On March 20, 2025, President Trump signed an executive order (EO) to increase domestic minerals production for national security by invoking Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code. Notably, the EO designates clear and significant authorities to relevant agency heads; sets swift timelines for implementation within 10, 30, or 45 days; and positions the new National Energy Dominance Council (NEDC), chaired by Secretary of Interior Doug Burgum, to take a leading role in overseeing the progress of domestic minerals security.
The EO positions critical minerals as a national security imperative, ordering the secretary of defense to add mineral production as a priority industrial capability development area for the Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment Program. While focused exclusively on developing domestic minerals resources, the EO sends a strong signal to the private sector that the Trump administration is prioritizing minerals security and willing to support the private sector by lowering barriers to entry and mobilizing existing funding expeditiously.
The EO seeks to strengthen U.S. minerals security primarily by expediting permitting for priority mining projects on federal lands, invoking the Defense Production Act, and leveraging financing programs, including the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), which is traditionally reserved for development-oriented projects in low- and middle-income countries, to inject capital into minerals projects at home.
Q1: What minerals are included in the executive order, and why is the widened list strategic?
A1: The EO defines “minerals” as not only the minerals identified as critical on the Department of Interior’s list, but also adds copper, uranium, gold, and potash. The EO also leaves the critical minerals list open to other materials as determined by the NEDC. This provision widens support to key materials that have historically been left off the list and unable to benefit from government incentives and other forms of support aimed at the critical minerals sector.
Expanding the minerals to go beyond the Department of Interior’s list has two key benefits. First, it increases support to commodities like copper, uranium, and potash, which are vital for U.S. national, economic, and energy security interests. Copper is the second-most utilized material by weight in weapon platforms and plays a crucial role in powering electrical grids, integrated circuits, and telecommunications networks. Additionally, the growing artificial intelligence (AI) sector is increasing demand for copper. It’s estimated that between 330,000 and 420,000 tons of copper will be needed in data centers by 2030. On the other hand, uranium is crucial feedstock for nuclear power, which accounted for 19 percent of total U.S. energy production in 2023. Once the world’s largest uranium producer, the United States is now nearly wholly import reliant, including relying on supply from adversarial nations like Russia. Including these minerals can provide crucial support for shoring up domestic production and processing capabilities.
Second, providing support to the expanded list of commodities can be strategic for sourcing important by-products, as they’re often not found alone. For example, Stibnite Gold Mine, which was also the largest producer of antimony in the United States, closed operations in the 1990s. In 2024, China banned antimony exports to the United States—a move that undermines U.S. defense interests given its use in missile and munitions applications. Perpetua Resources has proposed plans to reopen the Stibnite Gold Mine to produce gold and antimony, and the project has received government funding. Federal support to projects with strategic by-products can unlock access to key materials.
Q2: How important are the EO’s provisions to expedite permitting and leasing on federal lands to moving mining projects through the pipeline?
A2: Permitting is the largest barrier to developing domestic mineral projects. The United States has the second-longest timeline in the world to develop a mine, and the U.S. Government Accountability Office has noted that ineffective government coordination can delay federal permitting by up to three years. In order to quickly scale up mineral mining and production within the United States, the EO seeks to address serious permitting bottlenecks that have hindered domestic mining projects in the pipeline for years.
Within just 10 days, the EO directs the NEDC to identify priority projects for expedited permitting and orders the secretary of the interior to identify all federal lands with minerals deposits. Within 30 days, it directs all relevant agencies to identify sites on federal lands suitable for leasing for private commercial mineral production.
While addressing the permitting bottleneck is important, there are additional challenges in building new mining and processing projects on federal lands that are not addressed in the EO. Both mines and processing facilities are energy-intensive projects. There is a shortage of energy and energy transmission infrastructure throughout the United States. The U.S. Department of Energy estimated that transmission line mileage must increase by 60 percent by the end of this decade and triple by the middle of this century to accommodate new energy projects coming online, yet construction of long-distance transition lines has stalled. These energy infrastructure challenges will need to be addressed for mining and processing projects to find sites on federal lands attractive and come online quickly.
Q3: In an era of fiscal austerity and budget cuts, how does the EO approach financing?
A3: The EO seeks to utilize various sources of federal funding to support domestic minerals projects. The Departments of Energy, Agriculture, Defense, and the Small Business Administration (SBA) are directed to give as favorable terms as possible to private entities establishing commercial minerals production on federal lands. Additionally, the SBA is to give recommendations for legislation that can enhance private-public capital activities to support financing of domestic small business and junior mining companies in the minerals sector.
The EO can only leverage existing funds and cannot appropriate additional resources to agencies to carry out these activities. In order to designate additional capital to support critical minerals programs, President Trump will need to work with Congress to pass new legislation. Just as the Biden administration signed the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and the Inflation Reduction Act into law with appropriations to the Department of Energy for a wide array of new funding programs including minerals initiatives, the Trump administration will need congressional approval to leverage additional funds. This will be challenging considering tight Republican margins in both the House and the Senate as well as Republicans’ focus on cutting back the deficit.
Q4: How does the EO empower the Export-Import Bank to support mineral offtake, and will this approach work?
A4: The Export-Import Bank (EXIM) is empowered to use its Supply Chain Resiliency Initiative (SCRI) to secure offtake of raw materials produced abroad for domestic processing. SCRI provides financing for international mining projects that have signed long-term offtake contracts with U.S. companies. The EO directs EXIM to submit guidance as to how this program can be leveraged to secure offtake of feedstock mined abroad. The success of this initiative will be key to addressing concerns that domestic processing and refining facilities will not have access to enough raw materials to reach economies of scale.
This has been a challenge for many minerals supply chains. Although the United States is building a nickel refinery and rare earths separation facilities, it still has less than 1.5 percent of these commodities, necessitating ore imports to reach economies of scale and operate profitably.
There are key challenges to this effort that have yet to be addressed. First, while the EO prioritizes getting mineral offtake agreements signed, many off-takers are financially struggling and may be hesitant. For example, given the uncertainty around the Inflation Reduction Act’s tax credits for electric vehicles, auto manufacturers are less likely to sign long-term mineral offtake agreements. Second, as mining companies face low commodity prices, demand uncertainty, and geopolitical risk, long-term agreements are less appealing. Thus, for a long-term offtake agreement to be signed, it’s likely that a comprehensive set of risk mitigation tools will be needed, including price floors, risk insurance, and tax incentives.
Q5: What is the significance of delegating Defense Production Act authority to the International Development Finance Corporation?
A5: Finally, the EO invokes the Defense Production Act (DPA) and delegates authority to the secretary of defense to direct industrial production as well as to the CEO of the DFC to issue direct loans and loan guarantees for domestic mineral production. This builds upon the national energy emergency Trump declared in January. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Ben Black, Trump’s nominee to head the DFC, will play significant roles in determining the future of U.S. critical minerals production.
Black and Hegseth will use Department of Defense investment authorities, including the DPA and the Department of Defense Office of Strategic Capital, to establish a dedicated mineral and mineral production fund for domestic investments executed by the DFC. This is not the first time the DFC has been tapped to issue DPA loan authorities. In 2020, amid the Covid-19 pandemic, the DFC was allocated $100 million in DPA loan authority to respond to shortages of medical supplies and equipment. However, the EO significantly expands the role of the DFC in directing domestic investments. Traditionally focused on international infrastructure and aid programs, the DFC will now be pivoting much of its capacity to domestic minerals investments.
Given that the DFC is up for reauthorization in 2025, the EO paves the way for a new kind of DFC that is far more domestically focused and critical mineral dominant. This would be a significant change considering that the DFC was established to be a development-oriented financing agency in low- and middle-income countries.
Gracelin Baskaran is director of the Critical Minerals Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Meredith Schwartz is a research associate for the Critical Minerals Security Program at CSIS.