Naval News provides an overview of a new set of Chinese amphibious bridging designs with ominous significance for a notional PLA-invasion of Taiwan.
Satellite and ground imagery shared on social media recently revealed an intriguing system of Chinese amphibious bridging barges. The design likely aims at facilitating a large scale amphibious operation aimed at a Taiwan-contingency. Naval News in this analysis will provide an overview on the characteristics of these designs and outline their notional application.
Naval News in a notable first reported on the production of these distinct barges in early January. In a follow-up, naval analyst and former USN submariner Tom Shugarth provided additional detail on the nature of the designs. The builder of the barges in question is CSSC Offshore & Marine Engineering Company (COMEC) in Guangzhou, southern China. The company is frequently referred to by its former name, Guangzhou Shipyard International (GSI), including here on Naval News. COMEC is an established provider to the Chinese Navy (PLAN). The yard**produces naval designs** such as replenishment oilers, hospital ships and submarine support vessels. COMEC in recent years has diversified into building innovative new systems such as a aviation platform for drones and helicopters.
Chinese jack-up barges on the beach at Nansan Island, off Zhanjiang. Note different sets of legs, reduced draft on first barge, extendable platforms on structures left and centre. Image via Sinodefenceforum, originally Chinese social media.
Presently COMEC appears to have produced four distinct designs tied to the Chinese amphibious bridging system. Three of these are relevant for operational use by PLAN, with the fourth possibly representing a prototype or developmental design. All three designs relevant to this article in the most basic sense can be characterised as “jack-up-barges”. The term refers to self-elevating marine platforms using a set of legs to stand on the seabed. This design intends to provide a stable platform for high-load transfers and operations above the waterline. Jack-up rigs experience significant proliferation in the commercial offshore industry, particularly for resource extraction, such as drilling for oil and gas.
Jack-up rigs require transport by specialised vessels, under tow, or move to an area of operations under their own power. The Chinese designs discussed here appear to be self-propelled. Therefore, despite termed “barges”, they are more accurately seagoing vessels capable of transiting across significant distances unassisted. This aspect carries importance for a notional invasion of the Taiwanese main.
Radar imagery via Sentinel/Copernicus showing arrival of the barges February 27 and deployed March 4.
Three of the four designs next appeared at a beach on Nansan Island, off Zhanjiang, in imagery shared on “X”, formerly Twitter, and other social media from March 14. Zhanjiang is well over 200 nautical miles east of Guangzhou, where the barges originated. Whether the three Chinese amphibious bridging units made the journey under their own power, under tow or via transport by heavylift vessel is unclear. Nansan Island also houses a dedicated facility for PLAN amphibious units, notably Zubr-class and Type 726 LCAC. The three barges arrived around February 27 and remained in place until March 22. During that time the**PLA had conducted tests** involving at least two civilian Ro/ro-ferries connecting to the platforms. By March 23 all barges appear to have departed the area according to radar imagery via Sentinel.
Key characteristics of operational designs
As noted in analsysis**such as by Sal Mercogliano**, the designs in question distinguish themselves through a number of features. This includes length, number of legs connecting them to the seabed and elements enabling the berthing of cargo ships. The first variant, termed Type 2 by Tom Shugarth, is the most compact design featuring four legs. A newer report by Tom Shugart and J. Michael Dahm via CMSI also refers to this design as “Shuiqiao 110”, in reference to an article by Andrew Erickson on March 13. “Shuiqiao” (水桥) means “water bridge”, with the number referring to its length in metres. The design measures 38 metres in beam, with a 140 metre-extendable ramp. Primary use for Type 2 is as a direct connector of the bridging system to the shore. Type 2 features shorter legs for shallow waters, no extended platforms enabling the berthing of ferries, and possibly waterjet propulsion.
All of these traits combined suggest Type 2 would see use as bridgehead in very shallow waters. The design appears to have limited or no capability facilitating transfer of materiel from transport ships by itself.
Variant I, or Type 2 according to Tom Shugart’s count, at the beach on Nansan. This design appears optimised to serve as bridge-head, with no organic capability to land material by ships, requiring external bridging or platforms extending onto the stern. Image via Sinodefenceforum, originally Chinese social media.
The next variant is the design termed by Shugarth the “Type 1” or “Shuiqiao 135”. Shugarth**measures this vessel** at 135 metres long, 35 metres wide, with the same 140 metre-ramp. Unlike the smaller design, “Shuiqiao 135” notably features two extending platforms port and starboard. These platforms enable berthing of Ro/ro-ferries unloading materiel from either side. Accommodating the increased length, Type 1 features six instead of four legs. Notably this design features longer, sturdier legs, suggesting a requirement to operate in deeper waters or further from shore. Furthermore the Type 1 appears to have propellers and rudders fitted, again suggesting an optimisation for operation at increased draft.
Satellite image of the second variant, termed Type 1 by Shugart on “X”. Screenshot used with permission.
The final variant is the Type 3, or “Shuiqiao 185”. Tom Shugarth measures this design at 185 metres long, and 36 metres wide, with the same 140 metre-long ramp once again. The minor differences in beam may in fact be caused by inaccuracies of the satellite imagery in question. Naval News considers the possibility that all three designs are in fact of the same width, but this remains to be confirmed. Either way Type 3 similarly to Type 1 appears to feature propellers and rudders for operation in deeper waters. Unlike Type 1 the Type 3 also includes an extendable platform at its stern, in addition to one foldable extender on its starboard side. Again, accommodating the increase in length, Type 3 also features eight legs, instead of four or six on the other two designs.
These traits suggest Type 3 is the terminal element of any combination with the other platforms discussed here. Type 3 would likely facilitate disembarkation from the largest Ro/ro-vessels furthest from shore.
The variant/Type III-design in a close-up, moving under its own power. Bow on the right, extendable platforms at stern and starboard. Image via Sinodefenceforum, originally Chinese social media.
The observations discussed above suggest the Chinese amphibious briding design allows a range of notional operations. Several Type 1 or Type 2-platforms could conceivably combine to provide flexible disembarkation of materiel depending on the exact conditions of the shore in question. Type 2/Shuiqiao 110 is distinct in serving exclusively as access point to the beach, while likely unable to berth transport ships itself. Meanwhile the Type 3 vessel would serve as the terminal element towards the sea of any bridging combination. Both the Type 1 and Type 3 elements are notionally capable of landing materiel onto a suitable shore without using the Type 2-element courtesy of their own 140 metre-long ramps.
Bridges unlikely to be used in initial assault
In terms of actual operations the Chinese amphibious bridging elements enable rapid disembarkation of large amounts of material in the second stage of landing operation. One misconception, propelling discussions over the survivability of these barges, focuses on their use in the initial landing of an amphibious force.
Based on etablished PLA practice however amphibious assault ships, landing platforms and tank landing ships would likely conduct an initial landing allowing follow-up operations. Both LHDs and LPDs are capable of disembarking amphibious assault vehicles directly into the water. Alternatively these dedicated vessels move materiel to the beach via landing boats (LCU), amphibious hovercraft (LCAC) and conduct airborne operations. LSTs could either disembark suitable vehicles into the water or beach themselves, delivering non-amphibious vehicles such as main battle tanks or other materiel. China has also evaluated the use of Ro/Ro ferries**delivering amphibious assault vehicles directly into the water** in support of first stage-landing operations.
PLAN Type 075 LHD and Type 071 LPD provide capability for direct amphibious assaults against opponent-held landing areas.
The pertinent point is that an initial stage of landings conducted by LHDs, LPDs, LSTs and supported by naval and aviation support would shape the conditions under which the modular bridging systems would then deploy to deliver follow-on forces. The materiel delivered by Ro/Ro-ferries through the bridging system could range from engineering vehicles over regular combat vehicles including MBTs, IFVs, and land-based air defence materiel, to logistics support elements such as tracked and wheeled transport and supply vehicles.
Military compared to disaster relief relevance
One suggestion regarding the Chinese amphibious bridging system has focused on their non-military, humanitarian and disaster relief-role. Naval News considers such a motivation implausible as principal motivation for such a capability. The bridging-elements as observed distinguish themselves by high mobility, high materiel throughput and flexible application accommodating a range of shore conditions. No requirement in recent history compels relevance of such a bespoke design for purely civilian applications including disaster relief. In fact, existing amphibious and logistics capabilities of PLAN are more suitable and have previously appeared in typical relief-centered operations.
This aspect contrasts with the notional requirements for conducting a large scale military operation against a well defended and physically expansive opbjective such as the Taiwanese main, where time-sensitive delivery of large amounts of materiel is of supreme importance. A highly mobile and flexible bridging system would complicate tactical calculations for the defending party responsible to secure key points along the coast.
Historical context
A frequent point of discussion is the comparison of the Chinese amphibious barges to t**he Mulberry harbour-system** of WW2. The Chinese military has closely studied historical precedent of amphibious operations abroad. Despite now dating back seven decades, the Allied invasions of Sicily and Normandy remain relevant reference points for certain logistical requirements of large scale amhibious assaults. There are nevertheless nuances compared to the Normandy-effort. The new barge system combines modern industrial and marine offshore operational practices, resulting in a significant evolution of previous efforts creating ad-hoc deep water ports. Fewer key structures with increased mobility may facilitate more dynamic operations. Subject to exact characteristics of the barges the Chinese approach may also provide increased resilience to adverse weather conditions. However, additional breakwater installations may still be required depending on the sea state to enable unloading from berthing sealift vessels.
PLA in previous years conducted tests deliverying military vehicles from civilian ferries via commercial jack-up systems and lenghty pontoon bridges. Image via “X”, originally Chinese state media.
Conclusion
The present stage of Chinese amphibious bridging efforts represents the result of many years of previous experimentation. Earlier operations included disembarkation from ferries onto more basic raft assemblies. Notably some of these activities included civilian jack-up rigs acting as connector to the ship for berthing. The new bridging elements may illustrate that those efforts identified potential for improvement or expansion of capabilities. Obvious shortcomings of the earlier arrangement include a more time consuming setup-process and higher susceptibility to bad weather conditions. The new designs tackle these problems, representing a significant qualitative improvement.
Past activities and the present development illustrate how the PLA is actively pursuing innovative solutions enabling a flexible capability in support of a large scale amphibious operation squarely aimed at a Taiwanese contingency.