On March 15, the US began a campaign of airstrikes against the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen. US Central Command said it had “initiated a series of operations consisting of precision strikes against Iran-backed Houthi targets across Yemen to defend American interests, deter enemies, and restore freedom of navigation.”
The Houthis have responded with attempts to target the USS Harry Truman aircraft carrier and other ships in the Red Sea. The regime fired a ballistic missile that landed in Egypt, and a second missile intercepted over Israel’s Negev desert.
The new campaign will be a test for the Trump administration. US President Donald Trump has warned Iran that it will be held accountable for attacks by the Houthis.
Trump has said that “tremendous damage has been inflicted upon the Houthi barbarians.” He also said that the US will increase strikes as they become “progressively worse” for the Houthis. Eventually, the group will be “completely annihilated.”
Trump is known for setting goals like this only to climb down in order to get some kind of deal that appears to be a win for the United States or its allies. In some ways, the brash talk may be part of the doctrine. However, the strikes on the Houthis are still a test.
Can airpower alone defeat the group?
Houthi Activity
The Houthis have terrorized shipping in the Red Sea for almost a year and a half. They started their attacks after Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023. The Houthi campaign has gone through phases of escalation.
They hijacked a ship called the Galaxy Leader in November 2023, which they claimed was linked to an Israeli commercial firm.
They fired drones and ballistic missiles at Israel. They have targeted US warships and commercial ships they claim are linked to Israel or various Western countries.
Essentially, they tried to blockade the Red Sea and Suez Canal to ships that they decided to attack.
The Houthis have increased their capabilities in the last several years. The rebel group burst forth in 2015, capturing swaths of Yemen and causing Saudi Arabia to lead a coalition to intervene to back Yemen’s government. The Houthis received Iranian backing. This support came during the Iran deal talks when Saudi and Iran were at loggerheads.
In addition, Iran increased support for the Assad regime and militias in Iraq. It was a time of opportunity for Iran. Eventually, the Saudis wound down their role in Yemen, and Saudi partners such as the UAE became estranged from any kind of joint work there.
The Saudi role in Yemen and other countries, such as the UAE, that use modern Western defense technology illustrated the challenge of using airstrikes and modern precision weapons against an enemy like the Houthis.
The Houthis excelled on the ground, where one might expect a local insurgent group to excel, and used new technologies, such as kamikaze drones, to great effect. They used ballistic missiles against Riyadh. Although air defenses, such as Patriots, worked against the missiles, the Houthis still spread terror far and wide.
Eventually, they likely acquired Iranian Shahed 136 drones, the same drone that Iran then exported to Russia for use against Ukraine in 2022. Conflict Armament Research believes the Houthis use hydrogen fuel cells on their drones today. This new fuel source represents yet another step in the drone innovation ladder.
One-way kamikaze drones are no match for a US carrier strike force. Houthi ballistic missiles are also no match for the US Navy. However, that doesn’t mean the war in Yemen is a walk in the park. Israel carried out a series of raids on the Houthis in 2024 in response to increasing attacks, and the airstrikes did not deter the group.
Airstrikes can be a false prophet of success, especially with modern precision weapons. This perception is because the extreme precision provides operators with a sense of accomplishment, but the challenge is making the damage actually count. If the Houthis can hide ballistic missiles in caves and keep making them, all they have to do is wait out the campaign.
Air campaigns have worked in the past in several instances. The campaign against Serbia in 1999 worked because Serbia’s army wasn’t prepared to face a modern NATO bombing campaign. The campaign against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq worked in 1991 because it also arrayed a modern US-led coalition against Saddam’s tank-heavy conventional Soviet-supplied army. Iraq’s defense made easy pickings for air power.
The Houthis don’t have thousands of tanks. They aren’t a state like Serbia. They have been under air attack for years by Western-supplied aircraft and munitions.
There is a chance the sheer firepower of the USS Harry Truman and other assets the US puts into play in the region could bring the Houthis to heel. There is a chance that the Trump administration’s threat to hold Iran accountable could get Tehran to open a backchannel. So far, Iran has distanced itself from the Houthis. Iran wants plausible deniability when it comes to the Houthi weapons.
The Trump administration is seeking a possible new deal with Iran, according to a recent letter reportedly sent by the White House. The US also wants a ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia. Meanwhile, Israel has returned to striking Hamas in Gaza after a US-backed ceasefire broke down because Hamas refused to extend the first phase of the deal.
The Trump administration’s decision to focus on the Houthis may be a way to go after low-hanging fruit. Opening the Red Sea to shipping and reducing threats can be seen as a win for US naval power. It can then be leveraged with Iran and possibly to curtail Iran’s backing of militias in Iraq. It may even affect the Israeli war on Hamas and US backing for stability in Lebanon. Russia may be watching closely as well.
If Moscow judges that the US is serious, it could affect the Ukraine talks. For all this to work, the White House needs to show it achieved something in Yemen. All eyes are thus on the USS Harry Truman and its presence in the Red Sea, along with US Central Command, to pull this operation off.
Seth Frantzman is the author of The October 7 War: Israel’s Battle for Security in Gaza (2024) and an adjunct fellow at The Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He is a Senior Middle East Analyst for The Jerusalem Post. Seth is now a 19FortyFive Contributing Editor.