The Philippines made history by handing over former president Rodrigo Duterte this month to the International Criminal Court (ICC) on charges of crimes against humanity. In many ways, the move has been both surprising as well as ironic, since it has taken place under the watch of the namesake son of former Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos, who oversaw massive human rights violations during his decades-long reign in the late 20th century.
Though no longer a member of the ICC, thanks to Duterte’s unilateral withdrawal from the body in 2018, the Philippine government justified its move as part of its “obligation” to abide by relevant instruments of international law. Consequently, Duterte has become the first-ever former Asian head of state to face trial by the ICC.
This is not the first international law achievement by the Philippines. Almost a decade ago, the Philippines sought to preserve its sovereign rights in the South China Sea by taking Beijing to another court at The Hague under the aegis of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
It is true that the Marcos Jr administration’s ICC decision also served its political interest amid escalating tensions with the Duterte dynasty in the past year. But it also underscores the Philippines’ emergence as an anchor of a rules-based order in the region – and a vital partner for other flagship democracies in Asia and Europe. Lest we forget, the Southeast Asian nation is also the only member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to have consistently supported Ukraine against Russian aggression in the United Nations General Assembly as well as the only regional state to have openly stood up and resisted China’s bullying behaviour in adjacent waters in recent years.
Amid rising doubts over America’s commitment to a rules-based international order, and the troubling revisionism of rising eastern powers such as China and Russia, the Philippines is actively pursuing closer cooperation with like-minded powers to both protect its strategic autonomy as well as resist the worst instincts of competing superpowers. The upshot is intensifying “middle power” cooperation between Manila and fellow democratic maritime powers of Japan, Australia, India and Europe.
Warships from Australia, Japan, the Philippines and the United States during a joint exercise in February (Iggy Roberts/Defence Department)
Warships from Australia, Japan, the Philippines and the United States during a joint exercise in February (Iggy Roberts/Defence Department)
More than ever, the Philippines is committed to a “multi-aligned” strategy that reduces its dependence on America as well as actively promotes a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. Accordingly, the Philippines and other major maritime democracies should bargain together to check Trump’s excesses as well as effectively resist hegemonic ambitions of revisionist powers.
Barely months into office, the Trump administration has made clear its contempt for traditional allies as well as the rules-based international order. The public berating of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the Oval Office, and constant refusal to provide any “security guarantees” against future Russian aggression, not only alienated much of Europe but also struck a raw nerve among Asian allies.
In theory, frontline Asian allies such as the Philippines are in a relatively privileged position. The Trump administration has exempted the Southeast Asian nation from ongoing aid suspensions, and a multi-billion-dollar bipartisan defence package to the Armed Forces of the Philippines is widely expected to go into effect in coming years. Nevertheless, senior Filipino officials have publicly warned against overreliance on America. No less than the country’s ambassador to Washington, a first cousin of Marcos Jr, who also served as Manila’s envoy during Trump’s first term, publicly cautioned: “It may be some other [US] president [than Trump] in the future. But at the end of the day, each country now has to be ready to be able to beef up its defence, beef up its economic security.”
US allies, whether in Europe or in Asia, will have to seek a seat at the table, otherwise they may end up on the menu of any prospective grand bargain among the superpowers.
The ascendance of neo-isolationists, who have publicly espoused for “grand bargains” with China and Russia at the expense of frontline allies, in key Pentagon positions has also alarmed the Philippines.
The Southeast Asian nation, now the region’s fastest growing economy, is heavily investing in modernising its largely decrepit armed forces following decades of domestic insurgency and chronic corruption. It’s also seeking advanced missile systems, including America’s much-vaunted Typhon Mid-Range Capability missile system, which it’s currently co-operating under the Philippine-US Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement. Manila is also mulling purchase of advanced fighter jets, warships, and even submarines under its third horizon military modernisation program.
Given China’s immense military capabilities, including the world’s largest naval forces, the Philippines is in no position to singularly resist China. Accordingly, it’s not only maximising whatever empathy it may currently enjoy among top Trump officials, such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio, but it’s also exploring closer defence ties with middle powers such as Japan, which last year finalised a Reciprocal Access Agreement with Manila. Other like-minded nations, such as Canada, New Zealand and France, could follow suit.
As this year’s keynote speaker at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, French President Emmanuel Macron is widely expected to double down on burgeoning defence ties with new and emerging regional partners, including the Philippines. Manila will also be hosting more than a dozen middle powers for a special conference weeks ahead of Macron’s regional visit. The upshot is a historic opportunity for US allies to enhance “minilateral” cooperation against revisionist powers as well as collectively pressure the Trump administration and bargain for a more equitable and predictable relationship with America. In this new age of disruption, US allies, whether in Europe or in Asia, will have to seek a seat at the table, otherwise they may end up on the menu of any prospective grand bargain among the superpowers.