia and he has considerable opposition within the U.S. and the West, so, Russia’s alignment with China is not really in danger from Beijing’s perspective?
**Zhao Long:** Yeah, basically, that’s my understanding.
**Peter Slezkine:** Is there a difference between Russia experts like yourself and more general foreign policy thinkers in China? Because when I was in Beijing, I don’t know, two weeks ago, and previously, I’ve long heard this anxiety in China about Russia returning to the West, a fear that Russia’s alignment with China is forced by current circumstances, but that at the end of the day, it’s part of Western civilization and that Russia will jump back into the Western embrace as soon as that is a possibility.
**Zhao Long:** Look, I think that argument could be something quite popular before the war in Ukraine from 2022. But I think, nowadays, from my observation of Russia’s strategic elites, I think the fundamental distrust remained between Moscow and Washington. The structural challenges of the bilateral relations between Russia and United States remain for decades.
**Peter Slezkine:** What are the structural forces that you think will keep Russia and the U.S. apart and Russia and China close?
**Zhao Long:** Well, I think, first, there’s no mutual trust, because all those agreements have been broken, starting from the strategic stability, the nuclear agreements, and et cetera.
**Peter Slezkine:** You mean U.S.-Russia agreements?
**Zhao Long:** U.S.-Russia agreements. And secondly, I don’t see here substantial economic ties between Russia and the U.S. I think in terms of economics or technology, there’s almost no alternative for Russia to rely on except China. So, I think that those ties are quite strong. Although, I agree with you, Russian could be using, you know, this opportunity to play cards with China, there’s no doubt. But again, I think the mutual trust, the leaders level between the Xi and Putin are quite strong. And the establishments, not to mention about the companies, enterprises, and the people-to-people ties.
So, basically, there are certain worries. But I don’t think that worry could be something quite significant to overturn the current narrative of partnership between Beijing and Moscow.
**Peter Slezkine:** So, you don’t make much of Rubio’s declaration that there are great economic and geopolitical opportunities for U.S.-Russian cooperation. You think that that is mostly rhetoric that comes out of a summit in Saudi Arabia, but not something that can truly compete with what China has to offer in these domains to Russia.
**Zhao Long:** Yeah. Basically, look, consider the size of the bilateral trade between Russia and the U.S. It’s not comparable with the China-Russian trade relations. And in terms of energy, President Trump trying to pioneer in that sector, which stating that the U.S. will be the top one in the energy export. But in the meanwhile, I think the energy export sector is one of the crucial sector of Russia. So, there’s a competing relationship between Washington and Moscow.
**Peter Slezkine:** You don’t think that they could cooperate to fix global energy prices? So, on one hand, they’re competitors; but they could also form a cartel along with Saudi Arabia, sort of a mini-OPEC.
**Zhao Long:** Well, that will require a grand bargain between Russia and U.S. But I see…
**Peter Slezkine:** You haven’t heard that Trump is looking for a big beautiful deal? A grand bargain is precisely what he’s after.
**Zhao Long:** Sure. But look, the time is quite limited. So, next year will be the midterm for Trump. So, even by the end of this year, I think there will be quite strong headbacks from Democrats from the establishments. So, although there’s a lot of agenda on the Trump’s list, I don’t think he has the time and the capability to achieve all those goals.
**Peter Slezkine:** But let’s say that U.S. sanctions on Russia are somewhat relaxed and the effect isn’t that, suddenly, the Russia is pulled into the United States orbit, or that the U.S. forms some tight economic bond with Russia that would rival the Chinese that seems impossible, but that, if Russia is given a bit more autonomy, then India, South Korea, Japan, and so forth would make economic inroads into Russia that would lessen Russia’s dependence on China, that they would start buying Korean cars and Japanese cars as much as Chinese cars, or Korean phones as much as Chinese phones.
**Zhao Long:** Yeah, speaking of long-term perspective, I do believe less dependence of Russia on China could be expected. But I don’t think that this is something that would totally disrupt the current trend of Sino-Russian partnership, because, again, let’s say, the one thing is both Moscow and Beijing shared the grand view of the future world order. Although we take the quite different approach to develop this world order, maybe Russia is more preferring building the new order in parallel with the existing one, but China is more preferred of reforms. But again, there’s shared view…
**Peter Slezkine:** But what is the shared view of the world order?
**Zhao Long:** Well, that view is, first, no longer U.S. hegemony. The second, more voices of a global south. And third, there will be more balance and justice, the international mechanisms, in many aspects—in the politics, in economics, the trade, investment, even the judicial mechanisms. So, I think there’s a lot of a common issue, the common agenda between China and Russia.
**Peter Slezkine:** But maybe, there’s also now a common agenda between Xi, Putin, and Trump. Let’s say Trump is truly interested in a sphere of influence, multipolar world, that he lessens the U.S. commitment to the UN and puts considerably less emphasis on U.S. global hegemony, then, why are these even competing visions? Maybe, all these powers together can build a beautiful new world.
**Zhao Long:** Well, it goes back again to the credibility of Trump’s vision and Trump’s actions, because we had not good record from his first term. He’s saying, they won this and the next day will totally overturn his position. So, I think this is something that Beijing worries the most, that whether we could really take in account of his words and his promises.
**Peter Slezkine:** You are an Arctic expert, as well as being a specialist on Russia, broadly. There was specific mention of the Arctic as an area where the U.S. and Russia could cooperate, presumably, on energy. What is the Chinese reaction to that proposition? Is there any fear that the U.S. will acquire Greenland and Canada and the Russia and the U.S. will split the Arctic 50-50 and exclude the Chinese and the Europeans?
**Zhao Long:** Well, I think Beijing, also, is closely watching what will be between Russia and U.S. in the Arctic agenda. So, as you know, China has positioned itself as the New Arctic States, and also the important stakeholder of Arctic affairs.
So, let’s establish some context on that. The Arctic is not just about climate, environmental concerns. It’s also about the shipping roads and resources, which China has been very closely engaged together with Russia. So, there’s growing concerns whether Russia and U.S. could coordinate on the Arctic affairs. Personally, I’m quite skeptical about that.
In terms of shipping, I think Russia claims that the whole Northern Sea Route, at least the big part of it, belongs to the Russian’s territory water. So, this is something that the U.S., for decades, opposed. So, I don’t think these legal disputes would easily go away for next, let’s say, three or four years.
This is one thing. Again, energy. I don’t think there will be bad news for China to hear that the U.S. companies were interested in, let’s say, Yamalo energy project or other Russian Arctic energy projects, because for the companies, there will be a good opportunity to share those commercial risks, right? More foreign investments would really relieve on the fear of the secondary sanctions off Chinese companies. So, I don’t think, in particular, the energy cooperation in the Arctic between Russia and the U.S. would be perceived as some negative developments for Chinese participation.
**Peter Slezkine:** The presence of big American business, of ExxonMobil or some other company, in the development of Russian infrastructure projects would not necessarily be seen as a negative by China. It would help China exploit these resources by bringing these projects to completion sooner and spreading the financial risk across these different companies and countries.
**Zhao Long:** That’s right. We did it before the war. Those projects are not only between Russia and China. It’s not bilateral cooperation. It’s involved with French companies, with Japanese companies, with many others. So, I think the Chinese enterprises prefer the multilateral framework of Arctic cooperation rather than only rely on bilateral interactions.
**Peter Slezkine:** And you don’t think there’s any danger that, in these discussions, there is a specific motivation on the U.S. side to minimize Chinese presence, that, like, “We will come back with ExxonMobil if you promise to keep the Chinese presence in the Arctic within certain bounds.” Is there worry in China that the U.S. and Russia are discussing something along these lines?
**Zhao Long:** There are some discussions. There are even some debates about the possibility that what would be the ultimate goal for Trump’s Arctic cooperation with Russia, whether the China will be targeted again. But personally, I’m not too much worried about it. The reason I mentioned, not only the legal prospects or the energy or commercial process. I think, there’s other reason, is that, in terms of Arctic, U.S. is far left behind of Russia in terms of the capability, in the navigation, in doing some field studies, or those commercial use of Arctic.
So, basically, Russia is the leading Arctic state. So, I think Russia will definitely stick on this own agenda to, of course, it will be willing to involve more stakeholders. But I think China will be definitely one of the major stakeholder. And I could expect that Beijing will double down its partnership with Russia in the Arctic.
Well, I think we also will be very interested in engaging with European Arctic states, like Norway, Denmark, and maintain our access, not only to the Russian Arctic, but also to the Arctic affairs as a whole. So, I think China is likely to push more multilateral governance framework like the Arctic Council and others. But again, personally, I think there are some potential challenges, but I don’t see there will be totally, so called, the game-changer for the China-Russian Arctic cooperation.
**Peter Slezkine:** How many of your Russian colleagues have reached out to you in the last few weeks to reassure you that their commitment to China remains strong? How actively are they trying to say that the partnership will continue?
**Zhao Long:** Well, I think, at level of think tank exchanges, we just had try to do dialogue with Russian colleagues last month in China. And the question being repeatedly asked, what’s your understanding of Trump’s policy towards Russia? Nearly, the U-turn policy adjustment towards Russia. What’s our understanding, what’s our concerns about the Sino-Russian relationship.
I can tell you that, I would not describe this, kind of, a reassurance, but I think we do have some common worries or questions that, what’s the whole logic behind the Trump’s policy towards Russia. There’s still debatable, the Russian colleagues are quite confident that our relationship well-maintained with quite strong and productive manner, not really impacted by those strategic or policy adjustment of Washington.
And there’s many arguments. There are many evidence that could support this idea in terms of pragmatic cooperation, trade, investment, technology. But again, overall, I think, we both share those distrust towards Washington. So, the Russian colleagues really feared about this so-called strategic trap of President Trump, which is offering something even beyond their expectations. What will be the so-called the hidden agenda of Trump? I think, in those academic circle, the think tank colleagues, they’re still debating about this kind of, what will be the outcome of policy adjustment from Washington.
**Peter Slezkine:** So, you hear from Russians a certain skepticism, to put it mildly, maybe, about these overtures from Trump. That they’re too good to be true, that the Russians have seen resets before, and that they’re worried that there is some hidden agenda, or that this will all be rolled back by a different political administration. So, they’re almost afraid to take a bite out of what looks like a really juicy apple.
**Zhao Long:** Yeah, exactly. Well, at least from what I’ve heard from our Russian colleagues during the discussion, yes, that is the key question or worries that they have shown to us. And I do share the similar feeling about that, because I think, China, in our experiences in dealing with Trump’s first term, we had a quite similar feeling.
**Peter Slezkine:** You mentioned Trump’s first term a couple times as evidence of what may happen now, but is there not an appreciation in Beijing and in Moscow, insofar as you talk to Russian colleagues frequently, that Trump, in his first stint in the White House, came in unprepared, without a team, and that this time, he has had a while to prepare a large number of cadres. He has nominated and now has had confirmed a series of allies to direct all of the major Washington bureaucracies, and that this is a very different beast, that the first time around is not necessarily evidence for what will happen now, and if we judge by the whirlwind of the first month, it does seem to be quite different.
**Zhao Long:** Oh, of course, I think Trump is totally different in terms of team, in terms of preparedness in the White House, in terms of his experiences in dealing with other leaders. But again, I think the biggest challenge is not for Trump in achieving those strategic goals and global agenda, not from the outside, I think, especially, from inside, because, from my observation, there is almost zero coordination between the different departments, between the different figures of his team. And all of them are just guessing what Trump wants, and they are acting differently and independently from each other.
So, I don’t see there any synergy. And that’s why I’m quite skeptical about the real outcome from any of his foreign policy adjustment. And secondly, think, there’s a big challenge for him. We should not ignore that he created this kind of chaotic situation among the allies and partners. I do believe there will be some hitbacks. There will be some responses from, let’s say, Europe, from other Asia Pacific partners, even from Canada. Every country has their own agenda. It could be pressured by Washington on one issue, but not on all of them and not all of—
**Peter Slezkine:** But wait. So, let’s push a little bit more on this subject of potential rift between the United States and its so-called allies and partners. So, we started by talking about the possibility of the U.S. peeling Russia away from China, and you thought that wasn’t likely. Is there a possibility for China to pull Europe away from the United States?
Wang Yi said something nice about the Europeans recently and castigated Trump for treating them badly. You watched, I’m sure, Vice President Vance’s speech in Munich. And the audience members shocked at his speech. So, is there a sense in China that, perhaps, there is some advantage in this situation and that there’s an opening to pursue or re-enter European Markets if the U.S. imposes tariffs, withdraws from NATO, and otherwise, abdicates its role as Atlanticist power?
**Zhao Long:** Well, in terms of transatlantic relationship, my reading is that, first, the weakened transatlantic alliances, of course, to some extent, benefits China, because Beijing’s biggest strategic concern has been the economic or strategic containment strategies, the tech restrictions, the trade barriers from the coordinated actions of U.S. and Europe, which is the transatlantic alliance against China.
So, if the U.S. and Europe are increasingly at odds over Ukraine, over NATO’s commitments or economic policy, that could, of course, create a room for China to maneuver diplomatically or economically. And meanwhile, I think China does not want complete so-called disorder in the West, because I don’t think we are viewing this tension only through the speculative perspective, because I think, that kind of a disruptive relationship between Washington and Brussels would further escalate those chaotic situation and those in Europe, and those changes will lead into the instability.
**Peter Slezkine:** But what’s the problem? The Chinese constantly talk about changes unseen in a century, which provide some sort of opportunities for Beijing to prosper. I understand that it’s a double-edged sword, and it’s not only a set of wonderful opportunities, but also extraordinary challenges. But nonetheless, why is unsettled global situation, necessarily, a bad thing for a growing China?
**Zhao Long:** Again, I think Europe is still one of the major market for China, right? So, if there are economic uncertainties, those impact on supply chains will trigger the market of volatilities. All those things, I think, will hurt China’s economic interest. This is the first.
And secondly, I think China prefers more predictable partner, even the competitors. So, if the transatlantic relations or the West as a whole become too unpredictable, it makes a long-term strategic planning more difficult for Beijing. “So, how should we deal with the European countries in the long term?” That will create a lot of uncertainties and problems.
**Peter Slezkine:** Yeah, actually, this is something that I’ve found fascinating, is that the Chinese love of predictability extends even to competitive relationships, that there seemed to be a preference for Biden or Harris over Trump. And most of my conversations with Chinese during the election season, even though Biden’s democracy, autocracy is small yard, high fence frameworks were objectively constraining and potentially catastrophic for China. And with Trump unpredictability extends possibly to productive developments. But there was preference, as they say, I guess, in English, for the devil you know.
**Zhao Long:** That’s right. That’s a whole point I would like to make. China, as Beijing, it’s really good in making those long-term strategies and policies. So, we are always insisting on the predictabilities rather than those daily changing policies or strategies, in particular of Trump.
So, that’s why, even for the competitors, even for those non-partner countries, so, I think China is still more preferred in those long-term vision about them, in which, based on that understanding, we could develop the long-term solution and response to that.
So, again, in terms of Europe, I think China has already been actively engaging European leaders and trying to somehow normalize our relationship, because after the war outbreak in Ukraine, I believe our relations with Europe was, kind of, hijacked by those Ukraine war narrative or the China support Russia’s war machine narrative.
I think the whole atmosphere and the narratives being hijacked by this war. I think this is a great opportunity for us to normalize our relations with Europe. I think, China trying to be the responsible power, to be more stable and reliable partner towards, not only to Russia and the global south country, but also to Europe, which, again, as I mentioned, one of the biggest market for China.
I would not say that the China will drive a wedge between Europe, and U.S, but certainly, I think this turbulent time for transatlantic relationship will be perceived by Beijing as the good opportunity for us to normalize our relations with Europe.
**Peter Slezkine:** Because the sense is that Europe’s problems with China are all a function of American policy. So, if the U.S. and Europe drift apart somewhat or have different conceptions of world politics, then that provides an opening for European and Chinese relations to develop along their natural course, as China sees them.
**Zhao Long:** Yeah, we always encourage European’s strategic autonomy, but this kind of a strategic autonomy means specifically in terms of their policies regarding China, not only follow the Washington’s orders or the links of great power rivalry between China and the U.S. And we’re always encouraging European colleagues to develop their own agenda towards China.
**Peter Slezkine:** But do you think that that is any more likely now? Because on one hand, the Europeans reacted very negatively to Vance’s intervention and to American policy in the last couple of months. On the other hand, there doesn’t seem to be much sign of Europe unifying absent American power. I mean, generally, they seem to be wanting to pull the U.S. back in. So, the idea that Europe would adopt a totally independent policy toward China seems unlikely to me.
**Zhao Long:** I wouldn’t be too naive to say that the Europe will just turn to China because of their tensions with Washington. No, not at all. But there are still many Europeans who believe that China is the systematic rival, right? There’s a lot of skepticism about the Chinese role in the Ukraine war. I think there’s a window of opportunity for Beijing and Brussels to have more in-depth discussion about, what will be our own agenda? Only between Europe and China.
**Peter Slezkine:** Have those discussions started in the last few weeks? Have new discussions been launched to take advantage of this window of opportunity?
**Zhao Long:** I think, at some point of this year, those kinds of a discussion will take place because this year marks the 50th anniversary of our relationship with European Union. So, basically, I think, there will be some high-level visits and there will be more discussions on the merit of our relationship, especially in terms of trade, investment, the Chinese EV things, the investment agreement things. I think those topics would be brought up because that will really left behind due to the war. But if we could see even the temporary ceasefire in Ukraine, that would be a good sign continuing such dialogue.
But here, I would like to remind there’s still quite a significant challenge here. Let’s assume that Washington would put maximum pressure on Ukraine, which President Zelensky make a significant compromise on the territories on all conditions sign the ceasefire agreements. That will significantly increase the Europeans dissatisfaction over China. So, China may be one to be blamed for the Europeans to getting such worse deal for Ukraine. So, I think this is, maybe, the potential challenge for the Sino-European relationship, although—
**Peter Slezkine:** So, you think if Trump forces Zelensky into what the Ukrainians and Europeans might perceive as a bad deal, then China will bear part of the blame for this end result.
**Zhao Long:** For sure. I think there’s a great possibility for this kind of a scenario. Yes.
**Peter Slezkine:** So, what can China do, not necessarily to avoid that, but at what point would China consider coming into the Ukraine settlement process?
**Zhao Long:** From my understanding, China certainly wants to be seen as peacemaker, but there’s a big difference between playing a role and taking the lead. So, so far, Beijing has positioned itself as a neutral facilitator. But in the future, I think, there are some concerns of China, of Beijing regarding our role in peace process.
Although Trump has previously suggested that Beijing could play a role in breaking the peace deal, I think his actions suggest that there’s a clear reluctance to allow China to take center stage in mediation. So, it’s unlikely for him to endorse China as primary broker, as doing so would undermine his narrative of American-led ceasefire, right?
And secondly, our concern or worry is our so-called China’s influence over Russia. So, I think, although there’s a strategic partnership, but Beijing does not fully control Moscow’s decision-making, especially for President Putin, right? I’m afraid there are some kind of an over-estimated expectation on China’s influence over Russia. But China, of course, enjoys some economic leverage or diplomatic tools. I think China is mostly likely to play a role in post-war reconstruction.
**Peter Slezkine:** Who would need to invite China in? Obviously, China would love to play a role in post-war reconstruction. Do you have much in the way of construction material? And that is economically a potentially hugely beneficial enterprise. But there are lots of parties on the ground. And not all, I suppose, would be accepting of a leading Chinese role in economic reconstruction. Is there outreach with the Ukrainian government about this? Who would need to sign on to this? How would it work?
**Zhao Long:** Definitely, based on the concern of Ukraine and Russia, but mainly Ukraine. So, that’s why I mentioned that it really depends on what kind of a deal that finally could be reached between Ukraine and Russia.
**Peter Slezkine:** But so, if that’s what China wants, if China wants ultimately to play a role in Ukraine’s reconstruction, how does it get there?
**Zhao Long:** Based on knowledge, China will not only offer some infrastructure projects, but also, maybe, providing some funds, even investments. But it really depends on the position of Kiev and even the attitudes of Europe, I think. That’s why I think it’s too early to say that the China could, for sure, be part of this post-war reconstruction. We do have some willingness, we also enjoy some capabilities, but, again, it’s too early to say.
But I think China probably will get more involved in the later stage, I think, in this whole peace process, when the broader framework is already in place and China can step in as stabilizing force and think you can take China as the final mile facilitator.
**Peter Slezkine:** Would Beijing consider putting a substantial number of peacekeepers on the ground?
**Zhao Long:** Yeah, in terms of security guarantees, peacekeeping missions, I think, within China, there’s a quite debatable issue. My understanding is it’s highly unlikely that China will send our troops directly to Ukraine as the peacekeeper. Because I think China, historically, has been extremely cautious about deploying troops abroad, especially outside the UN-mandated operations.
So, I think if we are really talking about China role in peacekeeping, there’s some preconditions. First, there should be under the UN-mandate operations. Secondly, it should be jointly participate by all those global south countries, not only lead by the Europeans, right?
There’s still, I think, some domestic considerations. I think some of Chinese public are quite skeptical about sending the troops to Ukraine, because for them, they think this is the Europeans own business. Why should you bother us, right? This is one thing.
But there are some alternatives. I think the sending the troops, not only option for the peacekeeping mission, right? For China, we could use some more advanced technologies, like unmanned or remote surveillance system, drones to participate.
**Peter Slezkine:** Yeah. The front line is already saturated with Chinese drones that are dealing death. So, maybe Chinese drones can also bring peace.
**Zhao Long:** Yeah, maybe. And also, China could be interesting, be part of a monitoring mechanisms, right? But any such initiative, I’ve mentioned, it would require recognition, even the formal request from both Russia and Ukraine. So, I think China’s participation definitely will anchor, in the UN resolution, in the demands of both parties. But both on the ground in Ukraine, I think there’s still a big question mark.
**Peter Slezkine:** Okay. Well, I know you have to go soon. So, one final quick question. The Zelensky-Vance-Trump argument in the Oval Office, how was that received in China? What was the reaction on social media? What was the reaction in the expert community? Were you asked for interviews and comments? And what on earth did you say?
**Zhao Long:** Okay, that’s a tricky question. First, I think what happened in the Oval Office really impact on our understanding of meetings between leaders, especially how we perceive the possibility of potential Xi-Trump meeting. So, I think, those unpredictability shown from this meeting, again, further, increased our reluctance in seeking this kind of interactions directly with Trump without the, more, comprehensive preparations and discussions in advance.
So, basically, when Trump believes as through those leaders meeting, he could resolve all the problems, but reality shows that they could lead to another disaster of diplomacy. So, that’s why I think this is one worries when the Chinese watched the incident happening in the Oval Office.
**Peter Slezkine:** So, the Chinese traditional focus on diplomatic protocol would be raised to an absolutely extraordinary level in anticipation of a Xi-Trump meeting. To avoid any possible surprises, there would be an extraordinary amount of attention devoted to planning out every single second of the interaction.
**Zhao Long:** Yes, exactly. I think, especially for President Xi, I don’t think he will be quite comfortable in dealing with Trump’s performance in the Oval Office. So, I think it’s another sign of U.S. unpredictability. So, that’s why I think, this will reinforce Beijing’s long held belief that we must, not only rely on the leaders meeting, but also to resolve the problem in advance before the meetings, and then just have the whole image of the constructive dialogue between leaders, rather than discussing those substantial issue right in front of the world media.
So, I think that there’s some lessons, not only for Zelensky, but for all other leaders, which will have more clear understanding of Trump’s style of negotiation. So, I think there’s really, somehow, reshaped the beijing’s, understanding of the leaders meeting.
**Peter Slezkine:** Well, let’s hope that leaders meeting does happen, and that it goes off without a hitch. So, thanks so much for joining me today. And I look forward to seeing you next time I’m in Shanghai.
**Zhao Long:** Thank you for having me. Always a pleasure.
**Peter Slezkine:** Thanks for listening to the _Trialogue Podcast_. Make sure to subscribe to the show, so you don’t miss out on any episodes.
The _Trialogue Podcast_ is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.