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Can Israel’s Highest Court Stop Netanyahu?

In the coming weeks, a battle royal is poised to begin over the future of Israeli democracy, and it is by no means certain that the side representing democratic norms and the rule of law will win.

On one side is Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who moved to fire two key government officials last week as part of his drive to weaken other branches of government and elevate loyalists.

On the other side is the Supreme Court. In theory, the court has the power to block parts of Netanyahu’s agenda, but, in practice, it faces a government determined to defy its decisions and erode its power.

If it comes to a constitutional standoff, the street protests that have rocked Israel since Netanyahu returned to power more than two years ago are likely to escalate. Some influential Israelis who are usually measured in their assessments of the country are even warning of a possible civil war.

The events that precipitated the crisis are the back-to-back decisions by the cabinet over the past few days to dismiss Ronen Bar, the head of the Shin Bet domestic security agency, and begin the process of dismissing Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara. Netanyahu justified the decision to fire Bar on the grounds that he had lost trust in him and that Bar was too “soft” for the job. Justice Minister Yariv Levin, who has led a monthslong campaign to oust the attorney general, accused her of “unfitting conduct” and cited her “substantive, and prolonged differences of opinion” with the government.

Both the Shin Bet chief and attorney general are appointees who serve at the pleasure of the government, but dismissing them is not a simple and straightforward procedure. Even in normal times, the act of firing the Shin Bet chief is subject to administrative law, which requires the government to, among other things, provide a factual basis for its decision and meet the legal standard of reasonableness. An attorney general cannot be dismissed until an advisory committee reviews the decision and holds a hearing.

But these are hardly normal times. The rules and regulations were written on the assumption that the government would abide by them in letter as well as in spirit and that it was committed to democratic norms. Previous governments, including those led by Netanyahu, had their share of disputes with the Shin Bet head and attorney general, yet none ever took the extreme step of firing them.

Much like U.S. President Donald Trump, however, Netanyahu is resentful of limits to his power imposed by these gatekeepers and is prepared to strike out at his political enemies, even if it means playing fast and loose with the law. And, like Trump, Netanyahu is aided and abetted by ideologues who are exploiting their leaders’ lust for power in order to remake their respective societies.

Baharav-Miara is regarded as an obstacle for her persistent refusal to countenance government acts she regards as unconstitutional—including its judicial reform program that would weaken the Supreme Court and other parts of the judicial branch.

Bar, for his part, as the person whose chief task is fighting terrorism, wouldn’t ordinarily be in the government’s crosshairs. But the Shin Bet is also charged with preserving Israeli democracy and investigating breaches of national security. Both those tasks have put him in conflict with the government.

The war the Netanyahu government is waging against democratic norms began long before the cabinet moved to fire Baharav-Miara and Bar. Indeed, the opening salvo was fired the moment Netanyahu formed his current government at the end of 2022—and later when Levin unveiled a wide-ranging plan to put the courts under the control of the politicians. His so-called judicial reform stalled out amid massive street protests, Supreme Court rulings striking down key measures approved by the Knesset, and finally by the Hamas massacre in October 2023 and the ensuing war in Gaza.

But it was clear the government was waiting for the opportunity to revive the judicial overhaul. Levin has long been obsessed with what he sees as a corrupt and hopelessly left-wing judiciary. The government’s religious and far-right partners saw the Supreme Court as the single biggest barrier to their efforts to reshape Israel into a less liberal and more religious society.

Netanyahu didn’t necessarily share those views, but a judicial overhaul could potentially help him wriggle out of the corruption charges he faces and escape a criminal conviction. Coping with the pressures of the 2023 street protests, his trials, and the war, the prime minister may have even gradually come to accept the far right’s premise of the government civil-servant gatekeepers as the enemy. The prime minister used to leave it to his social media acolytes to make MAGA-style claims of a “deep state” bent on destroying him personally and politically; more recently, Netanyahu has begun using the term himself.

The time to revive the overhaul and undertake other measures in the same vein finally came last autumn. The wars against Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran were going in Israel’s favor, but the wartime atmosphere remained intense enough to discourage the kind of street protests that had shaken the country throughout 2023. Trump’s return to office meant the White House would no longer object to anti-democratic measures, as the Biden administration had done.

This time, however, the government chose a piecemeal approach that was less likely to spark renewed protests. Earlier this month, the Knesset approved legislation putting control of the body disciplining judges into the hands of coalition lawmakers. Another law that will politicize the appointment of judges is now making its way through the Knesset. Next came the firing of the Shin Bet chief and the attorney general.

This political struggle will inevitably form the backdrop as the issue of the dismissals is heard in the Supreme Court, but the cases themselves will be formally decided over the more mundane question of whether the dismissals are tainted by a conflict of interest.

Bar’s Shin Bet has been investigating allegations of leaks of classified information from Netanyahu’s office and payments made by Qatar to officials close to the prime minister. This week, it emerged that it was also probing far-right infiltration into the national police. Netanyahu’s critics say that even if on paper he has legally permissible grounds to fire Bar, the real aim is to replace him with a more pliable successor who will agree to drop the investigation. Therefore, the courts must intervene.

The same argument goes for Baharav-Miara, who as attorney general is in charge of prosecuting the case against Netanyahu for breach of trust, accepting bribes, and fraud. These days, Netanyahu is testifying twice a week in a Tel Aviv court. In theory, at least, a loyalist in the position could make it easier for the Israeli leader to escape a conviction.

The Supreme Court has already issued a temporary injunction freezing Bar’s dismissal and will hear the appeals against the firing April 8. The justices could do one of four things: reject the appeals outright, order the cabinet to rewrite its decision to conform with administrative, propose a compromise under which Bar would step down in a few months’ time, or void Bar’s dismissal. If the latter happens, the battle royal will be on.

Even if the court doesn’t intervene in the firing of Baharav-Miara, the process would ordinarily take months. It must be vetted by a government committee, whose composition is likely to be contested in court. The government, however, is intent on ousting her as quickly as possible: Hoping to avoid all the red tape, Levin has advised her to quit of her own accord. He will no doubt continue the harassment campaign he has waged against her over the past two years.

Will the Supreme Court act? Isaac Amit, its president, is a fighter, and the three-justice panel hearing the Bar case is weighted toward liberal justices more likely to rule against the state. On the other hand, Netanyahu, Levin, and others in the government have invested time and resources into discrediting the court. They claim that far from being neutral arbiters, the court is politically motivated and has no right to stand in judgment of them. Levin opposed Amit’s appointment as court president in January and has been boycotting him since then.

Ordinarily, a Supreme Court ruling would prevail no matter how distasteful it is to the government. But this government may well choose to defy it. After the court issued its temporary injunction freezing Bar’s dismissal, some ministers explicitly threatened to defy any court order. They may cow the court into compromise or non-interference.

If so, the balance of power between the two branches of government could be determined by the Israeli street. If the polls are correct, the public doesn’t buy the “deep state” argument. They show that the court is far more trusted than the government itself. Since last Friday, anti-government protests have grown, with more than 100,000 people gathering around the country over the last weekend to oppose Bar’s dismissal.

But the protests will have to grow a lot more and continue on a sustained basis for weeks, or even months, to have an effect. It is by no means certain that they will. The renewed war in Gaza, the return of far-right political leader Itamar Ben-Gvir to the government this month, and his heavy-handed use of the police to quell protests may discourage masses of people from coming out time after time as they did in 2023. After months of war and political crises, many Israelis may be tired of protesting. Netanyahu is counting on that.

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