My regular update on global conflict & confrontation. This week: Putin's 'Big Week' strikes against civilians, peace negotiations 'Witkoff style', Chinese peacekeepers and the Putin-Trump bromance.
For over three years now, almost throughout this entire war, our Coordination Headquarters has been working—all the services that bring prisoners home. We have already successfully brought back more than four thousand people—4306. And we will bring them all back. President Zelenskyy,22 March 2025
Welcome to this week’s edition ofThe Big Five. This week, an examination of the status of peace negotiations, Putin’s ‘big week’ of strikes against Ukrainian civilians, the continuing Trump-Putin bromance as well as updates on the war in Ukraine and the confrontation with China in the Pacific.
As always, I conclude with my top five war and national security reads from the week.
Ukraine
Peace Negotiations. The injection of Trump into peace negotiations for the war in Ukraine continues to exhibit elements of farce and gullibility on the part of U.S. negotiators. This week, the American negotiating position was further compromised when the U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff,uncritically amplified a full range of standing positions of Putin about the war in Ukraine.
In an interview conducted on March 21, the Witkoffstated that Russia "reclaimed" five regions in Ukraine — Crimea and Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts — and that Russia "has gotten what it wants" and will not want more. Lots to examine here, with the most obvious point of critique being that Russia has not re-claimed this provinces because they weren’t Russia’s to reclaim. These are Ukrainian territory. The only thing Witkoff did here was to align himself with Putin’s frequently expressed view throughout this war, and beyond, that Ukraine is not a real state.
Also during the interview, Witkoff referred to twodiscredited referenda on the status of eastern Ukrainian regions. He also mentioned the old story about majority Russian speakers there. A couple of things. First, a huge proportion of Ukrainians speak Russian. It doesn’t mean they want to BE Russian. Second, I speak English (as does everyone else in my country, kind of) but that doesn’t mean we (or Americans, Kiwis or Canadians where almost everyone also speaks English) wants to be part of Great Britain.
Oh, and did I mention that this Witkoff interviewwas with Tucker Carlson?
Putin and his propaganda machine have recently stepped up their messaging in this regards, particularly their concept of "Novorossiya". Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov defined this all of eastern and southern Ukraine including Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts.
Also this week, the American Special Envoy to Ukraine, Keith Kellogg, described how U.S. diplomats will be undertaking ‘shuttle diplomacy’ between Ukrainian and Russian delegations in Saudi Arabia. Asa recent ISW report notes, U.S. technical teams will meet with the Ukrainian delegation on March 23, and the Russian delegation on March 24. They may also meet with the Ukrainian delegation again later on March 24 if there is some progress.
The objectives of these talks are quite limited, and will not achieve either a widespread ceasefire or any peace agreement. The focus of this round of talks will be a moratorium on straties against energy facilities and potentially, a ceasefire in the Black Sea.
This week also featured the first direct conversation between Trump and Zelenskyy since the infamous Oval Office ambush of 28 February. In their phonethat occured on Wednesday, the two leaders discussed a mutual pause in strikes against energy targets for 30 days as a step toward a more comprehensive cease-fire.
Adding another wrinkle to negotiations this week, President Trump suggested in his phone call with the Ukrainian president thatAmerica take ownership of Ukrainian power plants. Besides the obvious sticking points of one being occupied by the Russians, and all of them being owned by the Ukrainian state, this is an idea full of holes.
It is unclear exactly why Trump seeks such a big economic stake in Ukraine. Is it part of a masterplan to build such a big economic stake in Ukraine that it will make it easy for him to convince Congress to provide more aid? Or, more likely, is it just an attempt to extort Ukraine for a return on the ‘350 billion dollars’ the U.S. has given Ukraine (which isa much higher figure than the reality of actual U.S. aid). According to the Kiel Institute, at current exchange rates, U.S. aid to Ukraine sits at about US$125 billion.
Source: Kiel Institute
At the same time, Putin is not giving an inch in negotiations. He has stolidlyretained his overall objectives for the war, which is the complete subjugation of Ukraine, the extinguishment of its sovereignty, and no foreign military support. And why would he budge? Trump has largely conceded most of Putin’s claims even before serious negotiations commenced.
More importantly, according to Witkoff, Putin very kindly prayed for Trump after the recent assassination attempt (that’s soooo nice) and gave him a lovely painting of Trump. Future historians will have a field day trying to untangle this elderly authoritarian (and probably one way only) bromace.
Despite Trump’s stated aspiration to quickly end the war and end the killing, this is unlikely to be the case anytime soon. Given the very open and obvious bias towards Russian objectives and narratives of the U.S. negotiators, it is unlikely that a just or enduring peace for Ukraine will eventuate soon.
Putin’s ‘Big Week’ Demonstrating His ‘Peaceful’ Intentions. Back in the last big war in Europe where the good and bad guys were also very clear, the American and British air forces conducted an operation calledOperation Argument in February 1944. Executed over the course of a single week, it was designed to target and destroy aircraft factories in central and southern Germany to degrade the ability of the*Luftwaffe* to interfere in the soon-to-be-conductedNormandy landings.
Over 6000 allied bomber missions were flown, and over 300 British and American bombers were lost. But, the results were judged a success. After the war, the operation was dubbed ‘Big Week’.
This week, Putin has executed his own version of Big Week. The key differences are that this time, this Russian Big Week is not in pursuit of a just cause and is targeting civilians in a democracy fighting for its life. None of Putin’s targets were legitimate under international law or the laws of war. Putin pummelled Ukraine this week with a series of large-scale drone strikes against civilian infrastructure. Odesa, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, Kyiv, Khmelnytskyi, and Chernihiv regions were all targeted. Kyiv was the most recently targeted with strikes against residential buildings last night. Multiple Ukrainians were killed or injured in these attacks.
Putin is clearly trying to reinforce in the minds of U.S. negotiators that they are ‘doing the right thing’ by wanting to end the war quickly through twisting Ukraine’s arm behind its back and seeking to coerce it into an unfavourable peace. Pretty repulsive stuff: that Putin does it, and that it appears to be working with American negotiators.
Ukraine’s Big Hit Against Engels-2. But the strategic strikes were not all one way this week. Ukraine, as normal, avoided any civilian targets and continued to focus on degrading Russia’s military potential. It struck the ammunition storage facilities at the Engels-2 airbase, from which Russian strategic bombers take off for their missions to launch missiles against Ukraine. This was quite aspectacular attack, and as the imagery below shows, has caused considerable damage to Russia’s cruise missile stocks. There is no evidence ofdamage to the airfield or aircrafthowever.
Images: Maxar
And that mushroom cloud over Engels-2 at sunrise. Beautiful!
Engels-2 smoking accident this week. Image:@IAPonomarenko
Chinese Peacekeepers. A report emerged this week that China might consider sending peacekeeping troops to Ukraine as part of a coalition of the willing. Apparently, this is designed to make it easier to secure Russian agreement for such a force to be deployed to Ukraine. But seriously, who in their right mind thinks it is a good idea to have Chinese troops deployed to Europe for any reason?
The Frontline. After the significant events on the Kursk front in the past couple of weeks, events this week appears to return to the more normal tempo of operations on the ground in most parts of the frontline.
The Russians are continuing their assaults on the final Ukrainian positions in Kursk, although they have largely achieved their strategic goal of kicking the Ukrainians out of Russia before any peace negotiations about territory take place.
A useful assessment of the Ukrainian Kursk campaign was published by @Tatarigami this week. As the report notes, “the operation achieved only partial success relative to its initial goals, while potentially accelerating Russian gains in Donbas. The attrition ratio was unfavorable for Ukraine.” You can read the full reportat this link.
Given its advances in the Kursk region, the Russians now appear to have three options: 1. Finalise the clearance of Ukrainian forces inside Kursk, and halt at the border; 2. Continue operations into Ukraine in order to establish a buffer zone, which Putin has discussed before; or 3. Keep pushing into Ukraine beyond a buffer zone. While the Russians would love to exercise option 3 to put more pressure on the Ukrainians and reinforce to their American friends why a pressuring Ukraine into a ceasefire is a good idea, it is not clear the Russians have the capacity for this. What we are most likely to see is a combination of 1 and 2.
And influencing the Russian decision-making in Kursk will be the new Ukrainian incursion into the Belgorod region of Russia this week. This doesn’t appear to be a significant force, and appears to be aimed at drawing off Russian forces from Kursk and any further Sumy operations. This articlefrom Euromaiden Press is a useful explainer.
In eastern Ukraine, both sides continue to punch away at each other, with small gains in territory by both sides. But overall, the trend is one of Russia’s eastern offensive continuing to struggle to take more territory. As the most recent update from @War_Mapper shows below, the Russian momentum continues to wane. While we might see a spike in territory seized in March because of the Russian-North Korean Kursk campaign, the Russian pace of advance is slowing.
While there are several reasons for this, including Russian attrition and weather, part of the reason for slowing Russian gains has been attributed by some to a change in command of the Khortitsiya Group of Forces. General Mykhailo Drapaty has recentlyassumed command, andappears to have stabilised the eastern front line. Since he assumed command, there have also been some successful small counter attacks that have re-taken territory in various locations in the east.
The Pacific
Image:@MarineNationale
Taiwan Invasion Preparations. Perhaps the biggest story of the past couple of weeks has bee the confirmation that the Chinese a building and testing a set of inter-connected barges that could be used to facilitate amphibious landing operations at shallow beaches. Now, to be fair, these things could not be used until a beach is actually secured - there is no way to quickly or securely assemble the different elements of these ‘ship to shore’ connectors - without a secure zone behind the beach. They would make terrific targets for artillery, missiles, drones, etc.
These barges indicate China’s willingness however to experiment with a series of different innovations to intimidate Taiwan, or attempt to convince them to integrate into China without war. It that fails, China is sending the message that it will do what it must to seize Taiwan.
Chinese invasion barges for Taiwan. Image:The Telegraph
Some of the best analysis on this issue is fromTom Shugart, who has followed this topic for some time. I recommend following him if you don’t already.
New Taiwanese Counter Coercion Strategies. This week, the President of Tawian announced a series of measures to improve Taiwan’s resilience against the many different ways that China is seeking to coerce its decision-making and limit its sovereignty. As President Lai noted in the press conference announcing these measures “we have no choice but to take even more proactive measures…It is time we adopt proper preventive measures, enhance our democratic resilience and national security, and protect our cherished free and democratic way of life.”
Lai then described the five major national security and united front threats Taiwan is facing, as well as the 17 major strategies that have been prepared in response. The five key threats are as follows:
Responding to China’s threats to national sovereignty.
Responding to China’s threats from infiltration and espionage activities targeting the military.
Responding to China’s threats aimed at obscuring the national identity of the people of Taiwan.
Responding to China’s threats from united front infiltration into Taiwanese society through cross-strait exchanges.
Responding to threats from China using “integrated development” to attract Taiwanese businesspeople and youth.
You can read the full english transcript of President Lai’s address and the details of the 17 strategieshere.
Cable Cutting Communists. This week, Chinaunveiled a new deep-sea cable cutterthat could cut lines at depths of up to 4,000 meters. The cutter is designed for integration with China’s advanced crewed and uncrewed submersibles. The new device was designed and developed by the China Ship Scientific Research Center and State Key Laboratory of Deep-Sea Manned Vehicles. It is able to sever “armored cables,” lines with steel, rubber and polymer sheaths, which makes up the construction of the majority of cables that carry global data and communications.
Type-12 surface-to-ship missile. Image: The Defense Post
***Forward Deployment of Japanese Strike Missiles.***Japanese news agency Kyodo reported this week thatJapan was considering deploying long-range strike missileson the southwestern island of Kyushu to strengthen “counterstrike capabilities”. The missiles are likely to be sent to Kyushu, which would assist in Japanese and allied efforts to deny Chinese warships access to the Pacific.
The missiles deployed would be the Japanese Type-12 land-to-ship guided missile, which has a range of 1,000 kilometers. Kyushu faces the East China Sea to the west and the Korean Peninsula to the northwest, and it is approximately 900 kilometers north of the island of Okinawa.
Chinese Dogfights in Space. Finally, a U.S. Space Force general said this week that commercial sensing systems had monitored Chinese satellitesrehearsing “dogfighting” maneuvers in low Earth orbit. The Space Force generalnoted that “With our commercial assets, we have observed five different objects in space maneuvering in and out and around each other in synchronicity and in control…That’s what we call dogfighting in space. They are practicing tactics, techniques and procedures to do on-orbit space operations from one satellite to another.”
The Chinese space exercise apparently occurred in 2024 and used three Shiyan-24C experimental satellites and two other Chinese experimental spacecraft, the Shijian-605 A and B.
*****
Since my last edition of the Big Fivetwo weeks ago, I have had a reasonably busy time writing and publishing. My first article was a short piece that I wrote while sitting on a park bench in Kyiv. You canread it here.
Next, the Australian Financial Review published my story that described my interview with Ukrainian head of military intelligence, General Budanov. You can read that story atthis link.
I also published a piece here about my visit to the 53rd Brigade in eastern Ukraine,available here, as well as an article for the Lowy Institute about the adaptation battle and drones in Ukraine. You canread that article here.
Finally, on 22 March, I conducted my first ever Substack Live Video to debrief my visit to Ukraine. The briefing went for about 30 minutes and covered an array of insights that I gleaned from my recent visit to Ukraine. You canwatch the full video here.
*****
So, to this week’s recommended readings.
This week, I have included an article that examines the development, componentry and application of Russian glide bombs used in Ukraine. Another piece explores Chinese President Xi’s frustrations with the slow pace of military reform, and the challenges of addressing corrpution. There is a good article on cognitive warfare as well as two articles that explore different aspects of modern mobilisation.
As always, if you only have time to read one of my recommendations, the first one is my read of the week.
Happy reading!
1. The Glide Bomb Threat
Since the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russian tactical aviation has used more than 51,000 guided aerial bombs against Ukraine, some 40,000 of them in 2024 alone. High in destructive power, but low in cost, these munitions helped the Russians to take Avdiivka, and are being used to attack Ukrainian forces along the entire front line. The full report isavailable here.
2. Mobilising Modern Societies
I found this article fascinating as it gets to the heart of the challenge with mobilising sufficient quality and quantity of forces that might be needed to address the growing challenge of authoritarian powers. As the authors note, Ukraine offers a cautionary tale regarding the two main modern models of force generation. Neither the professional high-tech war model, favored by Western militaries, nor the whole-of-society war approach, have proved to be wholly successful formulas for Ukraine. The failure of both models has serious implications for NATO. You can read the articleat this link.
3. Xi Struggles with Military Reform
Corruption remans an issue within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and it continues to hinder Xi’s efforts to improve coordination in the military-industrial sector and related military equipment departments. This article provides useful insights into military reform, and also indicates that despite its growing military power, it still has many weaknesses. You canread the full article here.
4. Pushing Back on Chinese Cognitive Warfare
While war has always been about humans seeking to out think each other, recent research into the neurosciences and the development of AI has led to discussion about Cognitive Warfare. As the author of this article notes, “cognitive warfare disrupts the way we think—rationality itself. It uses neuroscience, data analytics, and algorithm-based strategies to achieve strategic advantage. Developing a framework to counter this threat is not just essential; it is urgent.” I think he is right. You can read the full articleat this link.
5. Mobilisation & Australian Defence Policy since Vietnam
This is an interesting piece from the final 2024 edition of the Australian Army Journal. The article argues that while mobilisation is a national challenge, it can take very different forms and have very different purposes when mapped against force structure and preparedness outcomes. You can read the full pieceat this link.
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